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Abstract 
 
In the past two decades, changes in American housing policy have transformed the landscape of 
high-rise ghetto poverty. In its place, has emerged what I call the horizontal ghetto, where high-
rise public housing has been demolished and poverty is turned on its side, spreading across the 
cityscape. Researchers are now beginning to document the reconcentration of voucher holders in 
moderately poor neighborhoods. This dissertation examines how residents come to live in this 
type of neighborhood, and how this new context shapes social organization for those who reside 
within it. I examine a case study neighborhood in Northwest Baltimore called Park Heights, in 
which I conducted 15 months of ethnographic fieldwork and 102 in-depth interviews. This 
neighborhood has a large population of working class black families who settled there in the late 
1960’s, a recent influx of Housing Choice Voucher holders, and also a population of residentially 
unstable unassisted renters. I examine two complementary explanations for how and why 
voucher holders end up in neighborhoods like Park Heights. I propose that the landlord is an 
important piece of the puzzle; landlord practices sort the most disadvantaged voucher holders 
into some of the most disadvantaged neighborhoods, serving as a mechanism in the reproduction 
of spatial inequality and the concentration of poverty. I also consider how residents’ experiences 
in contexts like Park Heights shape their decisions to remain in, and move to similar 
neighborhoods. Finally, I examine how the neighborhood context shapes social organization, and 
I argue that although poverty may be more moderate than in neighborhoods dominated by large-
scale public housing, the horizontal context of instability and clustered voucher use may have 
deleterious consequences for social relations.  
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Introduction 
 
In the past two decades, changes in American housing policy have transformed the 
landscape of high-rise ghetto poverty. The dissolution of large-scale public housing across the 
country, and especially in cities such as Baltimore, has resulted in great social turmoil and the 
displacement of the city’s poorest and most vulnerable populations. This dissertation considers 
the ways in which the housing landscape shapes outcomes for urban populations in the wake of 
public housing, and engages fundamental questions of urban sociology such as why and how 
poverty concentrates spatially, how the built environment and the unequal distribution of 
resources shape and constrain the residential decisions of the urban poor, and how families adapt 
in contexts of urban scarcity, violence, and instability.  
The Chicago School’s tradition of urban sociology has long posited that place is a 
defining element of social life, structuring social relations and shaping outcomes on a local level 
(Park & Burgess 1925; Wirth 1928; Zorbaugh 1929). Housing policy is a central mechanism 
through which place shapes the social, racial, and economic landscape of concentrated 
disadvantage in urban areas (Massey & Denton 1993). The housing projects built in the 1950s 
and 60s, largely built in poor and minority neighborhoods reinforced the legacy of racial 
segregation across the country. In 1987, Wilson’s seminal work The Truly Disadvantaged 
identified the macro-economic forces of deindustrialization and the departure of the middle class 
from the inner city. This, he argued was responsible for creating a new hyper-segregated ghetto 
of poor black Americans. This group was more isolated than ever before, with important 
negative consequences that would perpetuate inequality (Wilson 1987). Subsequent research has 
shown concentrated poverty, social isolation, and racial segregation to be at the root of many 
urban social maladies (Brooks-Gunn et al. 1993; Mayer & Jencks 1989; Sampson et al. 1997).  
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In the 1990s, policymakers began to take note of the crumbling housing stock and the 
deleterious effects of concentrated poverty, the impact of which was thought to be especially 
acute in public housing projects in the inner city (Newman & Schnare 1997). Policymakers also 
began to recognize the role that public housing was playing in enforcing de facto segregation due 
to the geographically segregated neighborhoods in which public housing developments were 
located, and the lingering impacts of de jure segregation due to the policies that assigned housing 
based on race. Following the release of a report from the Commission on Severely Distressed 
Public Housing (HUD 1992), the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Planning (HUD) 
initiated the widespread demolition of large-scale public housing. Coupled with an increased 
reliance on housing voucher subsidies, this effort was undertaken with the expectation that as the 
poor shifted into the private housing market and exercised more autonomy over where they 
lived, poverty would deconcentrate and there would be positive outcomes for recipients of 
housing assistance. 
This transformation in policy has indeed coincided with a decrease in concentrated 
poverty for all racial and ethnic groups in the U.S. (Jargowsky 2003).1 However, researchers are 
now beginning to document the reconcentration of voucher holders in moderately poor 
neighborhoods (Galster 2005; Hartung & Henig 1997; Orr et al. 2003). Several specific 
questions arise from this transformation: First, why and how do residents end up in these post-
public housing neighborhoods? Why don’t low-income families move to better neighborhoods 
when given the opportunity to do so? How do residents experience these new neighborhoods, 
and how are social interactions shaped by this new context? In this dissertation, I examine how 
residents come to live in this type of neighborhood, the mechanisms through which 
                                                
1 Despite this, the loss of subsidized units in a neighborhood has not been found to be associated with a 
deconcentration of poverty in that area (Owens 2012). 
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neighborhood effects operate in a post-public housing context to shape social relations, and how 
this context shapes future housing decisions. 
I examine a case study neighborhood in Northwest Baltimore called Park Heights,2 
characterized by higher than average voucher use, moderate poverty, and residential instability. 
In Chapter 1, I discuss the history of housing assistance in this country from the fall of public 
housing to the rise of tenant-based subsidies through the Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) 
Program. I also discuss sociological theories of concentrated poverty, social isolation, and 
neighborhood instability, laying the groundwork to understand the changes in neighborhood 
structure that have accompanied this transformation in housing policy. In Chapter 2, I describe 
the methodology of this study, which includes 15 months of ethnographic fieldwork and 102 in-
depth interviews. In Chapter 3, I describe the ecology of the neighborhood, which has a large 
population of working class black families who settled there in the late 1960’s, a recent influx of 
voucher holders, and also a population of residentially unstable unassisted renters. 
Next, I examine two complementary explanations for how and why voucher holders end 
up in neighborhoods like Park Heights. In Chapter 4, I propose that the landlord is an important 
piece of the puzzle; I argue that landlord practices result in a strategic balkanization of the rental 
housing market, sorting the most disadvantaged voucher holders into some of the most 
disadvantaged neighborhoods, serving as a mechanism in the reproduction of spatial inequality 
and the concentration of poverty. In Chapter 5, I consider how residents’ experiences in contexts 
like Park Heights shape their decisions to remain in, and move to similar neighborhoods. In 
Chapter 6, I examine how the neighborhood context shapes social organization in heterogeneous 
ways, demonstrating that although there are many formal social organizations, they do not serve 
to socially integrate different residential groups.  
                                                
2 Names, streets, and places are changed to protect the identity of participants. 
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In the conclusion, I draw on findings regarding supply-side sorting by landlords and self-
sorting by residents themselves to understand how voucher holders come to live in 
neighborhoods of moderate poverty and residential instability. Finally, I argue that although 
high-rise public housing developments have largely been dismantled, in their place has emerged 
what I call the horizontal ghetto – the concentration of housing voucher holders in moderately 
poor neighborhoods with high rates of residential instability. I argue that although poverty may 
be more moderate than in neighborhoods dominated by large-scale public housing, the horizontal 
context of instability and clustered voucher use may have deleterious consequences for social 
relations.  
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Chapter 1: Housing Policy, Concentrated Poverty, and Neighborhood Effects 
 
Public Housing and the “Second Ghetto” 
The high-rise public housing built across the country in the 1950s and 60s was meant to 
replace the hazardous tenement “slums” that housed much of the poor at the time. New buildings 
with running water, heat, and modern amenities such as washing machines were part of a new 
approach to provide the poor with safe and efficient homes. The complexes were meant to 
provide temporary housing to those in need. However, even in the early years before the 
development of notorious mismanagement issues and widespread physical disrepair, there were 
signs of trouble. 
The majority of public housing units were constructed in neighborhoods that were 
already predominantly black (Hirsch 1983), and in many cases, deliberately so (Bickford & 
Massey 1991). Segregation was reinforced and perpetuated through discriminatory lending 
practices and redlining, where entire neighborhoods were excluded from investment by the 
Federal Housing Authority (FHA) (Vicino 2008). These practices served simultaneously to keep 
black Americans in poor segregated neighborhoods, while also aiding the departure of middle-
class whites to the suburbs (Jackson 1985; Massey & Denton 1993). Thus, the “second ghetto” 
was created (Hirsch 1983). 
In 1968 the Kerner Commission warned: “our nation is moving toward two societies, one 
black, one white—separate and unequal” (United States 1968). The commission’s report 
implicated federal housing policy as complicit in the creation and maintenance of the ghetto. It is 
now widely accepted that the presence of housing projects in predominantly black 
neighborhoods substantially increased the concentration of poverty in these areas in later years 
(Massey & Kanaiaupuni 1993). Furthermore, despite the passage of the Fair Housing Act in 
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1968, many local Public Housing Authorities (PHAs) continued to maintain separate rosters for 
black and white public housing recipients until well into the 1980s. 
This de jure segregation led to several important fair housing lawsuits over the years: 
including Chicago’s famous Gautreaux case in 1976, and the Walker case in Dallas in 1985. In 
Baltimore, a lawsuit known as Thompson v. HUD, brought by the American Civil Liberties 
Union (ACLU) against the Housing Authority of Baltimore City (HABC) and HUD, alleged that 
these housing agencies had failed to desegregate the public housing system, in violation of the 
Fair Housing Act (1968).3  
 In addition to perpetuating racial segregation, several specific features of public housing 
contributed to a new context of concentrated poverty (Vale 2000). The Brooke Amendment, 
passed by Congress in 1969, mandated that families would pay a proportion of their income in 
rent, rather than a fixed sum.4 Economists have argued that the adaptive payment standard 
affected employment behavior and family structure in unintended ways. The more a family 
earns, the higher the rent. Therefore, families have perverse economic incentives to keep a 
working husband or father from living in the unit, or to work in the informal market rather than 
reporting formal wages (Edin & Lein 1997). Further, though preference was originally given to 
working families who were likely to transition out of public housing relatively quickly, a 1981 
amendment to the U.S. Housing Act of 1937 gave priority to households earning below 50 
percent of the area median income in an effort to help the most needy (Jacobs et al. 1986).5 
                                                
3 For a description of the Thompson case see (Darrah & DeLuca 2014; Engdahl 2009). In 2005, a consent 
decree created the Baltimore Housing Mobility Program, which provides vouchers for families to move to 
racially and economically integrated neighborhoods in Baltimore and neighboring counties.  
4 This proportion was originally capped at 25 percent, and it has since been raised to 30 percent of net 
income, taking into account additional social service benefits. 
5 This would change again in 1998 with the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act (QHWRA) in 
an effort to deconcentrate poverty in public housing. 
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While achieving this important goal, these changes also served to concentrate the most 
disadvantaged families in federally assisted housing. 
Neighborhood poverty rates in which public housing was located were also elevated. In 
2000, a third of public housing units were located in extremely poor neighborhoods (over 40 
percent), and less than 10 percent of public housing was located in low-poverty neighborhoods, 
or those where under 10 percent of the population was poor (Schwartz 2010). The location of 
much of public housing in blighted neighborhoods meant that jobs were scarce for tenants. Rates 
of unemployment and public assistance among residents were astronomical. Families were 
structurally isolated from jobs, public services, quality schools, and adequate transportation to 
other areas of the city. In the 1990s, the sociological theories of concentrated poverty and social 
isolation (discussed later in the chapter) set the stage for a government inquiry examining the 
conditions in the nation’s dilapidated public housing structures (HUD 1992), and for an overhaul 
of federal housing assistance.  
The 1990s: Distressed Public Housing  
By the 1980s and 90s, due to mismanagement and lack of adequate funding, much public 
housing had reached a deplorable state of physical deterioration, and many spoke of its failure 
(Popkin et al. 2000). Some of the purported ‘state-of-the-art’ design elements featured in these 
buildings turned out to be urban nightmares in practice (Kotlowitz 1991). Courtyards intended to 
be recreational common space became gang territory (Newman 1995). Breezeways designed to 
allow residents airy access to the outdoors were in fact wind tunnels in Chicago’s blustery 
winters. Buildings that faced inward rather that out in order to facilitate a sense of community, 
instead walled off projects from their surroundings. To make matters worse, housing complexes 
were grossly mismanaged, with long lists of unfinished repairs, creating hazards such as lead 
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paint, cockroach and rodent infestations, unlit entryways and stairwells, and broken or “skip 
stop” elevators that stopped only on every second or third floor, requiring even elderly and 
infirm residents to use the stairs (Popkin et al. 2000; Kotlowitz 1991). There were reports of 
children falling from windows lacking safety guards in high-rise buildings.6 These problems 
were compounded in cities like Chicago where HUD withheld federal funding due to local 
mismanagement (Popkin et al. 2000). 
In 1989 Congress established the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public 
Housing, to assess the degree of ““severely distressed” public housing,7 and devise a nationwide 
strategy and plan of action. In 1992 the commission issued a report documenting the physical 
disrepair of public housing, which found that 86,000 (about 6 percent) of the 1.3 million public 
housing units nationwide were in fact “severely distressed.” The report found that more than 80 
percent of public housing residents lived in poverty, many residents earned under a fifth of their 
unsubsidized neighbors, and there was an alarming increase in the proportion of the most needy 
families in public housing over the previous decade (HUD 1992). 
This new recognition of deteriorating housing quality and increased understanding of the 
perils of concentrated poverty spurred a dramatic change in housing policy. The commission 
recommended a comprehensive plan to unfold over the next decade, with two main components 
aimed to promote the deconcentration of poverty. First, it entailed the demolition and 
redevelopment of large public housing complexes and their replacement with mixed income 
developments, and second, the use of housing vouchers to provide families access to new and 
better neighborhoods (Khadduri 2001).  
                                                
6 See (Popkin et al. 2000) for discussion of the Eric Morse case. 
7 “Severe distress” was defined by four factors: 1) physical disrepair of the buildings, 2) impediments to 
management such as high vacancy and turnover, 2) high crime rates, and 4) family distress, such as high 
unemployment, low-incomes, low educational attainment. 
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The first component would be accomplished through a 5 billion dollar redevelopment 
program called HOPE VI, or “Housing Opportunities for People Everywhere,” launched in 1992. 
The program’s objectives were to demolish, rehabilitate, or replace severely distressed housing 
projects in order to improve living conditions for residents and lower the concentration of very-
low income families, the addition of market-rate units to create mixed-income communities, and 
the revitalization surrounding communities, making them more “sustainable” for all residents 
(Popkin et al. 2004). HOPE VI created less-poor, often safer communities, and provided better 
housing to residents (Cunningham & Popkin 2004). However these new neighborhoods were 
built to house mixed-income communities, and thus provided only enough units for a fraction of 
the original residents to return. It is estimated that about 30 percent of tenants in HOPE VI 
projects have moved back across the U.S (Popkin 2010). Many residents who were left without 
homes due to demolition received vouchers for use in the private housing market.  
The second part of the plan, separate from HOPE VI, entailed expanding the voucher 
program more generally. The idea was that these “tenant-based” housing vouchers (in that they 
are attached to the tenant, rather than the unit, and therefore geographically portable) would, in 
theory, aid in the deconcentration of poverty by allowing tenants the opportunity to access better 
neighborhoods.  
Over the past two decades, the federal government has closed many large public housing 
developments across the country in its quest to combat concentrated poverty. Since the 1990s, 
over 250,000 out of the 1.4 million units of public housing that existed at the height of public 
housing in the mid 1990s have been demolished (Schwartz 2010). Of course, public housing still 
exists; there are now approximately 1.2 million households living in public housing units (CBPP 
2013). However, housing assistance is increasingly reliant on a tenant-based system. Indeed, 
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from 1993 to 2007 the number of voucher holders rose from 1.2 million to 1.97 million (Turner 
& Kingsley 2008). By the end of the 1990s, vouchers would become the largest housing 
assistance program in the country (Pendall 2000).  
Housing Vouchers 
The voucher program was created well before it came to prominence as an alternative to 
public housing in the nineties. The Section 8 Certificate Program was created under the Housing 
Act of 1974. In the early years of the program, politicians and researchers touted it as an 
economically efficient way to provide housing aid (Lowry 1971). Economic evaluations of 
voucher experiments showed that public funding would be more efficiently used by giving the 
poor money to find housing in the open market than by rebuilding existing housing stock 
(Khadduri & Struyk 1982, p.198). Economic theory argued that voucher holders value each 
subsidized dollar slightly higher than they would value the same dollar in public housing. 
Though the value placed on a voucher is slightly lower than the value of housing independently 
acquired in the market, these “losses” were weighed against the advantages of aiding a large 
number of needy families in a manner that was acceptable to taxpayers (Khadduri & Struyk 
1982). 
Henry Cisneros, the secretary of HUD under the first Clinton administration from 1993-
1997, identified “the concentration of very low-income families in dense, high rise housing” as 
the central problem with public housing (Zhang & Weismann 2006). He is known for 
championing the revitalization of public housing through redevelopment. Cisneros also proposed 
the conversion of all public housing operating subsidies into tenant-based vouchers, though after 
pessimistic projections from a case study in Baltimore he backed down from this extreme 
solution (HUD PD&R 1996). Nevertheless, his proposed reforms would, in his words, “end 
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public housing as we know it” (Zhang & Weismann 2006). Furthermore, Cisneros advocated for 
an overhaul of federal housing assistance that would make local PHAs “learn to operate under 
market discipline” (Cisneros 1995). 
In 1998, “Section 8,” as it came to be known, would be renamed the Housing Voucher 
Choice Program (HCVP). This moniker reflected a new attitude about the purpose of the 
program and the new importance of geographic opportunity through residential choice. Choice 
was seen as a way to achieve better outcomes; it was thought that given the choice, families 
would select a neighborhood environment with lower poverty concentration (Briggs 2005).8 
Given this, policymakers have increasingly come to view vouchers as a means to achieve 
geographic integration (Freeman 2011; Newman & Schnare 1997; McClure 2010; Goering 
2005). The HCVP has been expanded in recent years and now serves 2.2 million low income 
households nationwide, and over 5 million individuals (HUD 2011; CBPP 2013).9 Between 1993 
and 2004, vouchers rose from 34 percent to 40 percent of all HUD assisted households (Schwartz 
2010). 
The voucher makes up the difference between what a needy household can afford and the 
cost of a unit in the private market. The price of the unit is set at a maximum of Fair Market Rent 
(FMR), which is defined as the 40th percentile of area median rent, adjusted for bedroom size 
                                                
8 While the deconcentration of poverty in and of itself is not an explicit, comprehensive goal of the 
HCVP, the consent decrees related to public housing lawsuits do have neighborhood poverty level 
requirements, e.g. Gautreaux in Chicago, the Thompson Program in Baltimore (see Darrah & DeLuca 
2014 for a discussion of this case), and the Walker program in Dallas. See (Popkin et al. 2003) for more 
on these cases. Furthermore, an emphasis on helping families attain low-poverty neighborhoods and a 
desire to demonstrate that an increasing proportion of HCVP households are moving to low-poverty 
census tracts is reflected in various HUD documents (HUD 2001; Wang et al. 2008). 
9 Though only one in four eligible families receives housing aid, HUD’s programs nevertheless reach a 
non-trivial portion of the poor (Turner & Kingsley 2008).  
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(Schwartz 2010).10 Families earning up to 80 percent of the area median income qualify, and are 
responsible for paying 30 percent of their adjusted household income in rent. Since the Quality 
Housing and Work Responsibility Act (QHWRA) in 1998, if a voucher holder chooses to live in 
a more expensive unit they must independently pay for rent beyond the FMR, though this cannot 
exceed 40 percent of the resident’s income (Schwartz 2010). The voucher covers the remaining 
portion of rent, and is paid directly to the landlord by the government.  
This allows voucher holders access to a wide range of neighborhoods, including many 
low-poverty, resource-rich neighborhoods. One goal of the program is to relieve poverty 
concentration. Yet even though a voucher can be used in any neighborhood with an affordable 
unit, voucher holders tend to concentrate in neighborhoods with moderate to high poverty rates. 
Equally troubling is the fact that in many cities across the country poor minority voucher 
recipients are segregated in poor minority neighborhoods, thus perpetuating racial as well as 
economic segregation (Devine 2003).  
Poverty Deconcentration and Housing Voucher Locational Outcomes  
There is important evidence of deconcentration of the poor in the 1990s. During this 
decade, there was an overall decrease in concentrated poverty for all racial and ethnic groups in 
the U.S. The number of people living in high-poverty neighborhoods (above 40 percent) declined 
by 24 percent in the 1990s, a dramatic departure from the doubling of people in concentrated 
poverty that had occurred in the preceding twenty years (Jargowsky 2003). During the same 
period, there was also an increase in the proportion of low-income neighborhoods that 
experienced gains in economic status. Changes in housing policy have been posited as part of the 
                                                
10 There are two important stipulations: 1) the QHWRA allows housing authorities to set payment 
standards between 90 and 120 percent of FMR under certain circumstances, 2) The FMR was raised to the 
50th percentile in the 39 most expensive housing markets in the country in 2001 (Schwartz 2010). 
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explanation for these changes (Jargowsky 2003; Ellen & O’Regan 2008; Kingsley & Pettit 
2003), although the loss of subsidized units in a neighborhood has not been found to be 
associated with a deconcentration of poverty in that area (Owens 2012). 
Though it is not clear to what extent changes in housing policy are causally related to a 
deconcentration of poverty, it is clear that subsided housing is less concentrated in poor areas 
than it used to be. Assisted housing in general, and housing vouchers in particular, are located in 
the vast majority of census tracts across the nation. Today there are vouchers in about 85 percent 
of census tracts across the country, compared to 1977 when vouchers were located in only 10 
percent of tracts (Devine 2003; Owens 2012). However, the HCV program takes advantage of 
only 6 percent of all affordable rental housing in the largest fifty Metropolitan Statistical Areas  
(Devine 2003). 
Results analyzing the locational attainment of voucher holders are mixed. On the one 
hand, voucher holders today are less likely to live in high-poverty neighborhoods (over 30 
percent poor) than they were at the beginning of the program in the 1970s (Turner 1998; Devine 
2003; McClure 2008; Schwartz 2010). Voucher holders are also less likely to live in extremely 
poor neighborhoods (over 40 percent poor) than are their low-income counterparts without 
housing assistance, as well as compared to residents of public housing (Newman & Schnare 
1997; Pendall 2000; Turner 1998). However, even though the majority of HCV families do not 
live in high-poverty neighborhoods (those above 30 percent poor), there are important racial 
differences in locational outcomes. Black voucher holders are much more likely to reside in 
distressed neighborhoods than white voucher holders (Pendall 2000). About a quarter of both 
black and Hispanic families live in high poverty neighborhoods, as compared to only 8 percent 
of white families. Further, across all groups, voucher holders are not as like likely to end up in 
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“opportunity” areas as some might have hoped or anticipated (Newman & Schnare 1997). In 
2000 almost 40 percent of voucher holders lived in areas with 20 percent poverty or more 
(Schwartz 2010). Another way to think about this is that only a small share of voucher holders 
have been successful in using their vouchers in low-poverty areas. A mere 26 percent of HCV 
holders reside in census tracts with less than 10 percent poverty; and only 17 percent of blacks 
and 19 percent of Hispanics (McClure 2008). White voucher holder families are about twice as 
likely as black and Hispanic families to live in low-poverty neighborhoods. (Devine 2003, p.18). 
There is substantial evidence that voucher holders have begun to cluster in moderately-
poor, segregated neighborhoods (Devine 2003; Galster 2005; Hartung & Henig 1997). In 20 
percent of neighborhoods with any affordable housing, voucher holders are over-represented 
(Turner et al. 1999). A study of eight metropolitan areas between 2000 and 2005 finds that the 
proportions of HCVP recipients living in the central city increased in five out of the eight areas, 
including Baltimore (Wang et al. 2008). There is no evidence that HCV clustering is declining 
overall, though there are variations by metropolitan area; concentration within hot spots11 is 
declining in Chicago, but rising in Baltimore (Wang et al. 2008). In Baltimore, 93 percent of the 
census block groups identified as hotspots were “emerging,” meaning that they appeared in 2005 
in places where they did not exist in 2000. This finding suggests that voucher clustering in 
Baltimore is on the rise. 
While there are various ways to calculate clustering, one standard is as vouchers out of all 
occupied housing. By this definition, the vouchers make up less than 2 percent of the occupied 
housing stock in the nation’s fifty largest MSAs (Devine 2003). And in almost 90 percent of all 
neighborhoods with HCV units, the program represents less than 5 percent of the occupied 
                                                
11 Wang et al use the concentration within certain areas or “hot spots” to think about HCV clustering. 
These hot spots are defined as raster cells with an HCV density greater than half of the highest HCV 
density in the metropolitan area in 2000 (Wang et al. 2008). 
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housing stock (Ibid). The HCV program utilizes over 10 percent of the occupied stock in very 
few areas, only 10 percent, and it uses 25 percent or more of the occupied stock in an even 
smaller proportion, less than 1 percent (Devine 2003). By this definition, I calculate that 
Baltimore has a citywide average of 5 percent (HUD 2009, ACS 2010), over twice the average 
for other large MSAs, and one of the highest rates for large cities in the country (Devine 2003; 
Owens 2012). In summary, though not every neighborhood has affordable options, recent 
research clearly demonstrates that black voucher holders are realizing far less locational 
attainment than their vouchers would, in theory, allow them to afford. This raises an important 
puzzle that I will address in the coming chapters.  
Coupled with the economic growth of the 1990s, changes in housing policy including 
efforts at creating mixed income housing and an increased reliance on the private market may 
have contributed to the decline in concentrated poverty and the number of “high” poverty 
neighborhoods (Ellen & O’Regan 2008; Jargowsky 2003; Kingsley & Pettit 2003). However, 
while the number of neighborhoods with poverty rates above 40 percent declined during the 
1990s, the proportion of neighborhoods with poverty rates of moderate poverty (above 20 
percent) increased (Galster 2005). Galster reviews the empirical literature, finding a suggestion 
that there is a threshold effect below which poor neighbors do not affect an individual until they 
reach between 5 and 20 percent of the neighborhood population (Galster 2005). This means that 
as long as the median poverty level is below the threshold, a city where every neighborhood is at 
the median is better off than a city where all the poor are concentrated in “high” poverty areas. 
However, as some of the poor spread out into low poverty areas, and there are more 
neighborhoods of with “moderate” poverty, this city may be worse off, if these neighborhoods 
are above the threshold (2005). In other words, the moderate deconcentration of poverty that has 
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followed changes in housing policy in the past twenty years may present new and different social 
contexts that raise the “incidence of social problems” (Galster 2005, p.120). Galster is making an 
argument based on a theoretical model, but his evidence is strong and provides an imperative to 
study these neighborhoods on the ground. 
Neighborhood Effects and Theories of Concentrated Poverty 
Scholars of the city have long argued that the geographic unit of the neighborhood and 
everything that it encompasses – housing structures and the built environment, social networks, 
the spatial distribution of resources such as schools, job opportunities, and transportation – have 
an important influence on life outcomes above and beyond individual characteristics (Park & 
Burgess 1925; Sampson et al. 2002; Wilson 1987). In his seminal work, The Truly 
Disadvantaged, Wilson argued that with the decline in manufacturing and the departure of the 
black middle class from America’s inner city, the urban ghetto was experiencing a new sort of 
social isolation, which was at the root of many of the problems associated with concentrated 
poverty. He argued that a lack of contact with members and institutions rooted in mainstream 
society has profound effects for social networks, employment opportunities, educational 
achievement, behavioral development and delinquency among adolescents, non-marital 
childbirth, and family management (Wilson 1987, 61; Wilson 2010).  
Mayer and Jencks (1989) raised an important critique of neighborhood effects literature 
in the late 1980s that also shaped the nature of future research. They made the argument that if 
neighborhoods matter, intervening processes such as collective socialization, peer-group 
influence, and institutional capacity must help explain them (1989). They criticized 
contemporary researchers' treatment of neighborhood effects as a “black-box” where 
mechanisms were unknown and compositional measures of race and poverty concentration were 
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used to predict outcomes. At the time, there were few studies that went beyond these standard 
statistical measures to these more dynamic processes. In subsequent years, Wilson’s theory of 
social isolation sparked a range of sociological research examining mechanisms through which 
neighborhoods of concentrated poverty confer deleterious effects on their residents (Brooks-
Gunn et al. 1993; Brooks-Gunn et al. 1993; Duncan et al. 1994; Leventhal & Brooks-Gunn 2000; 
Massey & Denton 1993; Mayer & Jencks 1989; Sampson et al. 1997; Sampson et al. 2002; 
Wilson 1987). 12 Sampson et al. (2002) document the subsequent decade of growth in 
neighborhood effects research, highlighting processes such as neighborhood ties, social control, 
mutual trust, institutional resources, disorder, and routine activity patterns to account for 
outcomes related to delinquency, violence, depression, and high-risk behavior. 
Studies of neighborhood effects have also been fraught with what researchers call 
selection bias, or the challenge of disentangling the effects of the neighborhood from those 
characteristics of the individual that may have led them to choose that neighborhood in the first 
place (Mayer & Jencks 1989; Sampson et al. 2002). Over the years, efforts have been made to 
better understand the effect of the neighborhood by drawing on experimental design to eliminate 
selection bias (Goering & Feins 2003; Sampson 2008; Ludwig et al. 2008). 
Neighborhood Effects and Mobility Interventions: Gautreaux and MTO 
There have been several significant mobility interventions, which shed light on what 
occurs when low-income families are offered the opportunity to live in a more beneficial 
neighborhood context, and also illuminate issues related to the use of housing vouchers that are 
relevant to this study. Researchers interested in the effect of neighborhood context have much to 
learn from these interventions.  
                                                
12 See also (Small and Newman 2001) for a thorough review of this literature. 
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One of the most notable of these mobility interventions, Gautreaux, was the result of a 
lawsuit, Gautreaux v. CHA, which was initiated in Chicago in 1966, and in 1976 went to the 
Supreme Court when HUD was introduced into the suit (Polikoff 2006). As a result of a class-
action lawsuit charging that the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) had contributed to racial 
segregation by building housing developments in predominantly African American 
neighborhoods, between the years of 1976 and 1998, the Gautreaux program moved over 7,000 
low-income families into subsidized private housing in less segregated, lower-poverty 
neighborhoods.  
Gautreaux was designed to move families to less residentially segregated neighborhoods 
(under 30% black), although this requirement was relaxed in 1981 when families were allowed 
to move to neighborhoods that were above 30% black if they were deemed “revitalizing” 
(Duncan and Zuberi 2007). Although evidence suggested favorable effects on high school 
dropout, college enrollment, employment outcomes, and mortality rates, conclusions are limited 
due to the non-experimental design (Rosenbaum et al 1995). The data must be interpreted 
carefully because there is no control group. Researchers have compared subgroups of those who 
moved, in particular, comparing those who moved to the white suburbs to those who moved 
within Chicago (Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum 2000). Subsequent research by Mendenhall, 
Deluca, and Duncan (2006) found that Rosenbaum’s work was methodologically flawed: in fact, 
with a longer-term look at the data, there were no employment, earnings, or self-sufficiency 
effects. Additionally, despite controlling for neighborhood characteristics, there is still some 
concern that there may be issues of selection bias (Duncan and Zuberi 2006). A second wave of 
Gautreaux – “Gautreaux Two” – took place in 2002. Gautreaux Two emphasized moving to 
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more affluent neighborhoods, in addition to those that were less segregated (Boyd et al 2010, 
Pashup et al. 2006). 
The Moving to Opportunity (MTO) experiment was a unique effort by researchers, 
supported by the federal government, to understand how moving to a better neighborhood can 
improve the life chances of very poor families with children. MTO was designed with lessons 
from Gautreaux in mind; Unlike Gautreaux, MTO was designed as an experiment, with random 
assignment allowing for comparison between the treatment and control groups.13 Moving was 
intended to provide families with access to communities that offered better schools, a safer 
neighborhood environment, economic opportunities, and services such as police, parks, libraries, 
sanitation. 
Quantitative results from the interim and final report evaluations of MTO were mixed 
with respect to outcomes of interest, with some important puzzles that subsequent qualitative 
research has sought to explain (Orr et al. 2003; Sanbonmatsu et al. 2011). Results suggest that 
adults in the experimental group felt safer and perceived less neighborhood disorder, and also 
experienced improved mental health as compared to those in the control group (Kling et al. 2007; 
Orr et al. 2003; Sanbonmatsu et al. 2011). Additionally, while girls benefitted from moving as 
measured by psychological wellbeing, boys showed no difference in mental health, and 
demonstrated negative outcomes in risk behavior relative to those in the control group (Clampet-
Lundquist et al. 2011; Kessler RC et al. 2014; Kling et al. 2005; Kling et al. 2007; Popkin et al. 
2010). MTO showed no statistically significant improvement in educational outcomes and only 
                                                
13 The study was conducted in five U.S. cities: Boston, Baltimore, Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York. 
Low income families from public and assisted housing who volunteered to participate were randomly 
assigned into one of three groups: The experimental group which received a voucher allowing them to 
move to a low-poverty neighborhood (defined as 10% or less); the Section 8 group which received a 
regular Section 8 voucher allowing them to move anywhere that the voucher would normally be accepted; 
and a control group who retained their housing allocation but did not receive a voucher. 
  20 
modest improvements in school quality (Orr et al. 2003; Sanbonmatsu et al. 2011).14 It is 
speculated that one reason there were no positive effects on employment, earnings, or self-
sufficiency was because many participants were unable to find a neighborhood that could 
provide the three essentials: jobs, housing, and social supports for childcare (Briggs et al. 2010). 
The survey did not detect statistically significant beneficial effects on other important adult 
outcomes such as employment or public assistance.  
What can we learn from MTO? There are several lessons that are highly relevant to 
questions of the role of racial and economic segregation and how concentrated poverty at the 
neighborhood level may shape various sociological outcomes. Though MTO is lauded as “the 
gold standard for experimental social science at the individual level,” there are some important 
qualifications regarding the conclusions that can be drawn about “neighborhood effects” from 
the experiment (Sampson 2008, p.224).  
For example, what is the role of racial segregation as compared to economic segregation? 
Questioning the viability of the treatment, some have asked: “Did MTO introduce the right 
treatment?” (Ibid, p.226), Though there were large changes in economic segregation, there were 
only modest changes in racial segregation, since MTO required families to make initial moves to 
low-poverty neighborhoods, but had no requirements regarding the racial make-up of these 
neighborhoods.15 This was especially the case in Baltimore and Chicago where families largely 
moved to majority-minority neighborhoods. 
Some have questioned whether the treatment worked (Sampson 2008). Over time, there 
was a convergence in neighborhood poverty level between the control and experimental groups. 
                                                
14 Deluca and Rosenblatt address these findings with the Baltimore and Chicago samples, and explain 
several reasons why this might be the case, including that fact that many parents kept their children in 
their old schools despite moving neighborhoods (2010). 
15 The argument is that to really test the effect of neighborhood disadvantage, race must be taken into 
account: a low-poverty black neighborhood is not the same as a low-poverty white neighborhood. 
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This was mainly due to the unanticipated dramatic reductions in the control group’s 
neighborhood poverty rate. Over the 15 years of evaluation, the control group moved out of 
initial neighborhoods more than was anticipated (some by choice, other were forced out due to 
the demolition of public housing), and their neighborhood poverty level improved on average. In 
the treatment group, the average neighborhood poverty rate improved substantially in the first 
year, but fifteen years out it not substantially different from one year after treatment. This was 
partially because the neighborhoods to which the treatment group moved declined over time. 
Given the unexpected convergence in neighborhood poverty level of the neighborhoods that the 
two groups ended up in, the treatment turned out to be weaker than expected, limiting the 
conclusions that can be drawn (2008, 211). Though some have argued that there are still 
differences in neighborhood poverty between treatment and control groups that are not 
insignificant (Ludwig et al. 2008). 
There also is a concern regarding the durability of effects. If we are interested in changes 
that may take place as a result of a transition to a new neighborhood context, early results only 
provide limited information about a new neighborhood’s ability to undo previously accumulated 
deficits. Put more simply, as Clampet-Lundquist and Massey remind us, “no mechanism takes 
effect overnight” (2008, p.129). Even if MTO cannot change these outcomes over the long-term, 
this does not necessarily imply that the previous neighborhood context bears no responsibility for 
creating them (Sampson 2008, p.226). Sampson proposes that there is a conflation inherent to 
MTO: the experimental design does not permit a full distinction between the effects of moving, 
which is an important life-course event in and of itself, and the effects of a new context 
(Sampson 2008, p.225-6). Despite these limitations, MTO provides important evidence for 
neighborhood effects; even the modest reductions in neighborhood poverty predict 
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improvements and cumulate to shape life outcomes in important ways. However, MTO is limited 
in its ability to unlock the ever-mysterious “black box” of mechanisms behind neighborhood 
effects (Sampson 2008, p.226-7).  
Reconcentration of Poverty 
Changes in housing policy over the last two decades provide an opportunity to build 
theory around the mechanisms of neighborhood effects in the contexts of moderate poverty and 
high residential instability that voucher holders are clustering in. Typically, researchers of the 
urban poor have considered neighborhoods of “concentrated” poverty, like the ones that typified 
public housing, usually delineated at 40 percent poor and higher (Jargowsky & Bane 1991). At 
the opposite end of the spectrum, neighborhoods under 10 percent poor are generally considered 
to be “low-poverty” or “non-poor,” which was the treatment neighborhood in the MTO 
experiment, and the national level of poverty at the time the experiment was conducted 
(Khadduri 2001). Neighborhoods between these two poles (20-40 percent) are increasingly 
referred to as “moderately” poor, though we know little about what this contxt may mean for 
residents (Devine 2003; Pendall 2000). 
Sociologists know much about the intricate forms of social organization that regulate 
behavior within the context of residentially stable, project-dominated neighborhoods (Anderson 
2001; Sampson 1999; Venkatesh 2000, 2006). However, in contrast to this literature on 
concentrated disadvantage and neighborhood effects, which largely treats poor neighborhoods as 
stable units, a growing body of data on the types of neighborhoods in which most former public 
housing residents are clustered in, suggests that these new neighborhoods are quite unstable, with 
high rates of residential mobility between neighborhoods with similarly disadvantaged 
characteristics (Galster 2005; Hartung & Henig 1997; Sanbonmatsu et al. 2011).  
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Researchers of urban poverty need to understand these new neighborhood types. If it is 
the case that vertical high-rise poverty was characterized by relative stability in social relations, 
while the neighborhoods voucher holders are moving to are characterized by residential 
churning, this begs the question: How are neighborhood effects transmitted within this new 
context? Below I review some of the sociological literature on instability and social organization. 
Stability, Instability, and Social Organization 
One important neighborhood-level characteristic thought to affect residents is residential 
stability, alternately theorized as residential mobility, social isolation, or “churning.” Each term 
implies a different theory for understanding the set of mechanisms affecting movement in and 
out of the neighborhood.16 Residential stability emphasizes the enduring ties that residents may 
create as a result of living in a neighborhood for a long time, while mobility emphasizes the 
ability of residents to move in and out of the neighborhood and on to better places. In contrast, 
the concept of social isolation emphasizes the inability of many residents to leave the 
neighborhood. Finally, instability or “churning” is associated with a range of adverse effects 
ranging from low educational attainment, and physical and mental health risks, to decreased 
social ties and increased crime (Sampson et al. 1999; Sampson 1985; Sampson & Sharkey 2008).  
There are two schools of thought regarding stability and social organization in 
neighborhoods. The first, the cohesiveness perspective, argues that neighborhood stability is 
good for neighborhoods and the individuals within them (Sampson 1985; Shaw and McKay 
1942). This perspective is based upon Shaw and McKay’s (1942) social disorganization theory, 
where low residential turnover increases social integration, making residents more likely to know 
                                                
16 Quantitatively, we often lack fine-grained ways of measuring whether individuals move or stay by 
choice or out of necessity; these concepts are usually measured in the same way, producing conflicting 
theoretical models. 
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one another, watch out for one another other, and share certain cultural attributes. All of this 
contributes to the development of informal social control. In contrast, neighborhoods with high 
residential turnover lead to the breakdown of informal social control, by increasing the likelihood 
that neighbors are strangers, and are therefore have more difficulty working collectively to 
enforce local social norms (Sampson 1991; Sampson et al. 1997). 
Ross et al. delineate two strands of the cohesiveness perspective, the “general” and the 
“conditional” (1999). Surprisingly, there has been little empirical research testing these 
hypotheses. The general cohesiveness hypothesis holds that residential instability in the 
neighborhood is associated with high levels of crime and victimization. In fact, Sampson (1985) 
found that residential mobility has one of the largest positive effects on violent victimization of 
any neighborhood characteristic, higher even than poverty or racial composition. The conditional 
cohesiveness hypothesis holds that there is an especially strong relationship between instability 
and crime, conditional on being in a poor neighborhood, due to the fact that poverty is thought to 
impair social organization (Ross 1999). It is also possible that in poor neighborhoods lacking 
formal protective services – for example, where the police are corrupt or simply not relied upon 
– the benefits of stability may be greater (Anderson 1992; Jencks 1992, Ross 2000). Smith and 
Jarjoura (1988) compare the effects of stability on crime in disadvantaged versus advantaged 
neighborhoods, and find evidence supporting the conditional cohesiveness hypothesis: residential 
stability is associated with less violent crime in poor neighborhoods but not in more affluent 
ones. They conclude that stability helps poor neighborhoods avoid crime. 
In contrast, the social isolation perspective holds that the most disadvantaged 
neighborhoods are those where high rates of poverty combine with high rates of stability (Wilson 
1987; Wilson 1997).  Thus, stability is seen as negative because it can mean being trapped in a 
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disadvantaged neighborhood, which leaves residents isolated from mainstream resources 
(Warner & Pierce 1993; Warner & Rountree 1997; South & Crowder 1997). South and Crowder 
find that blacks are substantially less likely than whites to escape poor tracts, and also over time 
are substantially more likely to move into them, controlling for socioeconomic status. Others 
have argued that rather than building cohesiveness, stability may build resentment and frustration 
due to the inability of the most disadvantaged to escape to a better environment (Anderson 1992; 
Jargowsky 1997). Indeed, this theory has been substantiated by findings from two empirical 
studies in Boston and Seattle, showing that the effect of poverty on crime was the greatest in 
stable neighborhoods, and that stability amplified the effect of poverty on crime because when 
people feel trapped in their neighborhoods they disinvest (Warner & Pierce 1993; Warner & 
Rountree 1997). 
Clearly, there is a difference between staying in a poor neighborhood because individuals  
have no other choice – either due to financial, informational , or housing constraints – or staying 
by choice, despite some disadvantages in the neighborhood. One way to garner more information 
in order to help resolve the contradiction implied by these two theories is to develop more fine-
tuned measures of stability. We must find a way to differentiate between voluntary and 
involuntary stability. Whether or not people have a choice in staying may have important effects 
on the way they engage with, and invest in, the neighborhood.  
Neighborhood Instability 
Notably, previous research does not empirically consider what happens in neighborhoods 
with instability, other than observing that it generally impedes social integration. Thus, many 
important questions remain. For example, is living in a poor, unstable neighborhood better or 
worse than living in a poor, stable neighborhood? Social isolation predicts that residing in a poor 
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but stable neighborhood is bad for both wellbeing and crime (Ross et al. 2000; Warner & Pierce 
1993; Warner & Rountree 1997) because of the inability to escape, but it does not predict what 
would happen in a poor and unstable neighborhood. Instability might be better for effects on 
wellbeing, and even on crime in some cases, but what about the effects on social integration and 
social control? How might neighborhood instability affect different groups in the neighborhood? 
How does residential status – individual stability – interact with neighborhood-level stability? It 
is important, too, that we understand more about the relationship between stability, social ties 
and social control in neighborhoods of moderate poverty.  
Culture and Neighborhood Effects 
In The Truly Disadvantaged, Wilson famously proposed that living in the bounded 
geographic context of the ghetto shaped life outcomes, independent of individual characteristics. 
He posited that due to the departure of manufacturing jobs from the inner cities and the out-
migration of the black middle class, increasing social isolation was the structural condition that 
gave rise to cultural adaptions and orientations perpetuating poverty. With the departure of 
middle class social institutions came the decline of social organization, contributing to the 
community’s inability to realize its collective goals and resulting in disorder and a consequent 
rise in crime (Wilson 1987, p.144).  
More recent scholarship builds on this idea that neighborhood structural conditions often 
give rise to certain cultural adaptations, but suggests that that disadvantaged neighborhoods are 
not necessarily cut off from mainstream institutions and social networks particularly in reference 
to educational aspirations, labor market outcomes, and family planning. For example, Carter 
finds no evidence for oppositional culture in schools (2005). Young finds that men who were 
most isolated from whites and had the least involvement in the labor market were the least likely 
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to feel that racism would affect their life chances, suggesting that isolation did not negatively 
affect aspirations and outcomes (Young 2004). Edin and Kefalas (2005) find that the low-income 
women they study do not have alternative aspirations for their futures. They seek the American 
dream of a family and a white picket fence, just like everyone else. But because it is less easily 
obtainable for them through conventional means, they opt for an alternative route (Edin & 
Kefalas 2005). 
Some have called for a more nuanced understanding of how neighborhood context may 
be experienced by residents, which would help researchers to account for diverging outcomes 
within the same neighborhood (Harding 2010). Small finds that “many people in poor 
neighborhoods do the opposite of what they would theoretically be expected to do” in a given set 
of structural conditions (2004, p.12). Similarly, Harding points out that despite what social 
isolation theory might predict, not all young people in the disadvantaged communities he studied 
are, for example, “getting pregnant and dropping out of school.” He argues that youth in poor 
neighborhoods have more frames and scripts for behavior at their disposal, and “neither 
“oppositional” nor “mainstream” is dominant” (Harding 2010, p.244). Thus, appropriate scripts 
for action are more “diluted,” and when one doesn’t work it is easy to take an available and 
socially supported alternative route, a process which he calls “model shifting” (Harding 2010, 
pp.242–3). This multiplicity of strategies within the same set of structural conditions points to 
the principle of effect heterogeneity: neighborhood effects may have a different direction or 
magnitude for different residents (Harding et al. 2010), which harkens back to Shaw and 
McKay’s suggestion that we must consider the substantial heterogeneity that exists within 
neighborhoods (1969).  
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Some neighborhood scholars have charged that previous research has used compositional 
measures of neighborhood characteristics as proxies for emergent cultural characteristics, 
including poverty rate, unemployment rate, welfare receipt, and the percentage of single-mother 
families as a measure of cultural norms regarding non-marital childbearing (Harding 2010). This 
practice assumes a tight connection between culture and behavior, exposure, networks and 
interactions. Many propose that researchers need to shift focus away from broad theories of 
neighborhood effects and examine the specific mechanisms, especially the cultural processes that 
create associations between neighborhood level demographics and individual outcomes (Harding 
2010, Sampson 2002). Researchers increasingly agree that in order to better understand the 
mechanisms through which neighborhoods transmit their effects, we need to think about how 
culture plays a role (Lamont & Small 2008; Small 2004; Small et al. 2010). Rather than trying to 
assess the overall effect of living in a particular type of neighborhood, researchers should strive 
to examine discrete mechanisms in ways that account for effect heterogeneity.  
Cultural processes also work to shape the neighborhood itself through processes 
including community participation, collective efficacy and social control. Sampson and Wilson 
(1995) describe community contexts as “cognitive landscapes” concerning behavioral norms. 
The concept of collective efficacy, defined as the “social cohesion among neighbors combined 
with their willingness to intervene on behalf of the common good,” suggests that “one is unlikely 
to intervene [on behalf of one’s neighbors] in a neighborhood context where the rules are unclear 
and people mistrust or fear one another” (Sampson et al. 1997; Sampson et al. 2002, p.457). 
Sampson demonstrates that neighborhoods with higher rates of collective efficacy also have 
lower rates of violent crime (Sampson et al. 1997; Sampson & Raudenbush 1999). 
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Scholars have examined the ways in which cultural processes affect outcomes including 
social organization and community engagement. For example, interpretations and framings of 
neighborhood conditions may be key mediators in predicting whether changes in neighborhood 
structural characteristics will translate into changes in social dynamics (Small 2004; Tach 2009). 
For example, Tach (2009) examines whether increasing the presence of higher income neighbors 
decreased social isolation or improved social organization in a Boston public housing project that 
was redeveloped into a HOPE VI mixed-income community. She argues that variation in 
neighborhood engagement stemmed from the frames through which residents interpreted their 
neighborhood surroundings, generated by current and past environments and reputations. She 
argues that these interpretive frames might help explain variation in resident behavior between 
different racial groups within the same neighborhood (Tach 2009). Small also links residents’ 
cultural framing of their neighborhood with subsequent heterogeneity in organizational 
involvement (Small 2004). He finds that differences in neighborhood participation in a Latino 
housing project in Boston had little to do with expressed values; rather, participation was 
strongly correlated with respondents’ framing of the history of political and social activism in the 
neighborhood (Small 2004). 
Some analysts have made the case that due to structural features of the environment, 
there was little social cohesion in high-rise public housing (Popkin et al. 2000), while others 
have highlighted community action and ingenuity even in the face of these challenges 
(Venkatesh 2006; Venkatesh 2002). In “The Hidden War” (2000) Popkin et al. describe 
circumstances of racial and economic segregation, inadequate public services, few amenities, and 
high unemployment: “without this underlying social structure, there is little mutual trust and 
cohesion that can encourage or even allow residents to unite together to fight their common 
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problems” (Popkin et al. 2000). They describe a social order in the 1970’s created when street 
gangs took over public housing across the city of Chicago, leaving residents no choice but to 
tolerate the state of affairs. Even if stability is thought to benefit social integration – meaning that 
people have more social ties in stable neighborhoods – social ties are only associated with social 
control and other positive outcomes in certain contexts (Ross et al 1999, 594). Drawing on 
Cloward and Ohlin (1960), Pattillo (1998) argues that stability can provide the social networks to 
foster crime through an alternative opportunity structure. Even if stability is associated with the 
presence of informal social ties among residents, these networks do not necessarily reduce crime, 
and in some cases may in fact facilitate crime, as in the case of criminal social networks. 
Such alternative opportunity structures may indeed increase isolation from the rest of the 
city, creating what some sociologists have historically referreds to as “a city within a city” 
(Drake & Cayton 1945), and others as the dichotomy between “ghetto-specific” and 
“mainstream” behaviors (Hannerz 1969; Rainwater 1970).17 However, some caution against a 
conception of the high-rise ghetto as a place where a “subculture” of poverty exists (Harding & 
Hepburn 2014; Venkatesh 2002). In his discussion of a public housing development in Chicago, 
Venkatesh notes that: “Developments such as the Robert Taylor Homes, however isolated they 
may appear, are nevertheless managed, subsidized, and administered by a number of social 
actors…As such, they should not be seen as completely different or separate from the rest of 
American society…” (Venkatesh 2002, p.9). He warns against a monolithic view of life in high-
rise public housing as limited to crime, disorder, and fear, as it is so often portrayed, to the 
exclusion of a richer and more complete understanding of how residents react and adapt to 
instabilities.  
                                                
17 See (Venkatesh 2002) for a discussion of the limitations of this conception of the ghetto. 
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Outline of the Dissertation 
In Chapter 2 I discuss the data and methods used in this dissertation, including 
geographic data, ethnographic observations, and in-depth interviews. I use data from the 
American Community Survey (ACS) and HUD’s Picture of Subsidized Housing to select a case 
study neighborhood in West Baltimore characterized by higher than average voucher use, 
moderate poverty and residential instability. I moved into this neighborhood and lived there for 
15 months, conducting ethnographic fieldwork, including 102 in-depth interviews, and 
participant observation with residents receiving a housing voucher subsidy, unassisted renters, 
long-time homeowner residents, and community members. In order to better understand the 
supply-side dynamics of reconcentration, I conducted fieldwork with landlords who rent to 
voucher holders as well as unsubsidized renters in the Park Heights neighborhood and 
throughout the city of Baltimore.  
In Chapter 3, I describe the ecology and history of Park Heights. Between 1955 and 1965, 
this primarily white, Jewish, middle-class neighborhood of 20,000 residents was completely 
transformed as homes were sold to upwardly mobile working-class black families. For many of 
these families, buying a home was a step closer to the stable, middle-class life of which they 
dreamed. Many of these pioneering black families still reside in the neighborhood today, even 
though they and their children have experienced significant downward mobility. In the past 
fifteen years there has been significant renter turnover, and in particular, an influx of voucher 
holders.  
In Chapter 4, I offer the first of two explanations for the clustering together and 
reconcentration of voucher holders in moderately poor neighborhoods, by considering how 
choices are constrained by the landlords and property owners who operate in these 
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neighborhoods. The study of landlords reveals the minute individual-level decisions and 
practices that form the building blocks of structured urban space, with enormous consequences in 
the lives of low-income renters. This supply-side account complements my fieldwork with low-
income families, which reveals the important ways in which they react to and are shaped by the 
post-public housing context. I examine how voucher rules are enacted, negotiated, and contested 
through everyday interactions between landlords and tenants. I draw on in-depth interviews and 
ethnographic observation with landlords in Baltimore city to understand how their participation 
in the HCV program may play a role in the sorting of voucher holders. I argue that landlord 
practices such as geographically concentrated property acquisition, targeted recruitment 
strategies, and selective tenant retention sort the most disadvantaged voucher holders into some 
of the most disadvantaged neighborhoods, and serve as an important mechanism in the 
reproduction of spatial inequality and the concentration of poverty.  
Scholars of poverty and residential mobility have long been interested in how the choices 
of low-income families interact with structural barriers to create high-poverty segregated 
neighborhoods. In this study, I look at both the supply-side and the demand-side explanations for 
voucher concentration. In Chapter 5, I consider the residential choices, attitudes, and behaviors 
of the residents themselves. I examine how voucher holders – who in a previous era might not 
have had a choice about where to live – make decisions that lead them to neighborhoods like 
Park Heights. Drawing on ethnographic observations and in-depth interviews with seventy 
residents, I argue that researchers need to move beyond the paradigm of “choice” in order to 
understand how culture operates as a neighborhood effect influencing mobility outcomes. My 
ethnographic research provides a means to move beyond the framework of hierarchical 
residential preferences, to understand how residents of poor and violent contexts construct and 
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deploy an array of strategies to deal with neighborhood conditions. People’s narratives about 
what a home and a neighborhood should offer to them change and adapt as events unfold, and 
guide future mobility decisions. However, despite these varying orientations and subsequent 
decisions, the skills that are accumulated over a lifetime of living in a dangerous environment 
render it possible, and even likely for families to move on to a similarly poor and violent context. 
My research suggests that the reasons people move to, or stay in a neighborhood, are in 
themselves a product of living in a disadvantaged neighborhood context. 
In Chapter 6, I examine social relations within Park Heights. The decrease in 
neighborhoods of concentrated poverty and the rise of moderately poor neighborhoods can be 
thought of as an improvement in purely quantitative terms. Yet this can hide the heterogeneity 
that exists within moderately poor neighborhoods. My case study of Park Heights is not 
composed of a monolithic group of “moderately” poor, but rather an array of populations 
including homeowners, unassisted renters, and voucher holders, each having a unique set of 
circumstances and challenges. In contrast to much of the literature on concentrated disadvantage 
and neighborhood effects, which largely treats poor neighborhoods as stable units, a growing 
body of evidence on the new types of neighborhoods in which most former public housing 
residents are clustered suggests very high rates of residential instability. Though it is clear that 
many poor families now reside in somewhat less poor neighborhoods, we know little about the 
ways in which a context of moderate poverty coupled with instability and clustered voucher use 
may shape social relations. I consider the heterogeneity within the neighborhood, examining how 
different residential groups cope, respond, and interact within a horizontal neighborhood context. 
I demonstrate that although poverty may be more moderate than in previous eras, the horizontal 
context may have deleterious consequences for social relations. 
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Chapter 2: Data and Methods 
 
 
 I selected a Baltimore neighborhood with higher than average voucher use, moderate 
poverty, and high residential instability for ethnographic case study. This neighborhood, called 
Park Heights, is located in the Northwest of Baltimore.18 In the summer of 2011, I began fifteen 
months of fieldwork by moving to Baltimore. I lived near Park Heights from June to September 
2011, and in October 2011 I moved into a one-bedroom apartment in Park Heights, where I lived 
until September 2012. 
Neighborhood Selection 
 I draw on data from HUD’s Picture of Subsidized Households (2009) and the American 
Community Survey (ACS 2010, 5 year estimate) to determine where housing voucher use is 
concentrated in Baltimore. In Figure 1, the red line delineates the six census tracts that make up 
Park Heights. Each dot represents two vouchers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
18 Although I use the real name of the neighborhood, all places, street names, organization names, and 
respondent names have been changed maintain confidentiality. 
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Figure 1: Housing Vouchers in Baltimore 
Source: HUD 2008 
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I estimate the voucher rate by considering what proportion of renter households in the 
neighborhood are voucher holders. To calculate this rate, I divide the total number of vouchers in 
the neighborhood by the total number of occupied rental units. There are 4901 occupied rental 
units in Park Heights (ACS 2010 5-year estimate), and voucher holders inhabit 589 of them, 
which is approximately 5 percent of the total vouchers in Baltimore city19  (HUD 2009). The rate 
of voucher use ranges from 5.6 percent, to 22.8 percent across the six census tracts, averaging 12 
percent for the neighborhood (ACS 2010, HUD 2009). In contrast, the average rate across the 
city of Baltimore is 9.88 percent (ACS 2010, HUD 2009). There are several areas in Baltimore 
city that have above average concentrations of voucher holders; Park Heights is not the highest, 
or the largest of these areas, but it represents a confluence of characteristics that are theoretically 
relevant including above average voucher use and residential instability.  
Sampling and Data Collection 
Resident sample  
 The sample is stratified by residential status: there are three groups in the sample: 
homeowners, voucher holders, and unassisted renters. The “unassisted” group is composed of 
low-income renters, 90 percent of whom earn less than 80 percent of area median rent, and 
therefore would qualify for a housing voucher, though they do not receive one, and they may 
receive other types of public assistance. This group also includes several residents who are 
homeless or “staying” with a friend or relative, but who are not on the lease. My sampling 
strategy is composite, including a semi-random sample of voucher holders, and targeted 
sampling for the other two groups. For the voucher holder portion of the sample, over a three-
                                                
19 Throughout, I refer to Baltimore as “Baltimore city,” which is itself a county, as differentiated from 
Baltimore County, which surrounds the city to the North, East, and West. 
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month period before I entered the field, I collected all addresses of units advertised on 
www.gosection8.com.20  
Figure 2: GoSection8.com Addresses 
                                                
20 GoSection8.com is the website to which the Housing Authority of Baltimore City (HABC) directs all 
voucher holders looking for available units. 
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There were a total of 169 addresses on this list. I then visited these addresses one by one to 
recruit respondents. Many doors I knocked on were vacant, or it turned out that the family 
residing there did not have a voucher. If the household was not a voucher recipient, I asked them 
to participate as part of the homeowner or unassisted renter sample. In order to make sure that 
my homeowner and unassisted samples were not solely recruited from areas that were especially 
likely to have voucher holders living in them, I used several additional methods to recruit these 
participants. For the homeowner sample, I went to the local senior center where many members 
are homeowners, and introduced myself to residents at lunch. Additionally, I knocked on doors 
in other areas of the neighborhood that were not on my list of voucher addresses in order to 
recruit homeowners and unassisted renters. Finally, I posted flyers around the neighborhood at 
churches, community centers, the Head Start, the drug store, and several health clinics.  
 Families were overall interested and eager to talk to me. A subset of residents was 
reticent at first, though once people in the neighborhood got to know me and see me around, 
many of them let me know they were interested in participating. Of those who I asked to 
participate, only six refused. As shown in Table 1, the resulting sample consists of roughly one-
third voucher holders, one-third unassisted renters, and one-third homeowners, with a total of 82 
resident respondents.  
 
Table 1: Total Sample 
 Respondents Total Residents  82 Homeowners 18  Voucher Holders 27  Unassisted Renters 37  Landlords  20 TOTAL   102  
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I observed and conducted an additional 20 interviews with landlords, for a total of 102 in-depth 
interviews in the neighborhood. I also conducted informal key informant interviews with 
community members.  
 
Table 2: Resident Sample Characteristics 
 Male Female Total Households 
Homeowners 8 10 18 15 
Voucher Holders 10 17 27 21 
Other Renters 21 16 37 28 
Total 39 43 82 64 
 
 
Table 2 displays the total numbers of men and women in each residential category. There are 39 
men and 43 women in the resident sample. Two participants died during the course of fieldwork. 
When possible, I interviewed multiple family members in the household. There are 82 residents 
respondents, nested within 64 households. 
 
Table 3: Age 
 Young Adult 
(under 21) 
Adult  
(21-57) 
Senior  
(58+) 
Average  
Age 
Homeowners 0 11 7 51 
Voucher Holders 9 14 4 41 
Other Renters 3 29 5 41 
Family Total 12 54 16 44 
 
There is considerable variation in age among the respondent sample. The homeowners tend to be 
older, as they are often original homeowners and their children. The voucher holders and 
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unassisted renters tend to be younger, their average age 41. This age difference reflects a similar 
age distribution in the neighborhood as a whole (see Figure 15). 
Fieldwork with Residents: Interviews and Ethnographic Observation 
Fieldwork was conducted over a 15-month period, 11 of which in I lived in Park Heights. 
I relied upon a combination of ethnographic observations and in-depth semi-structured 
interviews to provide a multi-faceted understanding of both lived experience and interactional 
events. On a weekly basis, I spent 5 days a week, about two-thirds of my time (25-40 hours per 
week) conducting participant observation and interviews in the neighborhood. The remaining 
third of my time was spent working on field notes and writing.21 
 
Table 4: Fieldwork 
 Interviews Ethnography 
Homeowners 18 6 
Voucher Holders 27 9 
Other Renters 37 12 
 82 27 
 
In addition to the daily observations I made while living in the neighborhood, I followed a subset 
of the sample ethnographically; approximately one third of each residential group, as displayed 
in Table 4. Participant observation was comprised of a range of structured and unstructured 
activities. In order to get to know residents, I participated in their daily activities in the home, to 
capture elements of family life, for example sharing meals, sitting on the porch talking, watching 
movies, listening to music, household chores, cooking, playing with kids. Observations within 
                                                
21 During the semester, I spent about 3 out of 4 weekends a month in Park Heights, as I was traveling to 
Harvard once a month for teaching responsibilities. During the summers I lived there full-time. 
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the home helped me to build rapport with respondents, keep up to date on their day-to-day lives, 
and be included when important events came up such as housing searched, moves, or family 
events. In order to learn about how people experience their neighborhoods, I also observed 
outside of the home. I accompanied residents on their daily routines to school and/or work, as 
well as on errands such as shopping, picking up children, going to the Housing Authority, and on 
housing searches. Additionally, I attended monthly neighborhood community meetings over a 
period of a year, held by the local neighborhood development organization in order to learn 
about residents’ concerns about their neighborhood.  
Reception in the Field 
 
In the first few months of fieldwork, I conducted an interview with new respondents 
before moving into participant observation (with a subset of respondents). Interviews were a 
concrete way of introducing myself and my purpose. An in-depth interview can be a highly 
effective way to establish trust and rapport. In this way, interviews can offer a way into a 
neighborhood and a house where one has no legitimate place otherwise, and ultimately gain 
entrée. It is much harder to knock on someone's door and ask to begin “following” them then it is 
to ask to discuss their experience in the neighborhood at the kitchen table. Once getting to know 
them, it was not difficult to ask if I could observe them and participate in their daily lives. 
Interviews were semi-structured, and focused on topics surrounding residential history, 
past and present housing and neighborhood experiences, moving decisions, and future plans. 
Interviews lasted between 2 and 5 hours, with the modal interview being around 3 hours. In the 
style of interviewing that I use, the goal is for me to speak as little as possible. This allows the 
respondent to define much of the structure and content of the interview; though, I did ask 
prompting questions, and followed up when things where unclear or large topics had not been 
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covered. Depending on the respondent, this can take a bit of training. But even when respondents 
initially assumed it would be a short survey, they quickly opened up. Interviews generally lasted 
as long as they did because respondents did not want to stop talking. I found that there is 
something powerful about being asked to talk about one's past and daily life experiences. The 
fact that I was a stranger was palpable to both parties in the first twenty minutes or so, but in 
most cases, a curious listener who encourages with small prompts, facial expressions, and body 
language can keep a person talking for hours. 
At the end of these interviews, something was different. Respondents often marveled at 
how much they had shared, sometimes with genuine, warm, trusting feelings, and other times 
somewhat suspecting. Often at the end of an interview, it would be as if the respondent was 
waking up from a dream, coming back to reality, and confronting with some shock the private 
details of their lives they had shared. This was a delicate moment. If I left too quickly, it could 
cause feelings of resentment or distrust, which I only discovered on a three occasions, when I re-
contacted a respondent to meet again, and they reported feelings of discomfort about the 
interview. Upon probing, I learned that this was due to a confusion about who and I was and why 
I was so interested in them. But I found that by sharing a bit about myself, my interest in the 
neighborhood and in their life, and by following up to spend more time with the person this 
potential problem completely disappeared. In two of the three cases the relationship was (to my 
knowledge) completely repaired by doing this. 
As a young white female, I stuck out in Park Heights. In the fifteen months that I spent 
there on a daily basis, I can count on two hands the number of white people that I saw. After I 
got to know residents, I often asked them what they thought of me when they first saw me: most 
commonly, respondents thought I was a) looking to buy drugs, or b) a social worker or inspector. 
  43 
For this reason, establishing trust was key. At the beginning of the fieldwork I was knocking on 
doors based on a list of addresses. People were sometimes wary to open their doors and I had to 
talk through the door to explain to them why I was there. I explained that I was a student 
studying the neighborhood, and I was interested to hear about what it was like to live there.  
Two things dramatically changed my reception in the neighborhood. The first occurred 
by accident. After getting to know someone, I would often ask them to introduce me to friends or 
neighbors. Sometimes respondents were not willing to do this, but most were. I quickly learned 
the power of this introduction. The third party took the introduction very seriously, there seemed 
to be a tacit assumption that if a neighbor introduced me, that person was somehow vouching for 
me (even in the case where I had just met them). I found the relationships with people to whom I 
was “introduced” to be more open, more quickly (an alternative explanation for this is that 
people are more likely to introduce you to friends/neighbors who are extroverted and 
comfortable opening up to strangers.)  
The second change was moving to the neighborhood. Once I could introduce myself as 
someone who “lived down the street” and could talk in detail about goings on in the 
neighborhood, which streets to avoid, where to get the best produce, and started bumping into 
respondents on the street, people looked at me very differently. I was also able to observe events 
as they happened. As I gained a more stable position in the field, I met people organically (for 
example, walking down the street, in the supermarket, or at church), and spent time with them in 
their daily lives as a participant observer before conducting an interview. I did not find that 
relationships with these respondents were significantly different from those with whom I 
conducted the interview before the observation. The advantage of conducting the interview first 
is to have an opportunity to explain who I was and allay any suspicions of my motives. 
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Landlord sample  
The fifteen months that I spent living and working in Park Heights embedded in local 
events with residents, provided with me a baseline familiarity through which I could interpret 
much of what I heard and saw related to tenancy and landlording. In Chapter 4, I draw primarily 
on data from the landlord sample, but also bring in data from the thousands of hours that I spent 
with residents, especially the subsample of 27 voucher holders. Because I knew many of the 
tenants by the time I contacted landlords, I had two points of reference.  
The sampling strategy for the landlord sample was targeted to incorporate as much 
heterogeneity as possible, with an effort to include both small, self-employed landlords, as well 
as the biggest companies in the Baltimore rental market. I recruited a portion of the landlord 
sample through contacts I made in my ethnographic work, and another portion through more 
formal means; I drew a random selection of landlords from all online listings for units in Park 
Heights, posted from June to September 2011 on the website www.gosection8.com, the source of 
rental listings to which HCV renters are directed by the Housing Authority of Baltimore City 
(HABC). For those recruited through the random draw, the individual associated with each 
listing was contacted by phone, using the telephone number listed in the advertisement or 
provided in the referral. If this person was the landlord or property manager in charge of that 
property, he or she was invited to participate in a study regarding the experiences of landlords in 
Baltimore city.22 I arranged an interview, assured confidentiality,23 and offered compensation.24 
                                                
22 All participants in the landlord sample are property owners, though some also act as property managers 
for other property owners; I refer to their property management work when they are acting as the key 
player making decisions about tenant selection for a given unit. 
23 All names, company names, and addresses are pseudonyms to protect the identity of participants. 
24 About one-third of the landlords initially did not want to accept payment, though I remunerated every 
participant with the 50 dollars and suggested that if they did not feel comfortable accepting the money 
they could use it in some way for the benefit of their tenants. For example, one landlord used the money 
to buy snacks and soda for all the children in the building. 
  45 
This technique generated a high degree of cooperation: over eighty percent agreed to meet with 
me.  
I conducted an interview with each landlord. Initial interviews lasted between one and 
three hours, with the average interview being two hours long, and took place in the landlords’ 
offices, in empty rental units, or while riding around on a visit. In the initial interview, a set of 
predetermined topics was always covered,25 although the exact wording, order, and additional 
topics followed the flow of the conversation. Each landlord was asked to tell the whole story of 
how he or she became a landlord, to describe all aspects of the job, and to address a range of 
topics pertaining to tenant selection, property acquisition, the HCV program, and more.  
In addition to the interviews, though a series of visits and unstructured observations over 
a span of fifteen months, these landlords came to willingly let me into their world and trust me as 
a confidant with whom they could share the frustrations, joys, and daily struggles of their work. I 
spent approximately 300 hours with twenty landlord participants, including roughly 250 
hours observing them as they went about their work, meeting with each between one and 
five times,26 and observing them informally on many other occasions throughout my fieldwork. 
In each of these visits, I observed landlords conduct daily business. I accompanied them 
on twelve tours of properties with prospective tenants and twenty-five tours of properties under 
renovation or maintenance calls, observed six evictions, and observed firsthand the physical 
conditions and neighborhood contexts of the units themselves on these visits. I also accompanied 
landlords on eight visits to the Housing Authority of Baltimore City (HABC) for lease-signings 
and other official meetings with tenants. These informal interactions provided additional 
                                                
25 See interview guide in appendix. 
26 Of the twenty landlords, I conducted ethnographic observation and interviews with sixteen, and 
interviews-only with the other four. Of the sixteen that I ethnographically observed, in addition to the 
interview, I met with four of them once, two twice, three three times, one four times, and six 
landlords five times.  
  46 
opportunities to discuss a number of open-ended topics related to their businesses, as well as to 
observe how events played out on the ground. Twelve landlords volunteered access to records of 
various kinds, such as rental applications, logs of maintenance requests and rent payments, 
evictions, and inspection reports.  
The targeted-random sampling method produced a varied sample of twenty landlords that 
spans the range of types of HCV landlords, and also notably represents a significant portion of 
the units rented through the HCV program in Baltimore. There are eight landlords who own or 
manage over one hundred units, seven landlords who own or manage between thirty and one 
hundred units, and five smaller “mom and pop” landlords who own or manage under thirty units. 
This includes management personnel at the three largest rental agencies in the city, several large 
tenant placement agencies who also own property, and two well-known local landlords who have 
played a role in shaping policy and legislation related to the HCV program in Maryland. Further, 
many of these landlords set precedents for the smaller companies and individuals who rent to 
voucher holders. 
All landlord respondents own one or more rental units, though some are also property 
managers, and I observed them in this capacity as well. Sixteen out of twenty landlords in the 
sample are open to, or prefer to rent through the HCV program; four landlords no longer accept 
new voucher holders as a policy.27 Thirteen landlords rent fifty percent or more of their units 
through the HCV program. Nineteen landlords rent at least one property in Park Heights, eight 
rent the majority of their properties in Park Heights, while the other twelve have properties 
spread throughout Baltimore city. Two of the landlords are female. Eight are non-Hispanic 
African-American, twelve are non-Hispanic white. Five landlords have small businesses, owning 
                                                
27 Though they do not accept new voucher tenants, they all have units that are currently occupied by 
voucher tenants, accept for one, who used to but no longer does. 
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or managing between one and thirty properties; seven have mid-sized business, between thirty 
and one-hundred properties; eight landlords have large businesses, owning or managing over 
one-hundred properties.  
 
Table 5: Landlord Sample 
 HCV* Race Gender Size / 
Type 
Total** 
Properties 
Voucher 
Properties 
Percent 
Voucher 
Tyrone  Y Black Male Mid 84 40 48% 
Pas. Lewis Y Black Male Large 550 400 73% 
Morgan  Y Black Female Small 5 4 80% 
Jill Y Black Female Large 120 100 83% 
Oscar Y Black Male Small 25 15 60% 
Randall Y Black Male Small 4 4 100% 
Jake Y Black Male Small 5 3 60% 
Lamar Y Black Male Small 4 0 0% 
Noah Y White Male Mid 80 40 50% 
Abe Y White Male Mid 83 11 13% 
David Y White Male Mid 85 75 88% 
Thomas N White Male Mid 90 0 0% 
Jason Y White Male Mid 90 68 76% 
Alex Y White Male Large 130 50 38% 
Larry Y White Male Mid 90 54 60% 
Ryan Y White Male Large 150 100 67% 
Mark  Y White Male Large 400 350 88% 
Hyram Y White Male Large 620 100 16% 
Kevin Y White Male Large 800 520 65% 
Albert Y White Male Large 300 50 17% 
Total     3715 1984  
Total Vouchers***   1684  
Average       54% 
*HCV: “Y” indicates the landlord does accept vouchers, though may not have any currently 
** Total properties includes those rented and owned 
*** The total voucher count subtracts duplicates that are owned by one landlord and managed be 
another.  
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Together, these individuals and companies own and manage over 3000 units in Baltimore city, 
over 1600 of which are rented to voucher holders, meaning they control over fourteen percent of 
the units rented through the Baltimore city HCV program at the time of the study.28  
Data Analysis 
All interviews were recorded and transcribed,29 and after each day in the field I spent 
several hours every night recording detailed field notes describing the interactions and activities 
in which I participated and observed.30 These data were loaded into the qualitative data analysis 
software Atlas.ti, and coded both inductively and deductively, with thematic coding schema 
related to the research questions of the dissertation. In this way, I was able to allow hypotheses to 
emerge inductively from the data, while also systematically identifying and revealing the 
prevalence of various practices hypothesized to be important. In order to identify and assess the 
scope of a hypothesis or finding, qualitative data software was enormously helpful in organizing 
interview data for a sample of 102 respondents and linking it to thousands of pages of field notes 
and observations. I also relied heavily on my experiences from the field as an ethnographer, and 
my own knowledge of how people and places were connected. Some of the most important 
insights from this dissertation were revealed during an interaction I witnessed or was a part of 
that illuminated a process that had been obscured in the interview. 
  
                                                
28 In 2009 (the most recent year for which data is available) there were 11,834 units rented to voucher 
holders in Baltimore City (HUD Picture of Subsidized Housing 2009). By compiling the total number of 
units that the landlords in my sample control, which is 1634 (units that they own, combined with units 
that they manage, subtracting duplicates), I calculate that they control 14.23% of all units rented to 
voucher holders in Baltimore City. 
29 One landlord requested not to be recorded, but agreed to be directly quoted. Extensive notes were taken 
on this interview instead. 
30 A list of the forty codes that were used for analysis is available upon request. 
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Chapter 3: Description and Ecology of the Neighborhood 
 
Baltimore  
Baltimore is often considered a “rust belt” city, in that it historically relied primarily on 
industrial manufacturing, shipping, and transportation. However, like other rust belt cities, 
manufacturing experienced a dramatic decline in the 1970s. The large steel plant located 
southeast of the city, Bethlehem Steel’s “Sparrow’s Point,” began its decline in the early 
seventies and was eventually closed in 1997. Many jobs were lost over this period, and with 
them, 34 percent of the city’s population, and almost 50 percent of its white population (U.S. 
Census 1960 – 2010). In 2010 Baltimore had a population of 620,961 residents, as compared to 
939,024 in 1960 (U.S. Census). Baltimore has historically been a “black-white” city, with blacks 
making up 63 percent of the population, whites making up 29 percent, and the Hispanic 
population making up 4 percent (U.S. Census 2010). Baltimore has a high poverty rate. The 
American Community Survey estimates that 20 percent of Baltimoreans lived below the poverty 
line in 2010 (ACS 2010 1 year-estimate), though data from the U.S. Decennial Census reports a 
significant jump between 2009 and 2010 likely due to the Great Recession, indicating that as 
many as one in four residents lives in poverty (U.S. Census 2010).  
The demolition of public housing was especially pronounced in Baltimore. Almost all of 
the city’s high-rises were torn down in the 1990s and early 2000s. Many developments were 
replaced with mixed-income and scattered site housing, but there has not been one-for-one 
replacement, and the total number of public housing units has decreased. Between 1981 and 
2000, Baltimore city reduced its number of family public housing units from by almost half, 
from 12,016 to 6,854 (Rosenblatt 2011). The voucher population is unusually large in Baltimore 
city due to the demolition, whose former tenants were often “vouchered out,” e.g. given a 
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housing voucher to replace their public housing subsidy. Between 1990 and 2005, HCV 
subsidies increased from 5,966 to 11,700 (Newman 2005). However, given its high poverty rate, 
there are many low-income families that qualify for housing assistance but do not receive it. It is 
estimated that there are over 16,000 families on the HCV waiting list, which has been closed 
since 2003 (Newman 2005). 
Park Heights 
 In this chapter I will tell the story of Park Heights, a historically Jewish, middle-class 
neighborhood located in Northwest Baltimore. As I will show, between 1965 and 1975, the 
entire neighborhood shifted from 95 percent white, to 95 percent black (see Figure 9). During 
this time, the neighborhood’s predominantly Jewish population moved north of Northern 
Parkway, a main center-periphery dividing line in the city. Today, the neighborhood remains 
predominantly black, and demonstrates moderate poverty, typical of the types of neighborhoods 
that voucher holders tend to move to (Galster 2005; Orr et al. 2003). Despite its poverty rate, 
Park Heights has a large population of homeowners, many of whom were the pioneering 
working-class black families who bought homes in the neighborhood in the late 1960’s and 70’s.  
 In 2010, 25.3 percent of Park Heights’ families lived below the poverty line (ACS 5-year 
estimate 2006-2010), as compared with 20 percent in Baltimore city (ACS 1-year estimate 
2010). The neighborhood might be considered “working-class” according to the Jargowsky 
definition (Jargowsky 1997), however in this case the average hides some polarization within the 
neighborhood. A substantial proportion of the non-poor residents are just above the poverty line, 
53.7 percent of residents are under 200 percent of the poverty line (U.S. Census 2010). The 
median household income is $27,635, as compared to Baltimore city’s median household income 
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of $37,395 (U.S. Census 2010). Unemployment is 17.5 percent, compared to Baltimore city at 
11.1 percent (U.S. Census 2010). 
 Park Heights has a population of 26,123 (ACS 5-year estimate 2006-2010). The land area 
is 2.08 square miles. Park Heights is comprised of six census tracts, and two Community 
Statistical Areas (CSAs), indicated in Figure 3 by the red lines.  
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Figure 3: Park Heights Community Statistical Areas 
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The main artery that runs through the neighborhood is a wide two-lane street with a grassy 
median. On either side the land slopes upward and is lined with large overgrown trees and 
spacious homes. It is clear that the street was once impressive and beautiful. The smaller streets 
that branch off Park Heights Avenue lead to smaller blocks that vary in vivacity and upkeep. 
Over two-thirds of the housing stock in Park Heights is comprised of two-unit semi-attached, 
extra-wide row homes separated from adjacent units by narrow passageways, called sally ports, 
which lead into small backyards. The homes have covered front porches, large front lawns, and 
backyards or parking spots, accessible by an alleyway that runs behind the block. Two-thirds of 
the housing was built before 1960, and another third was built between 1960 and 1989 (ACS 
2010). Today, there are more vacant homes than occupied ones along this thoroughfare. 
 Block faces are peppered with empty holes where homes have been torn down and tall 
grasses are left to fill in the space between the houses. Some of those that are left standing are 
occupied, while others have caved-in roofs and porches with holes through which have trees 
sprouted. Bright red “X” symbols on a number of structures are an indication to the fire 
department that the home is structurally unsafe, and should be left to burn if it does not endanger 
surrounding buildings. It is not uncommon on these smaller streets to see memorials where 
residents have left flowers, notes, candles, or teddy bears and balloons to commemorate the loss 
of a loved one in a shooting or violent altercation.  
Who Lives in Park Heights? 
 Neighborhood level statistics sometimes hide the heterogeneity that may exist within 
neighborhoods. Park Heights would be classified as “moderately poor” as it has a poverty rate 
between 20 and 30 percent. However, it is comprised not by a monolithic group of “moderately” 
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poor, but by an array of populations including homeowners, unassisted renters, and voucher 
holders, each with a unique set of financial and social circumstances and challenges. 
 
Figure 4: Income Distribution 
 
Source: ACS 2006-2010, 5-year estimate 
As demonstrated in Figure 4, compared to Baltimore city Park Heights has slightly more 
residents in the lowest income brackets, and slightly fewer in the highest.  
 Park Heights has a large population of homeowners, who make up 48 percent of all 
occupied units, just above the Baltimore average of 45 percent (U.S. Census 2010). Figure 5 
displays rates of homeowners across the six census tracts in Park Heights. In Southern Park 
Heights, rates are between 0 to 20 percent of occupied units, while in Central Park Heights, rates 
are between 20 and 40 percent. 
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Figure 5: Homeownership Rates 
Source: ACS 2010, 5 year estimate 
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Figure 6: Homeownership 1980-2010 
 
Source: Decennial Census 1980-2010 
Figure 6 shows the absolute numbers of homeowners and renters in the neighborhood, 
demonstrating that over the past thirty years, the homeownership population has stayed relatively 
stable, while the renter population has declined slightly, resulting in an overall decline in 
population. 
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Figure 7: Occupancy by Decade of Move-in 
  
Source: ACS 2010, 5-year estimates 
 
By looking at when the homeowners and renters arrive in the neighborhood, we can learn more 
about movement in and out of the neighborhood. Figure 7 displays the relative distributions of 
the homeowner (lighter shaded area) and renter (darker shaded area) populations, by the decade 
that they moved in to the neighborhood. This figure demonstrates that the homeowner population 
has largely been in the neighborhood for over twenty years, whereas the vast majority of renters 
have only arrived quite recently. The majority, or 56 percent of current homeowners in Park 
Heights moved into the neighborhood before 1990, and only 27 percent of current homeowners 
have arrived since 2000. In contrast, a mere 7 percent of the current renters in Park Heights 
arrived before 1990, and a full 80 percent of all renters arrived in just the last ten years. This 
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suggests that much of the residential instability has been introduced in the past few years— 
while the original black families who bought homes in the 1970’s have remained in the 
neighborhood, renters have churned in and out, with the total renter population declining slightly. 
In the past ten years there has also been a decline in homeownership for the first time, suggesting 
that the pioneers of the neighborhood may be passing on and their children may be renting their 
homes or selling them to entrepreneurial landlords and property managers, some of whom are 
eager to cash in on the additional rents paid by voucher holders relative to unassisted renters, as 
will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.   
Instability  
 Park Heights has an elevated rate of residential mobility compared to Baltimore city, as 
demonstrated in Table 6: 
 
Table 6: Mobility Rates, by Tenure 
 
Owner Mobility 
Rate 
Renter Mobility 
Rate Mobility Rate 
Percent of 
moves within 
Baltimore city+ 
Park Heights 10% 29% 19% 90% 
Baltimore City 8% 26% 16% 65% 
 
Source: ACS 2010 5-year estimate, +ACS 2012 5-year estimate 
In 2010, 19 percent of households in Park Heights had moved in the past year. Relative to 
Baltimore city’s renters, Park Heights’s renters are 3 percentage points more likely to have 
moved in the past year. There is a significant divergence between renters and owners; only 10 
percent of renters moved in the past year, versus 29 percent of renters. In other words, almost 
one fifth of the neighborhood’s population has moved recently; including close to a third of 
renters. We might expect that Park Heights’s homeowners would be less likely to have moved in 
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the past year relative to other homeowners in the city (see Figure 6), but in fact they are also 
slightly more likely to have moved in the past year, likely a result of recent turnover in homes 
due to the Great Recession.31 It is important to note that since renters are clustered in certain 
tracts, the mobility rate in these tracts will be even higher: indeed, the mobility rates range from 
18 to 44 percent of households among the six tracts. This means that in some areas of the 
neighborhood close to a half of residents are newcomers.  
 Additionally, of Park Heights residents who lived in a different home one year prior, a 
striking 90 percent moved from another home within Baltimore city (ACS 2012, 5-year 
estimate). In contrast, only 65 percent of Baltimore city residents who moved in the past year did 
so from another home within the city (ACS 2012, 5-year estimate). Though data limitations 
prevent us from knowing exactly what types of neighborhoods residents are moving from, these 
figures provide strong evidence that residents of Park Heights are native Baltimoreans (at least 
within the last year), and may be churning among different neighborhoods within the city.  
Assisted and Unassisted Renters 
Due to its relatively less expensive rents, Park Heights is also a common destination for 
low-income renters who do not receive any housing assistance; I call these “unassisted renters”. 
In Park Heights, 28 percent of renters pay more than 50 percent of their income in rent, and 
another 22 percent pay between 30 and 49 percent, which is about the same for the city of 
Baltimore (ACS 2010, 5 year estimate). The average gross rent32 in Park Heights is $710, as 
compared to Baltimore where it is $856. However, the median gross rent as a percentage of 
income is 32.9% in Park Heights, and virtually the same, 33.3 percent in Baltimore city, 
                                                
31 It is also possible that with data on moves in the past two years, there would be a higher discrepancy 
between Baltimore city and Park Heights specifically, which is likely given other data available. 
32 Gross rent is the amount of the contract rent plus the average monthly cost of utilities, if paid by renter. 
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reflecting the fact that though rents are indeed lower in Park Heights, residents have lower 
incomes and therefore pay proportionally the same as the city average. 
 Despite Park Heights’s pervasive disadvantage and the stigma that many Baltimoreans 
attach to the neighborhood, it is attractive to certain populations due to several key factors that 
are common reasons for neighborhood selection. Many families explain that they came to Park 
Heights because it is where they grew up or where their families currently reside. Previous 
research suggests that transportation is an important factor in residential decisions (Rosenblatt & 
Deluca 2012). Located within walking distance to the subway, and also at the crux of several 
major bus lines that run both downtown, as well as out to the suburbs, Park Heights attracts those 
who need access to public transportation for employment. Additionally, Park Heights has a high 
concentration of single-family homes, many of them detached from neighboring units. This 
makes it attractive to low-income families, who – short of owning a home like their middle class 
counterparts – aspire to live in a single-family home with a lawn and maybe even a white picket 
fence (Wood forthcoming).  
 Unassisted renters come to Park Heights for many of the same reasons that voucher 
holders do. But unassisted renters face the additional problem of finding affordable housing, 
which is abundant in Park Heights. Furthermore, it is a neighborhood where landlords often offer 
move-in incentives, such as waiving the security deposit or skipping the credit check (see 
Chapter 4). Many low-income unassisted renters are simply unable to come up with a month’s 
security deposit, which forces them to seek out low-demand neighborhoods where the landlords 
are willing to negotiate (as will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4). In addition, there are 
several drug and alcohol rehabilitation centers and halfway homes in Park Heights. Five 
residents in my sample were involved in these programs, or had participated in one in the past, 
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and found housing locally once they completed treatment. Finally, there is a high number of 
“rooms-for-rent.” This is a common practice where a landlord will furnish an apartment, and rent 
out each room individually. 
In this study, I define the rate as the number of voucher holders out of the occupied rental 
units in a given census tract. This gives a sense of what proportion of rental units in a given 
neighborhood are in fact occupied by voucher holders. Twelve percent of Park Heights’s rental 
units are occupied by voucher holders, as compared to 9.88 percent in Baltimore city as a whole 
(ACS 2010, HUD 2009). Nationwide, the rate of voucher use is much lower than either the 
neighborhood or city average (ACS 2010, HUD 2009).33 Within Park Heights, voucher holders 
also cluster. Park Heights is comprised of six census tracts in which the voucher rate varies from 
5.7 percent to 22.7 percent, as shown in Figure 8. These rates of concentration are some of 
highest rates in the city (ACS 2010, HUD 2009), and among under 2 percent of HCV 
neighborhoods nationwide (Devine 2003). As only one in four poor households receives any 
housing assistance in the U.S., and only about half of those do so via a voucher, this are indeed 
very high rates.  
 
                                                
33 Some calculate the rate as the number of vouchers our of total occupied units. For nationwide 
comparison figures, see Chapter 1. 
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Figure 8: Housing Voucher Concentration 
 
Source: HUD 2009, ACS 2010 
Though these data are not publically available at the block group level, the uneven distribution of 
vouchers across the neighborhood at the tract level suggests that vouchers tend to cluster in 
groups within the neighborhood. As compared to Baltimore city, there are above-average 
concentrations of voucher holders in three of Park Heights’s six census tracts, while the other 
three are just below average.  
 Using the voucher holder rate, the type of residents, and level of instability, I identify 
three distinct ecological areas or “micro-neighborhoods” within Park Heights. 34 In tracts 3 and 4 
residents display above average voucher holder use, and are comprised mainly of voucher 
holders as well as unassisted renters. I refer to them as bounded transitory zones because these 
renters often reside in complexes or large buildings and so they are “bounded” in the sense that 
much of their social organization and community norms and rules are defined within the space of 
                                                
34 Throughout this chapter and the dissertation, I will refer to the census tracts as 1-6, however, I will not 
identify which tract is which, in order to protect confidentiality. 
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the complex. Also, residents tend to churn in and out of these residences, making them transitory 
spaces. I call tracts 5 and 6 transitional mixed zones to indicate that the micro-neighborhood is in 
transition from an area previously dominated by homeowners to a more mixed area where all 
three residential groups reside. These areas are in transition: many of the homes have been 
vacated by the original homeowners in the last ten to twenty years, and have remained vacant, or 
cycled through unassisted renters and voucher holders. These are also areas with many vacant 
and abandoned units, sometimes occupied illegally. They display average and above-average 
voucher use. Most residents in these areas reside primarily in single-family homes. Tracts 1 and 
2 are examples of what I call sheltered homeowner havens where blocks of long-time 
homeowners have remained intact, and are relatively sheltered from some of the neighborhood 
turmoil. These areas are primarily composed of homeowners, with only a few renters. 
History of the Neighborhood 
The Great Migration, blockbusting, and white flight 
Many older homeowners describe moving to Baltimore as children with their parents as 
part of the Great Migration, when massive numbers of African American men, women, and 
families moved from the south to northern cities like Baltimore for jobs in the expanding 
manufacturing industry (Lemann 1991; Wilkerson 2010). With gainful employment in hand, 
buying a home was a step closer to the stable, middle class life of which they dreamed.  
For Terrance Green, a seventy-eight year-old African American man who has lived in 
Park Heights since the sixties, the neighborhood represented a shot at opportunity. He explained 
to me how much better it was than the small town he came from in the south. “In a small 
southern town you could count the black men on your hand finished high school….But see I did 
much better than most black fellows that come from that part of the country, cause I worked a 
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skill. When I was twelve years old, the man that owned the newspaper liked me and I would 
work after school. He gave me a job, and I learned a trade.” Mr. Green came to Baltimore from 
North Carolina in 1960 for a job doing typesetting at the Baltimore Afro Newspaper on North 
Charles Street: 
That’s the only reason I came to Baltimore, was for the job, for work. A lot of black 
people came for work at that time, and I found out that they needed a stereotype 
[typesetter] here. So I called the man on the telephone; told him what I could do. And the 
man that taught me in my trade, he wrote a letter, let him know that I was skilled. So I 
brought that letter, gave it to him, and he hired me right off.  
 
Mr. Green worked there until they stopped using the antiquated typesetting method, at which 
point he moved to the mailroom, and then worked as a security guard until retiring in 2010 at the 
age of severnty-six. With a steady job, Mr. Green was able to think about buying a home 
relatively quickly. At first he lived at the YMCA on Druid Hill Avenue. Once he was able to 
bring his wife up from North Carolina, they moved into the Georgia Apartments in Park Heights. 
Georgia Apartments over here - brand new – right over there. My wife was walking for 
exercise cause she was carrying this one [pregnant with their oldest son] and she spotted 
this house for sale. Jewish people had it. Wasn’t no black people in here 
nowhere…Everybody was Jewish.  So the Jewish people wanted to sell it. So when I got 
home from work, she said, “I think it would be better for us to try to buy that house than 
to pay an apartment.”…So - we didn’t have a dime, we didn’t have no money. But her 
mother loaned us the down payment for this house and we bought the house. 
 
The Greens paid $10,000 for their home in 1962, which Terrance remarked was “a hell of a lot of 
money then.”  
There was a very different population in the neighborhood at that time. As Mr. Green 
remembers, “Oh my goodness, Park Heights in 1960 was all Jewish. Yeah, when I bought this 
house, then everybody, everybody, in this whole area was white; there were no black people 
nowhere.” Figure 4 illustrates the population shift experienced in Park Heights from almost 
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entirely white (95 percent) in 1960, to 81 percent black in 1970, and over 95 percent black 
thereafter.  
 
Figure 9: Racial Composition 1960-2010 
 
Source: Decennial Census 1960-2010 
When I asked Mr. Green about why things changed in the neighborhood so quickly, he said 
matter-of-factly: “Let me explain that to you, sweetheart. Any time a black person in those days 
would buy a house, all the Jewish people would leave.” Mr. Green’s understanding of racial 
flight was not far from reality, though structural forces of housing policy and real estate practice 
were behind much of this demographic change (Jackson 1985; Pietila 2010). 
Due to a long history of viciously enforced racially restrictive covenants, African 
American families were not allowed to move just anywhere. Ms. Patty, a seventy-six year-old 
homeowner, moved to Park Heights in 1972. She was recently widowed with three young 
children, but she had a good-paying steady job as a nurse. She used to live on Mosher Street near 
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Pennsylvania Ave—the historic bulwark neighborhood of blacks in Baltimore: “It was alright, 
but I just felt that I wanted to have more. And I was just renting the house there on Mosher 
Street. I wanted something of my own.” She contacted a real estate agency, and they told her 
about Park Heights and suggested that it would be a good place for her to move. “We talked 
about it, and they told me how much money I would have to have down and how much the 
settlement would be. I got that money together and I did it. I got it.” Ms. Patty was proud of her 
purchase. She says she did not think too much about where she was moving; she wanted to own 
a single-family home, and she wanted it to be quiet and family-oriented, which it was at the time. 
Ms. Patty moved to Park Heights towards the end of the turnover period; seven of the families 
who currently live on her block already lived there when she arrived in 1972. 
The exit en masse of Park Heights’s Jewish population was not just based on individual 
fear and racial prejudice. Like several other predominately Jewish neighborhoods in Baltimore, 
there is evidence that the rapid racial upheaval in Park Heights is the direct result of concerted 
real estate efforts. The neighborhood was one of active blockbusting, like many Jewish 
neighborhoods within the city limits of Baltimore, blacks were prohibited, whether by covenant 
or by custom, from most other non-black neighborhoods (Orser 1997). Practices of redlining and 
blockbusting are well-documented across the U.S. during this time period (Massey & Denton 
1993), and Baltimore was not only no exception, redlining was actually invented there (Massey 
& Denton 1993; Pietila 2010). In neighborhoods like Park Heights, blockbusting resulted in the 
transfer of “astronomical modernization liabilities of sub-standard housing to unsuspecting black 
buyers” (Pietila 2010, p.xii). In order words, the black families that bought the homes in 
neighborhoods like Park Heights assumed financial responsibility for an aging housing stock in a 
neighborhood that was possibly already in decline. And beyond the economic repercussions, 
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there were social consequences as well: Orser (1997) documents blockbusting practices in the 
same time period in nearby Edmonson Village. There too, a neighborhood of 20,000 people, in 
this case pre-dominantly Protestant, was almost entirely replaced with a new African-American 
population in the span of one decade. Orser points out that with this type of upheaval, the 
“trauma of racial change” – as we shall see in the coming chapters – “leav[es] its mark on  those 
who left, as well as those who took their place” (Orser 1997, p.4).  
Park Heights: Then, and Now 
Many old-timers lament the loss of a time when there was a vibrant community in Park 
Heights. There were many more employment opportunities, renowned local delis and restaurants, 
and activities for the kids. Many elderly homeowners grew up in the neighborhood and 
remember what it was like before the transition in the 80s. Mr. Green was not the only old-timer 
to tell me about the well-known Jewish deli in the center of town: “the Jewish man on the corner 
– Goldman I think – oh, he had the best meat in Baltimore City.” Barbie grew up in the 
neighborhood in the 1970s. She recalls: 
It was beautiful.  Green grass, trees, it was real nice. Ms. Reiner lived next door. Mr. 
Ward lived over there. Mr. Roth had eight children. And they had a pool in the backyard. 
We had another neighbor that lived over there. He was a lawyer. He was real proper. He 
had a ground pool, a round circle in their yard.   
 
Barbie could go on for hours about all of the stores, amenities, and community services she 
remembers in the neighborhood growing up: 
I had a great childhood living up here, it was real nice. We had everything right and 
convenient.  We had a drug store, clothing shop, bakery, bowling alley on Wood Road, 
movies at the plaza. We had a Ponderosa on Ten Mile Lane, we had King's Court in the 
plaza where we could go and eat. And then we had Cookies, which was a men's store. We 
had a Darnell’s Ice Cream Parlor, Goldman’s, what else… We had two drug stores in the 
area and Acme was right there by the church - and we had hardware stores, shoe shops, 
dry cleaners - it was real nice. It was real nice when we first moved there.  We had a 
recreation center out the back and a pool with a big sliding board, swings, sand box. We 
had the park. We used to go down there and picnic.  It was pretty good when we was a 
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whole lot younger.   
 
But, over the years as the population, the tax base, and the investment shifted, the neighborhood 
changed a great deal, as Barbie explains: 
It's changed over the years. They tore down our recreation center, our movies gone, our 
Darnell’s ice cream parlor is gone, Mr. Goldman who had the market, he moved – well, 
he died. Acme moved and Stop N' Shop moved in there. They stayed and then they 
moved later on.  So really we don't have a market in the area. And we don't have a drug 
store in the area.   
 
We had a library, too. Right there on the corner where that Head Start program is. That 
was the library. We could go around to the library and had a lot of stuff for us.  Movies, 
books, activities, you know, the recreation center we used to go to football games, 
baseball games - it was really nice. There was a lot to do. And now, they don't have 
anything for the kids to do in the community. They trying to close our rec centers down. 
We have a recreation center over here on Park Heights and Leroy. They closed the pool 
we had down there on the other side of Lakewood and Harrison. That was the nice pool.  
 
Barbie’s mother went door-to-door selling Avon in the neighborhood, and she accompanied her 
mother on her rounds and wrote down all the orders. A few weeks later, she would deliver the 
products. Barbie got to know many Park Heights families this way, and often got hired to watch 
the children: “my sister and I, we did all the babysitting around here.” Even when many of the 
white families moved north, Barbie continued working for many of them as a house cleaner. 
These accounts of neighborhood change are echoed by data on poverty in the 
neighborhood. Figure 10 shows that the poverty rate has remained relatively stable since 1970s 
when it increased from 16 percent – in line with the average for Baltimore City – to 27 percent. 
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Figure 10: Poverty Rate 1970-2010 
 
Source: 1970-2000 data are from the Decennial Census; 2010 is from the ACS 2010 5-year 
estimate, and Baltimore city 2010 is from the ACS 2010 1-year estimate. 
 
Transition in the neighborhood came to different areas at different times. Bob Marshall is sixty-
two and lives in a transitional mixed area. He and his wife were not among the original black 
settlers of the neighborhood, but he has lived in the neighborhood for over 25 years; they moved 
into their home in 1985 when his wife’s aunt passed away and left it to them. Bob has worked 
many jobs, including working for an oil company, landscaping, and driving a truck. However he 
could never save enough to buy a house, so when he and his wife inherited the home it was like a 
dream come true: “everybody’s dream is to own your own home. And that was mines. I wanted 
the porch where I could sit out on, and everything. It was a nice neighborhood at that time.” The 
neighborhood was only showing minimal signs of decline when the Marshall family moved in in 
the mid-eighties, and though the house needed some work, Bob was up for the task:   
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You know, no matter where you live you gotta pay. I thought maybe it would be more 
better for us to go here and try to fix what we have, rather than try to pay somebody else. 
I mean you know being that I was kind of handy with my hands I thought that I could do 
it well enough that we could live here and finish paying it off. 
 
And pay it off they did. Bob and his wife, and their two kids lived happily in the neighborhood 
for several years before it changed. On a rainy morning, Bob described to me how he remembers 
the neighborhood: 
You know when I think about the neighborhood I don’t think about cloudy days like 
today, I think about nice sunny days with the trees out… there was a few more then, that 
people done cut down since then. It was quiet and it was peaceful. It was like, you wanted 
to come home from work, you wanted to come home and put your feet up. During warm 
weather you could sit out there on the porch till late at night, and not be bothered or 
anything and relax you know, gather your thoughts. 
 
In the late eighties and nineties, the class composition of the neighborhood started to change. 
Those few whites who had not sold their homes in the sixties – those who had stayed rooted in 
their community – now began to leave. Barbie remembers each of her neighbors on the block 
and when and why they moved out. 
Miss Reiner stayed here a long time even after her husband died. Miss Carter, down the 
street, and Miss Epstein stayed. A lot of the whites still stayed around here. But in the 
early 90's a lot of them started to move. You know, 'cause they husbands had died, they 
really didn't have anybody to come in the house and I guess they start to get scared. 
 
The shifts in the past twenty years have led to a lot of vacancies and residential instability in the 
neighborhood. Many homes changed hands or were abandoned. Barbie says that change had 
been gradual, until there was an abrupt shift on her block: “I think about after about ‘98, it really 
started to change. Quite a few of the houses across the street was tore down. They done tore 
down a lot in this area.” Patty too remembers that, “Park Heights was a beautiful place. But then 
it came a point in time that it wasn’t. People were just people moving out, and they weren’t 
fixing up the houses, and the houses were boarded up. And this is something I don’t like, I do not 
like to be in a community where the homes are not being taken care of or the grass and what 
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have you are not taken care of.”  
Residents’ memories of when things really started to look different are in line with the 
statistics. Between 1970 and 2000, the overall vacancy rate35 rose steadily from 5 percent in 
tandem with the city of Baltimore, but between 2000 and 2010 it rose well above the Baltimore 
average of 16 percent, jumping to a full 20 percent (ACS 2010). This means that a significant 
portion of the housing stock in Park Heights is unoccupied at any given time. Of the 2277 vacant 
units in Park Heights in 2010, 60 percent of them were not for sale or for rent, suggesting that 
they are abandoned (U.S. Census 2010). 
 
Figure 11: Vacancy 1970-2010 
 
Source: Decennial U.S. Census 1980-2010 
 
 
                                                
35 This combines “for rent,” “for sale” and “other vacant” units. 
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Vicki is 54 years old, and a long-time renter in the neighborhood. 
When we first moved out here I was four years old. It was so nice around here. All these 
houses, they weren’t like that [she points across the street], they were beautiful houses, 
nice beautiful gardens. The kids had playgrounds, all the grass and trees it was cut so 
pretty and stuff; now it’s like… They don’t come and do the maintenance. Like that one 
across the street with all the trees growing on it, with the brick wall. 
 
Vicki is describing a home on the block that has trees growing up through the front porch and 
leafy vines that have wrapped around the front posts of the house, all but obscuring the entryway. 
After all, Baltimore is the “southernmost state of the union” as I was told many times, with long 
humid summers, and vegetation grows quickly, especially in areas that are not carefully 
maintained. Vicki says that the owners of the home “live a hop, skip and a jump from the ‘hill,” 
but don’t do anything to maintain the vacant home.  
I guess they figure mine is in a drug area and don’t nobody have money like that to buy 
them. They just let it go, and that’s how the rats will come. Like this house right here 
next door, I was on the porch the other night, and I kept hearing something over there.  I 
looked it was two Opossums! He was showing his teeth at me, I said, “I don’t want no 
part I am not going to bother you, I’m trying to get away from here.”  And I think he 
wanted to attack me.  He came right out that hole right there.  I said, “oh my goodness 
where is they coming from?” … Cats be over there too. And then in between that block 
down there, I seen a fox down there. There is a lot of animals around here now.  We have 
fox, opossums, and rabbits. They just come on up here. Because it’s a lot of trees, as you 
can see a lot of trees and grass.   
 
Even when derelict homes are torn down by the city, empty lots remain in their stead, and the 
city is not always vigilant about cutting back the vegetation that sprouts so quickly in 
Baltimore’s balmy climate, to keep the animals out.   
Violence in the Neighborhood 
As shown in Figure 12, since the year 2000, “Part I” crime has gone down across 
Baltimore city.36 In comparison, Part I crimes have been somewhat lower in both of Park 
                                                
36 Part I’ crime refers to refers to violent crime (murder, aggravated assault, rape, attempted rape) and 
other serious offenses including burglary, larceny, and auto theft. 
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Heights’ CSAs37 since the year 2000, but between 2009 and 2010 there has been an uptick, 
bringing them closer to the city average. 
 
Figure 12: “Part I” Crime Rate 2000-2010 
 
Number of reported criminal offenses per 1,000 residents  
Source: Baltimore City Police Department 
By looking at Figure 13, displaying a subset of Part I crime, “violent” crime, which 
includes homicide, rapes, aggravated assault, and robbery, we see a slightly different picture. 
Across the time period of 2000-2010, the violent crime rate has been much closer to the city 
average, except between the years 2009-2010 when it surpassed them, and reached levels not 
seen since 2001, especially in the Pimlico/Arlington/Hilltop CSA. From this, we can conclude 
that though Park Heights’ rates of violent crime are at or above the city level, the rates of other 
Part I crimes (larceny, auto-theft) are somewhat below the city average. 
 
                                                
37 Crime data from the Baltimore police department is only available at the Community Statistical Area 
(CSA) level, not the census tract level. 
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Figure 13: Violent Crime Rate 2000-2010 
 
 
A subset of Part I crime, violent crime measures the number of reported violent crimes including 
homicide, rape (and attempted rape), aggravated assault, and robbery per 1,000 residents  
Source: Baltimore City Police Department 
Residents in the mixed and transient areas sometimes report feeling like they live in a war 
zone, and many have the scars physically marking the violence they have endured in the 
neighborhood. For example, when I met Shawn and asked him about his experience in the 
neighborhood, the first thing he told me was: “I have a bullet in my brain.” When you look at 
Shawn from straight on, you can see that the left side of his head is misshapen from the incident, 
and when his hair is cut short a large scar is visible where the bullet entered his head. Bob, the 
homeowner mentioned above, told me the story of how his brother was shot dead on his own 
front porch. Bob thinks it was by a gang member who mistook his brother for someone else, 
though the shooter was never caught. In my time in Park Heights, I was witness to countless 
violent incidents; both firsthand, as well as through the stories of my respondents, in which they 
were involved sometimes as innocent bystanders and other times as participants. 
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In contrast, homeowners who reside in the sheltered homeowner havens are in large part 
protected from much of the neighborhood violence. They often have cars to get from one place 
to another, helping them to avoid walking through areas where drugs are sold, and where other 
have reported being mugged or jumped while walking home. Though they live in many of the 
same areas, they tend to be older and not as mobile and are therefore exposed to less of the 
neighborhood.  
Ecological Areas in Park Heights Today 
Residential status (i.e. whether one owns rents, or has a voucher) plays an important role 
in shaping the way residents interact with the neighborhood, but an alternative way to 
conceptualize how neighborhood effects are mediated is on a sub-neighborhood level. There are 
three within Park Heights, with distinctive characteristics related to 1) the housing status of 
residents, 2) length of tenure, 3) and geographic boundedness of the block group area. Using 
these criteria, in the beginning of this chapter I identify three distinct ecological zones: sheltered 
homeowners havens, transitional mixed areas where homeowners are dwindling, renters are 
moving in, but many homes are left vacant, and bounded transitory zones where both voucher 
holders and unassisted renters are moving in and out fairly frequently. 
Sheltered Homeowner Havens  
The homeowners in Park Heights face a very different situation from the renters, but in 
many ways, their choices are also quite constricted. Most of the African American homeowners 
(who now comprise 98 percent of all homeowners) moved to Park Heights in the late 60’s and 
early 70’s as the white population was moving out. They were often working class, and aspired 
to be in the middle class. Many were children of migrants from the south, and they were offered 
mortgages in the neighborhood. Most of these original settlers are still there, or they stayed until 
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they died. They often passed on their homes to their children and grandchildren. Their family 
and social networks are deeply embedded in Park Heights, as are their most significant financial 
investments: their homes. They have invested a lot in their neighborhood and in their home, and 
many are reluctant to leave both for sentimental reasons, as well as for financial reasons: their 
homes are not worth much. 
Mr. Green came to the neighborhood and bought a home with his wife in 1962. They 
were one of the first African-American families on the block. He still lives in the same house, 
and his son lives down the street. Mr. Green says when his neighbors don’t see his car move for 
a few days they come to make sure he is ok, and when he comes home with groceries, Mr. or 
Mrs. Peabody who live next door come running out to help him carry them inside. Mr. Green is 
far enough from the center of Park Heights that he feels relatively protected from the crime of 
the more “lively” areas. But he says that his son has warned him: If the crime moves further 
back, he will have to sell the house and leave. 
Transitional Mixed Areas:  
Maple Ave is short, about two blocks long, and very wide. There are row homes with 
small covered porches on either side of the block, but one side has a huge gaping hole where a 
home once stood, and is now an empty grass-filled lot. Occupied homes are interspersed with 
vacant homes, some of them in very bad shape, falling down with rotting frames, caved in roofs, 
and broken windows. There are no trees, and small patches of grass in front of the houses. There 
are often people hanging out, either in front of houses on or the porch.  
Tonya, the adult daughter of a couple who bought a home in the early 70s and lives there 
with her parents, explains that the neighborhood is aging – homeowners are getting old.  
This neighborhood it’s alright, it’s a cool neighborhood compared to what it used to be.  
This neighborhood has changed a lot…[It used to be] one of those neighborhoods that 
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you wouldn’t want to come into… I know for a fact at that time you would not want to 
come through here. But today it’s totally different. There’s a lot of homeowners around 
now so there’s not that many kids.  You probably see a little kids because they’re visiting 
their grandparents or they’re babysitting them or whatever. It’s is a nice neighborhood, I 
mean I get along with the neighbors that I speak to. 
 
Tonya lives on a street with a lot of homeowners. But this is not true everywhere. On streets 
where many of the homeowners have died or sold their homes to investors who turned them into 
rental units, there is an influx of renters and voucher holders; in these areas vouchers make up as 
much as 23 percent of occupied rental units (HUD 2009, ACS 2010). Many homeowners do not 
feel positively about this. It can be hard to find market rate renters who are interested in living in 
these areas, in particular renters who are capable of paying their rent on time. This leads many 
landlords to seek voucher tenants, because the majority of rental payments are paid on time by 
the housing authority (see Chapter 4 for more detail). 
Unassisted renters also live in these transitional mixed areas. For example, Destiny is 
twenty-seven. She, her fiancé James, and her two young boys, five months and five years old, all 
share their rented room in a three-bedroom house. They pay $600 per month for the room, which 
is about ten feet by twelve feet, and contains a full size bed, a small cot and crib for the two little 
ones, and all the family’s possessions. One of the other bedrooms is occupied by a couple in their 
thirties, and the third room is occupied by a fifty year-old single man. Destiny came to the 
neighborhood less than a year earlier through an ad on Craigslist for a room-for-rent. At the time, 
her fiancé was in jail, and she was pregnant with her youngest boy and she needed to get off her 
brother’s couch. It was important to her to live somewhere where her kids could play outside, 
where there was not a lot of drug activity. She also wanted the house and other residents to be 
clean and neat. She gets along very well with her housemates, who have only been in the house 
for a few months. Destiny would prefer not to share her home with four other adults; she would 
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prefer not to have to carry her own roll of toilet paper into the bathroom that is shared by seven 
people; but this was the most affordable option she could find on short notice. Destiny has been 
on the housing voucher waiting list for over six years, since well before the housing authority 
stopped adding new names to the list, and saving money to rent her own apartment so that she 
will have room to take custody of her nine year old daughter who lives with her mother three and 
half hours away in Virginia. Destiny’s story is common. 
Barbie, a long-time resident of a transitional mixed area keeps track of all the homes on 
the block. On a late afternoon in October we go outside to Barbie’s lawn, enclosed with a chain-
link fence, and survey the surrounding homes. She lives on a small back street with large single-
family detached homes. Many are visibly vacant. Pointing to the house across the street, she tells 
me with some dismay in her voice: “Tracy moved out so that's empty.  Somebody just moved in 
this corner house right there. Let’s go say hi.”  
We walk across the street and three houses down. We knock on the door and though we 
can hear children laughing and yelling inside, it takes some time before anyone comes to the 
door. Barbie turns her head to glance sideways at me over the rim of her glasses and murmurs 
“Mmm-hmm,” as if to say, “see, just as I thought.” I am not sure yet what suspicion of hers has 
been confirmed, but I keep quiet and wait. Finally, a young woman opens the door a few inches 
and peer out. She has bandana holding her hair back, a toddler on her hip, and a small child 
trailing at her feet. She looks tired and disgruntled to be bothered. But Barbie has met her once 
before, she turns on the charm and flashes a genuine toothy smile that seems to work on 
everyone.  
Soon enough, we are sitting at the kitchen table – the only piece of furniture that I can see 
on the entire first floor aside from the TV – the children have been quieted with a snack, and 
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Penny is telling us all about her family and her move to the neighborhood. “Yeah, but how much 
is your rent?” Barbie gets straight to the point. When she tells us that the rent is $1200 a month 
and her portion is $55, Barbie says, “Where you think we be at? … Is you crazy? Girl, you must 
be under Section 8!” Most of the rented homes on the block go for around $700 a month, so 
Barbie is shocked to hear that the landlord is charging so much. After we left, she told me that 
another landlord she knows, Tony, “he own Miss Lorraine’s house and he owns another house 
down here. The house he got down here is empty, the people moved out.  I think he trying to rent 
it for $700.  That ain't bad…and I think that Louise pays $700 or $650.” 
Barbie is highlighting a key feature of her micro-neighborhood. While the unassisted 
renters in the area can barely afford their rents of around 700 dollars for a two-bedroom row-
home, new voucher holders are moving in, and the landlords are charged $1000-1300 for the 
same homes. These units are renovated to varying degrees, and have to pass more stringent 
inspections to qualify for the voucher program, but Barbie and others do not think they are worth 
that much more. I explore this question further in the following chapter. 
Bounded-Transitory Zones: Unassisted and Section 8 Blocs   
The first time I found Oakland Terrace it was by accident. I was leaving the home of one 
of my elderly respondents, Ms. Rose – who lived on a quiet street with many other homeowners 
– seeking a shortcut to the Park Heights Ave., on a block where all of the homes except four are 
vacant. I reached the end of the block, and turned left onto what looked like a back alley. It was 
overgrown with trees, there were huge potholes in the road, and off to the right, I saw a 
ramshackle structure in what used to be someone’s backyard, but had overgrown into a wooded 
area. When I saw the speed limit sign, I realized I must be on an official street. Just then the four 
low-rise units of Oakland Terrace came into view, and I saw the outer building of a housing 
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development of about two hundred units hidden on this back road that connected two different 
areas of Park Heights. This was my first encounter with a bounded transitory zone. 
One resident in Oakland Terrance, Tina, is thirty-four years old and lives with her 
thirteen year-old daughter. She had to abandon the home she inherited in East Baltimore because 
she did not have enough money to fix the leak in the roof and pay for an exterminator to fix the 
rat problem. She adopted a cat to try to keep the problem under control, but it wasn’t enough: 
“after a while you get tired of coming down the stairs and seeing rats all over the place” she told 
me. She eventually abandoned the house and had to move with her daughter into the first place 
she could find that would accept her, Oakland Terrace. We will hear more of Tina’s story in 
Chapter 5. 
Demographics, Downward Mobility, and Transition Between Groups 
 There are also transitions between homeowners and renters; some experience downward 
mobility. For example, Tonya grew up in Park Heights in a stable two-parent working family. 
She suffers from depression and went through a period in her twenties where she lived on the 
streets, was addicted to heroin, and engaged in sex work in order to make money. She has been 
sober for ten years, and now lives with her parents in her childhood home in Park Heights.  It has 
always been important to Tonya to work and earn a living. She worked for a cleaning service 
where she cleaned schools and office buildings. This was the worst job, but she says: 
Maybe because the way I was raised: a job is a job. A job is a job. And it’s something 
you want out of life regardless of the age you’re going to take it, you gotta crawl before 
you walk.  So that’s how I look at it like now I’m trying to find me like at least two or 
three hours you feel me you know to make sure she get to school or whatever but right 
now I just take whatever it is.  If it’s walking animals I do that too (laughter) yes because 
things is hard and it’s just us you feel me?  I try not to put no more on my mother and 
father than I have to so. 
 
For Tonya, selling sex was a way to earn money, which allowed her to rely less on her parents.  
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Another “second-generation” Park Heights resident, Michelle, is forty-five and lives with 
her mother Ms. Patty, who was among the early African-American homeowners in the 
neighborhood. When Ms. Patty bought their home on Roland Ave in 1972, she had high hopes 
for her children. Though a widow, she provided a home for her children, worked full-time but 
was also home to take care of Michelle and her two brothers as much as possible. Ms. Patty tried 
to shield her children from the tumult in the transitioning neighborhood as they grew up. But 
Park Heights changed over the years, and adolescence was rough on her children. Her oldest son 
asked to live with his aunt in the county, went to high school out there, attended Greenburg 
College, and is now doing very well working for the city. Her daughter Michelle fell in with the 
wrong crowd, became addicted to heroin, but has been clean for ten years. Ms. Patty’s youngest 
son, Michelle’s brother, was shot and killed 18 years ago. 
He got caught up in the city by being in the city. I worked in the daytime, then I 
transferred to a night shift because I got paid more money, $30 more for working, they 
call it night, and I took that job. That meant that, okay that meant him and my daughter, 
Michelle, they were home because I left, I worked from three to eleven and by the time I 
go to work, I could always go home and check on them. Then I had a neighbor that lived 
right next door, she did too. She checked on them. She was a teacher. He got caught up. 
And me not being home at night he started- he took to the streets and whatever he saw his 
buddies do, that’s what he did and then he got caught up into drugs and drinking alcohol. 
 
Ms. Patty believes she did her best to raise her children well: “All this and while working, just 
working. I did what I thought a mother was supposed to do. …I always seen that they had 
clothes, went to school and did what they were supposed to do. But she has no doubt that the 
neighborhood environment was not a good one for her children. 
In some ways, these children of homeowners have more in common with the transitional 
renters in the way they interact with the neighborhood. Similarly, five of the renters in the 
sample have been homeowners at one time or another. Sue qualified for the “welfare to work’ 
program, but instead of renting, she bought a house: The house was not new, but Sue loved it. It 
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was well cared for by a woman who had lived there for over 25 years, and had left to get her son 
away from drug dealing in the neighborhood. The mortgage was $500 per month. Sue admitted 
that it was a very good situation for her. But when her husband died she had a depressive 
breakdown and felt that she could not hold on to the house. “The thing with him was he was a 
contractor, he was a master plumber …  And then stuff just started just breaking in the house and 
I just -- I don’t know. I just made the worst mistake of my life in not keeping my home.” She 
was able to pay the mortgage for a time, but “the roof was leaking and the toilet was backed up 
and maybe I just didn’t want to be in that house anymore.” She got behind on the rent and the 
water bill. Sue was about three months behind and decided to leave. But she immediately 
regretted the decision to leave the house:  
I was feeling very disappointed in myself because when I had left Woodland it seemed 
like I had done a full circle because Woodland is where Darrell and when I had left 
Woodland I was selling drugs and I said, “Oh, I’m going to go to college and they’re 
never going to be able to take it from me,” and then I’m right back.  I felt as though I let 
my family down, myself and my family down.  
 
Now Sue lives in Oakland Terrace, which she says is like “the projects,” which feels like a step 
backwards for her. “I mean, let’s be honest, right?  …the upkeep, the potholes, the hallways, the 
maintenance, that’s what makes it a project.”  
Barbie is a second-generation homeowner, who has experienced a full range of housing 
situations. In her forties she had a housing voucher. She later bought a house in Park Heights on 
Georgia Ave but ended up losing it when she could not afford to pay for repairs: 
Oh let me see.  I had my son in ‘78.  I had my daughter in ‘84.  I was married for 10 
years.  I was buying a house there on Georgia Avenue…my husband got crazy and I kept 
it for quite a while…Yes, I did because he only stayed there a year.  Yeah, and then he 
left and I stayed there - after that - yeah, I had a mortgage.  Lived there till 98 and 
everything was going wrong in the house…And I wasn't working… [It was on] the 3300 
block.  Remember they was building these new houses there?  I bought one of those 
houses.  They was $25,000 and I got one of those houses and everything started going 
wrong. The heat pump system went out.  That was our heat.  I had the guy come out and 
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look at it.  He wanted to charge me $5,000. 
 
Now, Barbie rents from her parents and raises her children and grandchildren in the family home 
in which she was raised herself. 
Residential status shapes the way residents use the neighborhood, but there is fluidity 
between housing groups. Many of the original African American residents who moved to the 
neighborhood in the late 1960’s have passed their homes onto their children. This generation of 
homeowners, now moving towards retirement themselves, have experienced a fair degree of 
downward mobility, and often have more in common with some of the renters and voucher 
holders.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have told the history of Park Heights, and the demographic shifts in race, 
poverty, vacancy, and crime that have occurred since the seventies when the neighborhood 
transitioned from a middle-class Jewish neighborhood, to a predominantly working-class black 
neighborhood. I have also described the three ecological zones or “micro-neighborhoods” in 
which residents live, ranging from primarily homeowner areas, to transitional zones, and finally 
to areas that are mostly occupied by renters. In the next chapter, I will offer an explanation for 
the newest demographic shift in the neighborhood, the recent influx in voucher holders. 
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Chapter 4: Landlords and the Geographic Sorting of Voucher Holders 
 
 
From redlining and racial covenants, to separate and unequal public housing rosters, 
discrimination in housing practices has played a pivotal role in sorting people across the urban 
landscape, creating and perpetuating spatial inequality and racial segregation in this nation 
(Massey & Denton 1993; Wilson 1987). Scholars of poverty and residential mobility have long 
been interested in how the choices of low-income families interact with structural barriers to 
create and reproduce high-poverty and racially segregated neighborhoods. This chapter considers 
an essential tension between structure, policy, and individual choice in the question of residential 
mobility: what forces operate to reconcentrate poverty in the modern metropolis? On the one 
hand, research has focused on the structural-ecological forces that push and pull urban dwellers 
into different residential locations, creating residential flows between certain types of 
neighborhoods (Sampson & Sharkey 2008; Sampson 2012; South & Crowder 1997; Zorbaugh 
1929). On the other, researchers have considered how the selection mechanisms of preferences 
and decision-making act to disperse residents into neighborhoods of their choosing (Mayer & 
Jencks 1989). However, accounts of structural-ecological forces and individual choice 
explanations ignore a critical intermediary force, the landlord. In their role as gatekeepers, 
landlords affect sorting processes on a simple and fundamental level: every renter who wants a 
home must go through a landlord. In this chapter I demonstrate that landlord practices interact 
with and shape structural forces and residents’ preferences alike, constituting an understudied 
mechanism through which people are sorted across urban space.38 This chapter sheds light on 
                                                
38 Recent work has revealed landlords have enormous power to affect residential outcomes and the 
reproduction of poverty through eviction (Desmond 2012). However, looking at landlords’ role in sorting 
residents allows us to think about how poverty reconcentrates at the neighborhood level. 
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these mechanisms in order to understand how they reproduce spatial inequality and concentrated 
poverty. 
To illuminate the juncture where policy, preferences, and landlord practices meet, I 
consider the recent transformation in housing policy over the past two decades, which has 
brought about the dissolution of large-scale public housing and the shift to tenant-based housing 
subsidies.39 In the wake of public housing, needy residents were given vouchers to move into the 
private housing market, with the expectation that as the poor shifted into the private housing 
market and exercised more autonomy over where they lived they would experience positive 
outcomes and we would observe a deconcentration of poverty. Though these vouchers can be 
used anywhere, voucher holders are now reconcentrating in neighborhoods with moderate to 
high poverty rates, with important differences by race (Devine 2003; Orr et al. 2003; Schwartz 
2010). The voucher program was meant to provide families with a means to move to better 
neighborhoods, but instead poverty concentration and racial segregation are being reproduced. 
Why don’t low-income families move to better neighborhoods when given the opportunity to do 
so? The case of the voucher program provides a scenario where renters have viable alternative 
residential opportunities, providing a unique moment to observe how landlords may operate as 
an intervening force.  
In this chapter I examine how landlord practices contribute to selection processes that 
sort the urban poor into different neighborhood environments. I take Baltimore as my case study, 
a city with one of the highest rates of voucher use in the country. Contextual factors such as 
Baltimore’s housing landscape, the economic climate, available housing policy options, and a 
particular set of challenges in the local rental market including rent collection, high turnover 
                                                
39 This has shifted the majority of federal housing subsidies into privately owned properties (Schwartz 
2010; Turner & Kingsley 2008).  
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rates, and high vacancy rates in disadvantaged neighborhoods, have led to rising popularity of 
the voucher program for landlords, and increased competition to attract and retain voucher 
tenants. Landlords have responded by structuring their businesses in strategic ways. I argue that 
these strategies are linked to residential sorting patterns through a three-step process: selection, 
matching, and selective retention. First, landlords use targeted recruitment tactics to select 
voucher tenants. Second, they select their ideal tenants – often the lower-end voucher tenants – 
and match them to the units where they are most needed. Third, landlords selectively retain 
tenants who do not have the means to leave. Across all three stages I find that race and 
geography are salient categories for understanding how selection and sorting processes operate 
through landlord practices. Taken together, such tactics result in a strategic balkanization of the 
rental housing market, serving as powerful mechanisms that sort and trap voucher holders where 
they can be most profitable to landlords – which happen to be the very neighborhoods 
policymakers would like to provide them with the opportunity to leave. The voucher case reveals 
the ways in which landlord practices can intervene to pervert the process of residential choice 
revealing the limits of a market-based solution to a complicated and entrenched social process. 
Transformation in Housing Policy 
In this chapter I consider how landlords engage with the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development’s (HUD) Housing Voucher Choice (HCV) program, formerly called 
“Section 8.” In recent years, federal housing policy has shifted away from public housing 
towards a system that is increasingly reliant on tenant-based subsidies meant to facilitate low-
income renters’ access to low-poverty neighborhoods (Turner & Kingsley 2008). The HCV 
program has been expanded in recent years and now serves 2.2 million low and very low income 
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households nationwide (HUD 2011).40 American housing policy has undergone a major shift in 
the past few decades: out of the five million households across the country that federal housing 
programs now assist, over half are now housed in privately owned properties (Schwartz 2010).41 
The voucher makes up the difference between what a needy household can afford, and the cost 
of a unit in the private market, allowing voucher holders the opportunity to access to a wide 
range of neighborhoods, including many low poverty, resource-rich, neighborhoods.42 
However, new research shows that voucher holders are concentrating in neighborhoods 
with moderate to high poverty rates (Devine 2003; Orr et al. 2003; Schwartz 2010). Further, 
there is mounting evidence of important differences by race: black voucher holders live in much 
poorer and more segregated neighborhoods than white voucher holders (Devine 2003; Pendall 
2000). Across both groups, voucher holders are no less likely to live in minority neighborhoods 
than other low-income renters (Basolo & Nguyen 2005; DeLuca et al. 2011; Devine 2003; 
Schwartz 2010; Turner 1998). The HCV program was meant to provide families with a means to 
move to better neighborhoods, but instead, poverty concentration and residential segregation are 
being reproduced. This raises an important puzzle: if poor families seek to achieve mobility 
through neighborhood attainment (see Sampson 2012), and residential preferences show that 
both blacks and whites would be open to more integration than currently exists (Charles 2003; 
Krysan & Farley 2002; Krysan 2011; Clark 1991; Schelling 1971), why then do voucher holders 
                                                
40 Though only one in four eligible families receives housing aid, HUD’s programs nevertheless reach a 
non-trivial portion of the poor (Turner & Kingsley 2008).  
41 Since 1992, the number of public housing units in Baltimore has significantly diminished while HCV 
subsidies have increased almost two-fold, from 5,966 units to 11,700 (Jacobson 2007). In 2009, Housing 
Choice Vouchers made up 9.88 percent of the rental market in Baltimore (calculated out of occupied 
rental units, HUD 2008, ACS 2008). In the U.S. there has been an increase of 450,000 vouchers since 
1995, half of which are due to new voucher households, and half of which are transfer households from 
public housing and other subsidies (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities 2004; Schwartz 2010). 
42 See Chapter 1 for details on program requirements. 
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not end up in more affluent and integrated neighborhoods when they are provided the 
opportunity to do so?  
Residential Decisions: Families in the Housing Voucher Choice Program 
Past research has focused on the role of policy implementation in determining where 
voucher holders end up (Edin et al. 2012; Marr 2005; Pendall 2000; Varady & Walker 2003). 
Much research on this demand-side of the equation has considered voucher holder preferences, 
residential behaviors, decision-making patterns, mobility experiences and perceived obstacles, 
and how these (Boyd et al. 2010; DeLuca et al. 2013; Edin et al. 2012; Pashup et al. 2005; 
Pendall 2000; Rosenblatt & DeLuca 2012; Varady & Walker 2003). Numerous scholars 
investigate the complex search process, considering how voucher holders’ decision making 
interacts with housing policy to explain the disproportionate voucher-holder concentration in 
poor and minority neighborhoods; this research reveals myriad obstacles to successful lease-up, 
including tight rental markets, discrimination, bureaucratic delays, limited experience with the 
program, household size, health issues (Pashup et al. 2005), social networks (Boyd 2008), 
constrained time windows within which to find a new unit (DeLuca et al. 2013), and problems 
with landlords (Boyd et al. 2010; DeLuca et al. 2013). Other work considers how participants in 
Baltimore’s voucher program make residential decisions, showing that voucher holders find they 
can attain better units with more space and more amenities in less advantaged, predominantly 
African-American neighborhoods (Wood forthcoming). This research on voucher holder 
experiences points to the importance of understanding how landlord practices may interfere and 
operate as a countervailing force to voucher holders’ neighborhood attainment. 
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The Role of the Landlord 
Although economic theory presumes housing markets to be perfect and competitive, if 
we ignore the ways in which landlords may interfere with the competitive market we will not 
understand their influence on housing outcomes (Gilderbloom 1989). Early work on landlords 
focused on their role in the urban housing crisis and the problem of deteriorating inner-city slum 
housing stock, making a strong argument that the landlord is an untapped, but key component to 
unraveling the market forces that underlie low-income housing problems (Stegman 1972; 
Sternlieb 1966; Sternlieb 1972). However, forty years later, few researchers have attempted to 
address this oversight.  
Recent research on landlord behavior suggests that they may have profound 
consequences on residential stability. The high number of evictions in low-income communities 
cannot fully be explained by tenant characteristics and behavior (Hartman & Robinson 2003; 
Desmond 2012). Desmond’s work on eviction shows that it is a much more prevalent 
phenomenon than previously accounted for, and an important contributor to residential instability 
and the reproduction of poverty in low-income populations, especially in female-headed 
households (Desmond 2012). (Whereas Desmond’s work focuses on eviction as a method of 
selecting tenants “out,” this study considers the processes through which landlords select tenants 
“in”). There is further evidence that landlords can destabilize households though “soft eviction” 
techniques by creating unsustainable living environments or manipulating Housing Quality 
Standards (HQS) inspections43 (Edin et al. 2012; Stegman 1972). More research is needed in 
these areas to understand exactly how these mechanisms operate from the landlord’s perspective 
and what consequences they may have for the concentration of poverty. 
                                                
43 A set of minimum criteria set by HUD, evaluated in a yearly inspection, in order to ensure the health 
and safety of program participants. 
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Beyond the question of residential stability, landlords may play a key role in selection 
processes on a neighborhood level. There has been a recent turn in the study of neighborhood 
effects to study selection processes in neighborhoods in their own right (Sampson 2012; 
Sampson & Sharkey 2008). Landlord practices constitute an understudied mechanism through 
which people are sorted into neighborhoods. Research on concentrated poverty needs to better 
understand how tenants are selected and then sorted within a landlord’s rental portfolio. There is 
almost no research specifically examining how landlords make decisions about desirable tenant 
characteristics.  
We also know little about why, and under what circumstances landlords participate in the 
Housing Choice Voucher program. What we do know suggests that many landlords do not find it 
in their interest, and refuse to accept families with HCV vouchers even though this is illegal in 
many jurisdictions (Pashup et al. 2005; Tegeler et al. 2005).44 This confers enormous power to 
define where voucher families can and cannot live (Daniel 2009, Johnson-Spratt 1988).45 Above 
and beyond discrimination, evidence suggests that there may be administrative and procedural 
investments that deter landlords’ participation in the HCV program (DeLuca et al. 2013; Turner 
et al. 1999). Importantly, several studies have pointed to the role of Fair Market Rent (FMR) in 
providing a disincentive for landlords to rent to voucher holders in affluent areas, given that they 
may easily find other qualified tenants who can afford to pay with no special procedures; on the 
                                                
44 SOI laws have been adopted at the city, county, and state levels; currently, only ten states have SOI 
laws, as well as a number of counties and cities across the country. See (Tegeler et al. 2005) for a list of 
all jurisdictions with SOI laws. 
45 The reasons for this may be two-fold. First, substantial evidence documents landlord discrimination 
based on a social stigma associated with voucher program participants, both racial as well as behavioral in 
origin (Freeman 2012; Turner & Ross 2005; Turner et al. 1999; Yinger 1995). A study investigating 
whether Source of Income (SOI) discrimination laws affect voucher holder locational outcomes finds 
significant impacts on poverty concentration as well as small but significant impacts on minority 
concentration associated with the implementation of these laws (Freeman & Li 2012). Further, Freeman 
finds substantial evidence that SOI laws affect the experience of voucher holders, in particular he finds 
that they are associated with voucher higher utilization rates (Freeman 2012).   
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flipside, there may be incentives for landlords to rent to voucher holders in more disadvantaged 
areas (Collinson & Ganong 2013; DeLuca et al. 2013). This points to a gaping hole in our 
understanding of how landlords make decisions about which properties and which 
neighborhoods are ideal to rent to voucher holders, which has clear and important implications 
for understanding a possible mechanism behind the reconcentration of poverty. 
In short, in order to understand why voucher holders end up in the neighborhoods they 
do, we must look beyond both the preferences and behaviors of those who are seeking housing – 
voucher holders themselves – as well as the structural factors of the housing market and the 
operation of the HCV program, to focus on the those who are supplying housing – the landlords 
– and their role as gatekeepers, intervening between structure and preference. I contribute to a 
burgeoning discussion on how landlords can affect residential stability and neighborhood 
attainment by considering the key moments of who gets selected, where they get sorted. 
Baltimore and the Appeal of Voucher Tenants 
The landlords in this sample face a common set of circumstances and challenges.46 In 
recent years, the Housing Choice Voucher program, formerly known as “Section 8,” has become 
increasingly attractive to landlords. Historically there has been a great deal of stigma surrounding 
the program, and landlords have often preferred to avoid renting to voucher tenants. But evolving 
HCV policies, coupled with the financial crisis of 2008 and the subsequent changes the housing 
landscape in Baltimore have made the guaranteed rent paid through HCV program much more 
coveted. 47 This has led many landlords to convert their properties to rent specifically to voucher 
holders.  
                                                
46 Refer to Chapter 2: Data and Methods, for details on data collection 
47 Elements of the housing market have also been shown to affect successful use of the voucher, which 
was at 69 percent in 2000, including the “tightness” of the rental market, and the presence of source of 
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David, a young, white property manager who works with many local landlords and also 
owns some of his own units, has been working in the real estate business for the past ten years. 
He explains that before 2008, he and his colleagues, “were mostly doing “flips” as they called 
them in those days… When the market was high and everything, people were paying a lot of 
money for properties so there was a lot to be made in the rehab side of things, and then as the 
market started going down, the rentals started becoming more stable … So we started building 
up a rental portfolio.” Mark, a young white man who is part owner in one of the bigger real 
estate companies, Reservoir Properties, explains that the company after doing an analysis of the 
company’s rental portfolio in 2007, he realized that the HCV program was a very profitable way 
of doing business in the changing economic landscape. In the span of a year, the company went 
from 15 percent voucher units to 85 percent voucher units: “We literally just vacated everyone 
and … we just said “Hey, we’re not renewing your lease and it’s time to get out,” and we just did 
like 15-20 houses a month…And just turned the whole portfolio over and then marketed 
exclusively to Section 8.” Smaller independent landlords like Noah changed their strategies 
around the same time. Noah is a white man in his late forties who comes from a conservative 
Jewish family, and took over the family business in 1988 from his uncle and cousin, who had 
about thirty properties and never accepted voucher tenants. Against his family’s advice, Noah 
began accepting vouchers in 2006, and quickly converted much of his business to renting to 
voucher holders; he employed a similar tactic as Reservoir Properties, where he would not renew 
the leases on units rented to market rate tenants, and then recruit a voucher holder to replace 
them. Within a year, he had converted almost half of his units to rent through the HCV program. 
                                                                                                                                                       
income anti-discrimination laws (Finkel & Buron 2001; Schwartz 2010). One might expect that these 
same factors would relate to the way landlords engage with the program in important ways. 
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 Many of the older, more experienced landlords cite familiar stereotypes of voucher 
holders as noisy, dirty, discourteous neighbors, and troublesome tenants. Noah sometimes 
attends meetings of the Baltimore Property Owners Association, a professional trade association 
for landlords and real estate investors, explains that very few of the older group members accept 
vouchers. He says there is still a “legacy mindset” that voucher tenants will “destroy the place” 
because “they have no incentive to keep it clean,” which will cost the landlord more in the long 
term.  
 However, even with the behavioral differences that some still believe distinguish market 
tenants from voucher tenants, there are compelling reasons for landlords to prefer voucher-
holders. In this economic climate, landlords face a distinct set of challenges: vacancies, turnover, 
early lease termination, rent collection, and property damage. The majority of the landlords in 
this study have come to the conclusion that renting through the HCV program is offers a set of 
solutions to these thorny problems.  
Most importantly, renting though the HCV program solves the problem of non-payment 
of rent. Rent collection is a huge problem for landlords in Baltimore who rent to low-income 
populations. In 2007 the median household income for renters in Baltimore city was $25,000 and 
a quarter of all renters earned $9,600 or less. That means for a quarter of the rental units in the 
city, an affordable rent (30 percent) would be just $240 per month.48 Many low-income renters in 
Baltimore simply cannot afford market rents, and landlords have quite a lot of difficulty 
collecting them.  
The majority of landlords in this study demonstrate a strong preference for voucher 
tenants because they recognize the economic advantages reaped from a tenant whose rental 
payments are in majority issued directly and dependably from the housing authority. They also 
                                                
48 American Housing Survey, Baltimore Metro data, 2007. 
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know that if a tenant loses their job, they will still get paid. Since many low-income renters are in 
precarious employment situations, this is quite relevant.  
Tyrone remarks: “A lot of owners like voucher tenants because the rent is guaranteed. It’s 
going to be in your mailbox or your account between the first and the fifth. You don’t have to 
worry about chasing any money.” This rings true with the other landlords who report having a 
great deal of trouble collecting rent on time from market tenants. Mark points to the simple 
economic reality that for people working at minimum wage, the landlord is not at the top of the 
priority list: “when you’re struggling to survive, “fuck the landlord!”” Many landlords go so far 
as to say that they simply cannot make a living renting to low-income market tenants, because 
they spend so much time and energy collecting rent, taking tenants to rent-court, and processing 
evictions for non-payment. Landlords feel that that HCV program offers them powerful tools to 
combat some of these persistent problems. It is for this reason that many landlords have a strong 
preference for renting to voucher holders, leading them to convert their business towards 
targeting voucher holders, and implementing the program in strategic ways. 
The Comparative Advantage of Vouchers 
The determination of rent reasonableness for a given unit is officially made through a 
two-step process. Rent for the voucher unit is compared to rents for similar unassisted units in 
the marketplace as well as to rents for similar units on the premises (HUD 2001). Criteria for 
comparison include location, quality, size, unit type, and age of the unit, and secondly, amenities, 
housing services, maintenance, and utilities the owner must provide under the lease. Though 
many of these criteria are fixed characteristics, I find that landlords have more discretion than 
previously thought. Not only can they make decisions about what sorts of amenities to include, 
but they can also alter seemingly fixed characteristics, such as the number of bedrooms, through 
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renovations and other alterations such as counting a den as a bedroom. This research reveals 
significant rent discrepancies between similar units in the same areas. 
There is evidence from landlords that they may be able to manipulate the rent 
reasonableness determination and charge more for subsidized units then they would for a similar 
unit on the private market.  When I met with one local landlord, Jake, we sat on the front porch 
of the four-bedroom home he was in the process of renovating. The home was located on a quiet 
street of an area in Park Heights largely populated by homeowners, but with a reputation for 
crime and break-ins. Jake wanted to rent the home for $1500 per month, but he is certain that he 
could never get this much from a market rate tenant on this block. “I mean you can’t go ask a 
person for 1,500 dollars knowing they have a regular job… something like this [house], you have 
to stay within the budget that somebody can afford. Now most [market rate tenants] I’ve been 
talking to can afford anywhere from like 700 to 900. That’s what they’re willing to pay for rent. 
But 700 to 900 these days is kind of cheap for a whole house that’s fixed up.” Jake was pleased 
that morning because he had just found an HCV tenant and negotiated the rent at $1500. This is 
the primary reason that Jake seeks voucher-holding tenants. Other landlords too, admitted that 
they can get as much as a three hundred dollars more per month by renting to an HCV tenant. 
Jason, a white landlord in his forties, who learned the business from an expert in HCV rentals, 
explains that when you ask for a certain amount of rent when negotiating the contract with HUD, 
there is more room for negotiation than one might expect.  
You request a rent. They’ll come back and say “Well, we can’t give you this but we’ll 
give you this.” And you can choose to accept it or deny it… You ask over and it can be 
way over but at least, because if you ask under they’re going to give you under… we 
always laughed about that because you’re like “Oh, I asked for 1200 and I got 1200.” 
That meant you probably should have asked for 13 and you could have probably got 1250 
or 1245 or whatever…If I do get a Section 8 tenant, depending on the bedroom size I may 
ask for 1300, 1350 and see where they come back in, knowing that they’ll probably come 
lower than that…Market tenant would probably be around 900… and that’s a whole 900 
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you have to collect. That’s the difference. 
 
There is also a feeling among landlords that they should get higher rents for participating in the 
program, in order to justify the additional administrative hurdles. Pastor Lewis confirms his 
experience of higher rents on HCV units: 
See, Section 8 should pay more because Section 8 goes through this microscope 
inspection. So you got to jump through all of these hoops, you know, and so Section 8 
tends to pay more where a market tenant wouldn’t get you but 900 dollars on the block… 
He wound up with getting about 1,300 dollars [through HCV]. 
 
Whether or not renting through the HCV program allows the landlord to collect a higher rent 
depends on where the unit is located. In many poor neighborhoods where there is a difficulty 
attracting a large range of tenants, landlords are obliged to lower their asking rents for market 
rate tenants in order to fill units and accommodate the incomes of the local population. But the 
HCV rents are based on Fair Market Rate (FMR) for a much larger geographic area, and 
therefore may indeed be higher than other similar houses on the block or in the neighborhood 
(DeLuca et al. 2011). Therefore, a landlord can often earn more rent by finding an HCV tenant 
than by renting through the open market. 
The Voucher Business Model: Concentrated property acquisition and economies of scale 
 Landlords make strategic decisions throughout the rental process in the interest of their 
business. At every step of the way – from property acquisition, to recruitment and selection 
criteria, managing relations with tenants, maintenance and renovation, and rent collection – these 
decisions can have an important impact which voucher holders end up in which properties and 
how long they stay.  
Many landlords acquired their properties before the housing market crash, with the intent 
to sell. But others have acquired their properties more recently, not for use as investment 
properties, but for use as rentals in order to generate cash revenue. In this case, landlords often 
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have strategies around what kinds of properties to buy, and where to buy them. Due to financial 
and administrative constraints, many landlords who accept vouchers find it most useful to 
leverage economies of scale; once landlords learn the intricacies of the HCV rules and 
regulations, they maximize their investment by converting their entire rental business into one 
that caters to the HCV market. Landlords achieve this by acquiring units in clusters, renovating 
at the same time, advertising in the same way, and setting up inspections for the same day. This 
means that it may be in the landlords’ best interest to concentrate their properties in a limited 
geographic region.  
For example, David’s company used to buy houses in order to sell them primarily, but in 
the past several years with the economic downturn they have been renting them. Thirty out of 
David’s 85 properties are located in just one neighborhood in Baltimore’s Belair-Edison area. 
This type of clustering is common among the landlords in the sample. Though not all landlords 
cluster their properties in the same neighborhood, it is common for them to cluster in the same 
types of neighborhoods – those where there is property available at the right price, and the right 
type of investment can be made. For landlords who know they will rent a particular property 
through the HCV program before they even buy it, learning about how acquisition decisions are 
made is especially important, because these choices form the basis for the array of possibilities 
from which voucher holders have to rent. The geographic concentration of properties may serve 
as a mechanism through which landlords contribute to the concentration of voucher use in 
disadvantaged neighborhoods.  
Landlords also create economies of scale by hiring tenant placement agencies and 
management companies who have experience dealing with special problems such as rent court 
and other legal issues. Morgan is a 35 year-old African-American woman who runs a 
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management company that contracts with several of the larger rental companies to “put out 
fires,” as Morgan puts it, dealing with a multitude of tricky problems such as rent collection, rent 
court, eviction, and tenant management issues involving damage and repairs, infestations, 
hoarding, and more. All of these specialized activities are often more efficiently out-sourced to 
companies with expertise in these areas. This also means that many of the techniques discussed 
below are widely disseminated through companies like Morgan’s, who contact with a wide range 
of landlords across the city. 
Some prefer not to hire a company to represent them in court, where they would risk 
sending someone who does not understand what it at stake for them; another way that landlords 
pool resources is to partner with other landlords. Ryan is a seasoned landlord who was one of the 
first in the city to specialize in HCV rentals. He owns over 150 properties in Southeast 
Baltimore, and prides himself his is business model, which is optimized to cater to the HCV 
market. He explains that he and a “circle” of four other landlords are business partners, each 
members of the other’s company. Ryan explains that when more than one of the partners needs 
to go to rent court on the same day, one of them can go and act as a proxy for the others. This 
helps from an efficiency standpoint, but also because they need business help from people who 
are trained, and who may even have a personal stake in the outcome.  
Ryan sets up his business with his business partners to ensure that renting to voucher 
holders – a process fraught with red tape and complicated administrative procedures – runs as 
smoothly as possible. Ryan has personally trained each of his partners in his business model. 
These practices of out-sourcing, pooling resources, and apprenticeship between landlords have 
important implications for the voucher program; when a method is found to be successful, this 
practice may quickly diffuse between landlords and companies by means these practices.  
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Selection of Tenants 
 The moment of tenant selection is key moment in the process by which landlords affect 
where residents end up living. This process can occur in a passive way, where landlords are 
contacted by interested tenants who have seen their advertisements on the internet, in the 
voucher office, or locally. It can also occur in a more active way; once we know the criteria upon 
which landlords rely to select tenants, we can consider how landlords target these types of 
residents for their properties. These selection criteria have important implications for who ends 
up where. 
Passive selection criteria: The ideal tenant 
 Despite the overwhelming preference for voucher holders, and that fact that economically 
is best to fill the unit as soon as possible, landlords do have preferences regarding the gender, 
family size, and source of income for the ideal tenant. Ryan has learned that it pays to look for 
certain characteristics in a tenant: 
We’re going to take the cleanest, best tenant possible versus just taking the first pulse that 
walks through the door…I want one single person to walk through the door that has [a] 
one bedroom [voucher] and no children and no family... They’re not going to wreck your 
house. Maybe when I first started, we were always looking for the [families with] bigger 
vouchers and [more] bedrooms, because more money. But absolutely, the house was 
destroyed. 
 
Other landlords too, express a desire for smaller families, single men or women without partners. 
Noah explains that he wants to find a family, “but it’s not the young twenty-something with four 
kids, it’s the later years with a couple of kids; a little bit older. …It’s been my experience that the 
younger single mothers with multiple children aren’t quite as focused on what they need to do to 
maintain the property. This comment highlights the salience of gender: Many landlords feel that 
male tenants are preferable to female. A woman with a lot of children is seen as a clear liability 
because of the damage to the home. Oscar claims that he would “rather have a man living in my 
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property than a woman because…with a woman, a lot of times you get into a little something 
with somebody or different guys may come over and there’s a big dispute.” So single women are 
also undesirable because of potential relationships with men. Furthermore, men are preferred 
because, as Oscar puts it, “a man can take care of his apartment a little better than a woman … 
they’re more handymen,” and often even help with the maintenance and upkeep. This preference 
for men may have implications for how landlords sort potential tenants within units. 
The general rule of thumb was best expressed by Pastor Lewis: “The ideal tenant is this: 
… the fewest amount of people in the house, with the highest amount of yield.” However, it 
became clear watching landlords interview and select potential tenant that in reality, the ideal 
tenant varies depending on one key factor: the property. When Noah had an open one-bedroom 
unit in a rough area of Park Heights. I observed him interview three potential tenants before 
picking one: He finally settled on a thirty-two year old man with schizophrenia. I asked him why 
he did was willing to accept a single man. He told me: “If it’s a lower-level one-bedroom then 
I’m looking for a NED, a non-elderly disabled person…The perfect tenant depends on the 
property.” This contingent matching process of tenant to unit is key to understanding how 
landlords’ preferences operate to sort residents within the city. 
Modes of Selection 
Credit history, residential references, and criminal history are three criteria upon which 
landlords can rely to screen tenants during the rental process in order to select for the 
characteristics of their ideal tenant for a given property. Of all three criteria, landlords are 
primarily interested in residential history: 1) how long a tenant stayed at the previous home, and 
2) what their relationship with the landlord was like. David explains:  
How many years have they been in a property, how often they change and why? In our 
experience if they had an issue in the last property after a year, had an issue in the 
  101 
property before that with the landlord after six months, they’re going to have an issue 
with me. It’s not so much the landlord, it’s the tenant. If they have mice everywhere they 
go, that were just too bad to treat, clearly it’s them. So rental history is definitely a big 
one and we speak to the landlord, as long as their stories make sense it doesn’t have to be 
a certain amount of years. It’s after a year this school wasn’t looking after their kids and 
they had to change neighborhoods and the landlord says “Yeah, we got along fine. I’m 
sorry they had to leave.” I’m more open to that. If the landlord is like “Yeah, they were 
horrible to deal with.” And the tenant is like “The landlord is horrible to deal with.” I’m 
going to shy away.  
 
Landlords are trying to find tenants who will give them little trouble, but they are also trying to 
find tenants who are likely to stay in the unit for as long as possible; the latter is often more 
important than the former, and the screening criteria are used strategically to select for tenants 
who are most likely to stay. 
 The majority of the landlords (13 out of 20) use the voucher status as a proxy for both 
criminal background checks as well as credit checks. Noah skips the screening step entirely, 
saving him time: 
If it’s a voucher I don’t check for anything... I could care less.  Get the utility in your 
name, get the BG&E, electric and gas in your name and your rent’s paid for by the 
housing.  Otherwise I really don’t care…  So you missed a rent or something like that, 
fine.  But I’m going with a voucher so it kind of doesn’t matter.   
 
David finds criminal background checks to be especially irrelevant on single-family homes 
“because the other neighbors are not my tenants, if they have an issue with them, that’s up to the 
police. That’s out of my control. In multi-family we are a lot more particular because there are 
regiments that I need to watch out for.” Since most of a voucher tenant’s rent is likely to be paid 
through the HCV program, these background checks are not particularly useful. In fact, there are 
some advantages to renting to a tenant who has difficulty getting accepted by another landlord 
who may employ more rigid screening techniques: some landlords reported that tenants who 
have stains on their criminal, residential, or credit histories are 1) less likely to be picky about 
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where the unit is located, and 2) less likely to want to move, aiding the landlord in avoiding 
turnover costs. 
Active Recruitment 
Given the costs of property vacancy, we might expect landlords to market their available 
units to as wide a variety of tenants and in as many venues as possible. However, the tenant 
selection process is filtered in a myriad of ways related to the strategies that landlords use to find 
tenants. For example, David remarks that it is “easier to find voucher tenants because we have 
more of a central place to advertise.” Landlords tend to concentrate their HCV marketing efforts 
on the privately owned website www.GoSection8.com, where the Baltimore Housing office 
directs all voucher holders to find available units. Although this single clearinghouse could 
function as a powerful search mechanism to help voucher holders find a unit that best fits their 
needs, there are several reasons why this is not necessarily the case. Most importantly, the 
website does not constitute a “master list” of all available properties.49 Landlords decide whether 
or not to advertise on the website Since any “affordable” property is voucher eligible, the website 
only highlights a fraction of properties that a family could rent. further , as I learned firsthand 
through my own process of contacting landlords through gosection8.com listings, properties are 
not necessarily updated or removed after they are outdated, which means that landlords often 
leave pictures of their most attractive units in order to lure potential tenants. When the tenant 
inquires after a certain property (as I did on every recruitment call that I made), the landlord will 
say that it is rented, and then offer to show a different unit, often one that is less desireable). 
                                                
49 Even in jurisdictions where the list may be more complete, voucher holders are limited to the 
neighborhoods in which landlords are choosing to market their units specifically to voucher holders. 
DeLuca et al argue that the list can therefore limit the kinds of neighborhoods in which voucher holders 
search. They find that 182 out of 191 listed properties were in mid- to high-poverty areas and located 
almost entirely in highly segregated neighborhoods (DeLuca et al. 2013, p.281). 
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Landlords’ manners of using the site therefore constitute an important intermediary step in this 
selection process.  
Much of the selection process happens through targeted recruitment tactics, which runs 
counter to the idea of the program, which would suggest that tenants should be choosing 
landlords rather than the other way around. Many landlords actively recruit tenants outside of the 
website. Inside the HCV office there is a waiting room with a table on which landlords leave 
fliers with listings for available units. Some of the bigger companies have boxes with their 
company’s name marked on the outside of the box, so that their fliers always have a visible place 
on the table. Further, many landlords go to the Baltimore Housing office and recruit tenants 
directly outside the building. David explains his recruitment strategy: 
[I] kind of just hang out, [on] voucher day… they give out the new vouchers. They have a 
debriefing with the tenants. They give them the new voucher packets, so [there] is just a 
flood of tenant placement people. Even when I’m there for other issues sitting around the 
waiting room and talking to tenants I get phone numbers and give out a phone number 
and [recruit] that way. 
 
Voucher holders without access to a computer or Internet, and those do not have the computer 
literacy skills to utilize gosection8.com, are more susceptible to learning about available 
properties from the landlords who are doing direct recruitment at the HCV office. If it turns out 
that landlords are more likely to market certain types of properties in this way – for example, for 
properties that they are having trouble renting – then voucher holders with less resources will be 
more likely to end up in these types of units. Indeed, the landlords in this study employ these 
targeted recruitment tactics most often with units in disadvantaged neighborhoods that they are 
having trouble filling. This is an important way in which voucher holders are internally sorted 
within the voucher market, limiting access to certain types of units and neighborhoods for a 
segment of the voucher population.  
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Geographic Matching: “A tenant for every house” 
In addition to tenant characteristics, also property characteristics also matter in the sorting 
process. Landlords engage in a process of matching tenant – based on race, gender, and voucher 
status – to geography, including unit and neighborhood. Landlords have a range of properties in 
various different types of neighborhoods, some of which are distinctly harder to rent than others. 
This leads them to employ targeted recruitment tactics in order to attract tenants to hard-to rent-
units. Oscar highlights the key to the strategy: 
The thing is you don’t need a lot of help when it’s a good area. The owner basically will 
sit back and wait for calls himself… If he in that area it’s a no-brainer. Somebody’s going 
to say, “Oh, man, I want that.” But with me, in the bad area, that’s when it’s hard. But 
you got to understand that everyone needs somewhere to live. It’s a tenant for every 
house. You’ve just got to find the right tenant. 
 
This means that landlords actually make strategic decisions about what type of tenant will be 
most likely to settle for a unit in a rough area, and how best to attract them. 
Enticements: Building a better mousetrap 
In some neighborhoods – in particular in disadvantaged, resource-poor, or high-crime 
neighborhoods – landlords have difficulty renting units to any type of tenant. Therefore, it is 
common to compensate for these factors by taking special measures to make the units attractive 
and rentable in order to attract a desirable tenant. For example, Tyrone likes to start with a home 
under renovation: 
 …when you start working with properties that are going to be renovated or in the 
renovated state, because when you get a serious tenant and you can lock them down, then 
you can … put the tenant in a position where they are in control, and everybody wants to 
be in control. So you come into a room and say “What color do you want this room? It 
has to be painted anyway. It might as well be your color.” And they feel like now it 
belongs to them so it makes them want the property even more. It makes them do the 
things they need to do to qualify for the property and then we rent it a lot faster. 
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Other landlords, too, use upscale amenities and renovations to attract tenants to units located in 
neighborhoods they might not otherwise consider. Mark drove me to one of his units located in a 
rough area of East Baltimore. He gave me a tour of several of the company’s homes on the block 
that have all been gut-renovated with hardwood floors, new carpeting upstairs, new kitchens with 
upscale appliances, finished basements, and the tenants’ choice of paint colors. He explains: “our 
experience has been you have to do this to get someone to move to a neighborhood that looks 
like this…this is towards the nicer end of what we deliver... you have to do a ridiculous product 
in order to get a Section 8 voucher … to really want to live there.” These measures can be 
selectively employed to recruit and attract voucher tenants who might otherwise to use their 
voucher in a better neighborhood. 
Even with these enticements, it can be difficult to rent properties in certain 
neighborhoods. Several of the larger companies engage the services of tenant placement agencies 
who do the work of targeting and recruiting voucher tenants for these hard-to-rent units. Jim 
Lewis, a former pastor, is a fifty-five year-old African-American man who runs a very large 
tenant placement agency, and works with the biggest rental agencies in the city. Pastor Lewis is 
clean-shaven, wears wide-rimmed tortoise shell glasses, and often dresses in brightly colored 
checkered button-down shirts. He is passionate about his work, and prides himself on his ability 
to place tenants in difficult-to-rent units faster than any other tenant placement agent he knows. 
He explains: “It depends on where their property is.  If their property in Park Heights -- I’m just 
trying to find somebody. I don’t care who that body is… Park Heights, Cherry Hill, and 
Brooklyn all have the worst reputation in Baltimore city... So it’s not easy necessarily placing 
tenants in those areas.” Pastor Lewis explains that Park Heights is a particularly stigmatized 
neighborhood where people are often reluctant to rent: “A lot of Park Heights blocks is one of 
  106 
those kind of where… the first thing you’d say –because people call me and they say “what you 
got?” I say, “I got this gorgeous house in Park Heights.” [They say] “What else you got?”” 
Pastor Lewis describes one property that he has in Park Heights that has been beautifully 
renovated, but it is “on the worst block…Awful, awful, awful… A bunch of board ups… But 
[the landlord] had made this nice house. I mean beautiful house. And another property manager 
had it and he couldn’t get it rented. The guy called me, I got it rented in about three days.” Pastor 
Lewis has a several tactics that he uses to rent these types of properties. 
Tenant placement agents like Pastor Lewis ask permission from landlords to offer 
additional enticements to tenants in order to fill a hard-to-rent units, especially if they want to 
attract voucher holders: “I tell owners … look, you want to get your place rented. Okay. All 
right, now, this girl is on Section 8, okay? Her annual income is $6,000 a year. For real. You 
want a $1,000 security deposit? You want one-sixth of her annual income.”  Pastor Lewis often 
advises landlords that waiving the security deposit on an apartment in an unattractive 
neighborhood can help it to rent more quickly.  
One afternoon in Alex’s rental office, I watched him speak with a young woman, Malia, 
in her mid-twenties with an infant in tow, who had a two-bedroom voucher and was considering 
moving into the building. After visiting the two-bedroom apartment and discussing the rent, 
which would be 600 dollars a month, it was clear that she was still on the fence. Her voucher 
would go up to 900 dollars per month, so it was unclear why she was even considering this 
relatively small apartment, which was technically a one-bedroom with a den. The landlord Alex, 
asked her if she worked, and when she said was still receiving WIC for the baby, and her only 
additional income was a few hundred dollars in TANF, he nodded knowingly, and offered to 
waive the 600 dollar security deposit. She looked relieved, and a few hours later signed on the 
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dotted line. Alex told me that he often has to take special measures to attract voucher tenants: “I 
bend over backwards for these programs and these tenants. I mean that’s why my other two 
buildings are full of Section 8.” The security deposit is not usually covered by the housing 
voucher, so waiving the deposit acts as a particular enticement to voucher tenants for whom it 
would be very difficult to come up with a sum that is equivalent to one-sixth of their annual 
income. Alex offers other types of incentives that are especially enticing to voucher holders with 
very little money. Behind the one-hundred-unit property that Alex owns is the former site of the 
swimming pool that was built as part of the complex in the late sixties. It was closed and filled in 
with cement years ago, but in the weed-filled empty lot Alex now stores discarded furniture from 
evicted residents, which he often offers as an incentive to prospective tenants who do not have 
enough money to furnish their apartments. Reservoir Properties, one of the larger companies, 
offers cash bonuses to voucher tenants after the first month of occupancy. 
Some landlords actually target certain segments of the HCV market. Mark, at Reservoir 
Properties, says that his company prefers the “higher end” voucher holders, and they make 
choices about where to acquire properties, and how to renovate them in accord. In contrast, 
landlords such as Ryan, Jason, Larry, and Noah seem to target the “lower end” of the voucher 
market. They are open to tenants that might be less desirable to other landlords, and therefore do 
not routinely use background checks, credit checks, or residential histories. In some cases they 
even go out of their way to attract these tenants, who may be more likely to accept a unit in an 
undesirable neighborhood. When landlords have difficulty attracting voucher holders to a given 
unit or neighborhood, there are further techniques that can be used. Pastor Lewis employs a very 
particular strategy when showing voucher holders a prospective unit. Lewis picks-up families at 
their homes, and drives them himself to see available units:  
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We’ll take the tenants around.  My tenant placement service is built upon this… How I 
got it rented was, I showed the girl the inside of the house…She didn’t want to go, I said 
look, this owner … wants me to show his house… after that I’ll take you to any other 
house that you want to see.  She said, “well, okay”... So she agreed to go in and see the 
house… Well, when we got – and this happens too on a bad block … the ladies will be 
like “I ain’t getting out here.  Are you crazy?” And this was one of those kind of blocks.   
 
But Lewis convinces the voucher holder to see the unit, and he shuttles them directly in the door 
of the newly renovated home. This tactic effectively prevents prospective tenants from exploring 
the surrounding neighborhood, and emphasizes the quality of unit over the neighborhood 
environment. Once the prospective tenant gets in the door, it is much easier to negotiate because 
the home is beautifully renovated with lots of amenities. The landlord “did a beautiful $74,000 or 
more rehab. Central air, the house look like anything that you might walk in in the suburbs on the 
inside of the house, so, it’s beautiful… It’s like, if you build a better mousetrap, you know how 
they say that…” In other words, he lures the tenant into a home with sparkling new renovations, 
and before they know what they have gotten themselves into, the lease is signed. The financial 
investment in the home is rewarded by the ability to attract an HCV tenant, which often brings a 
premium above the amount of rent that could have been charged to a market tenant.50  
 There is an interaction between geography and certain tenant characteristics, in particular, 
race. Though it is not clear how the racial background of a potential tenant may affect a 
landlord’s decision of whether or not to rent to them, it plays a clearer role in where a landlord is 
likely to show a tenant homes. Pastor Lewis admits to racial steering: 
                                                
50 Only some landlords admitted that they were able to charge more for a unit that rented through the 
HCV program than they would have gotten at market rate. This could be for several reasons. Pastor Lewis 
is primarily a property manager and tenant placement service, not a landlord, which means that he does 
not directly deal with the HCV program, and perhaps is not as acutely aware that HUD would not be 
pleased to hear they are paying a premium above market rate. Also, because of his position at the head of 
a tenant placement agency where he works on the ground with potential tenants, Pastor Lewis may be 
more in tune with exactly how much he can charge a given tenant for a given unit. Nevertheless, several 
other landlords readily admitted that it was well known that they could get more for a unit through the 
HCV program. It seems that this phenomenon varies a good deal by neighborhood, and may be specific to 
an area like Park Heights, which attracts a disproportionately large number of HCV tenants to begin with. 
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Now, I know – this may be discrimination and I must openly admit that I may 
discriminate but I won’t take a white client and put her right down in the middle of Park 
Heights. There’s not very many in the war zone, no, because they get out for safety. But 
now … when we place whites, it’s whites on Section 8, and we [do] get whites, but I’ll 
try to place them in a more safer type neighborhood, if I have a white I won’t try to 
place a white down in the middle of the war zone.  It wouldn’t -- it to me you can call it 
discrimination, to me it just wouldn’t be right.  
 
Lewis’s attitude resonates with much of the literature on racial steering. This type of reasoning 
seems to be based on 1) the assumption that a white renter will not want to live in an all-black 
neighborhood; 2) a practical approach to renting the property as quickly as possible to the tenant 
most likely to accept it; and 3) a strategy of fitting each tenant to the most “appropriate” unit 
possible. For example, if Pastor Lewis thinks he can keep a black renter in a unit in the “war 
zone” longer than a white tenant, it is in his interest to save it for the black tenant. Alternatively, 
if he does not want to place a black tenant in a unit he may have in a white neighborhood, then 
he needs to fill that unit with a white tenant. Any combination of the three explanations results in 
a powerful and overt racial sorting process that reinforces segregation across neighborhoods.  
Selective retention through the threat of voucher loss 
The “teeth” of the program  
Landlords have many ways of getting desirable tenants to stay in units they know they 
will have a hard time finding a new tenant for, ranging from enticements and incentives, to 
threats of voucher loss and financial entrapment. Despite his minimalist business model and 
renovation strategies, Ryan finds it to be in his interest to make small, targeted investments that 
“give them a reason to stay,” incentivizing the extension of his renters’ tenure. 
I give some tenants incentives to stay like number 517 and 519. They both came up on 
their lease renewals, and I had a good deal with Best Buy on stainless appliances. And I 
sent an offer out to [re-sign] for two or three years, this is our re-sign bonus. And we gave 
them brand new stainless steel stove and fridge that was theirs to keep… if you have a 
great tenant, and they don’t really want to move, and they’re up in the air, and you give 
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them a reason to stay... I’ll spend 1000 dollars on new stainless steel fridge and stove. 
Why would I not do that to keep them another two [years]? A lot of people don’t think 
like I think about being outside the box. 
 
But when incentives don’t work, there are more insidious ways of getting what they want. 
Many landlords explain that they can use the rules – or the “teeth” – of the HCV program to keep 
their tenants’ behavior in line, to hold on to desirable tenants. These “teeth” are based on some of 
the newer rules and regulations embedded in the HCV program, which may explain in part why 
the program is much more popular with landlords now than it used to be. Ryan explains the 
power of the voucher: 
There’s only one [way to hold tenants accountable]... The only thing about Section 8 is 
that you have to be in compliance to have your voucher. If you’re not in compliance, you 
can set up hearing and lose your voucher. So that means you’ve got to pay your rent. 
You’ve got to have utilities. You’ve got to pass your inspections.  
 
Here, Ryan identifies the main reasons for which a family would not be able to move without the 
loss of their voucher: owing the landlord rent money, utility money, or maintenance/repair fees. 
The threat of voucher loss can weigh heavily on a family. As Noah explains, “It’s a big threat.  If 
there’s 16,000 people that are waiting for a voucher in Baltimore… that’s a pretty big 
incentive…I would be scared…”   
The threat of voucher loss can also be used to affect tenants’ behavior. One of Oscar’s 
tenants, a thirty-year old woman named Marie, lives in one of his single-family homes with her 
mother and two children. This home is located on a street with a lot of homeowners who have 
live there for over forty years. Oscar likes Marie, but has had some complaints from neighbors in 
recent months, and is close to getting in trouble with the police. On the way to her house one 
day, he briefed me on the situation: “The city called me up and said, ‘Do you own a property on 
Park Heights?’ I said, ‘Yes.’ They said, ‘Well, we have a concern from a lot of homeowners over 
there that this is a nuisance house.’ They said, ‘Take care of it before we take care of it.’” Oscar 
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was torn because he knows Marie is a single mom, and by and large she has been a good tenant, 
paying her rent on time. He explained, “it’s not so much her, it’s the people that she associates 
with. She got a lot of guys that maybe up to no good selling drugs, that know her, that’s always 
sitting on the steps. She may not be doing anything but you get it by association.” As we 
approached the home, just as Oscar had predicted, Marie was sitting on the front stoop with a 
young woman and three men. There was music playing, and they were talking and fishing crabs 
out of bucket. Oscar approached the group and said, “Look, you can’t sit here.” He pulled Marie 
aside and said in a low voice: “We got to straighten this out. I could find another tenant, but then 
you’ll have to get another voucher.” On the way back to his office, he explained to me what was 
actually at stake: “That’s the stipulations. You can’t have any drug activity in your house. You 
can’t be hanging around. It’s one of those things where she could lose her voucher. I told her, ‘If 
you could just settle down…’” Oscar did not kick Marie out, which would have caused her to 
lose her voucher. But that is because his threat worked; Marie knew that if she did not change 
her behavior, Oscar could report her to the voucher office and, not only would she lose her 
voucher, she would then likely be evicted when she would inevitably have difficulty paying rent. 
This type of threat resonates with what we know about the threat of eviction to achieve 
behavioral modification (Desmond). 
The so-called “teeth” of the HCV program can help landlords combat one of the biggest 
challenges they face – frequent moves in and out of units. In Ryan’s words: “Every tenant wants 
to move all the time. That is the one bad thing about Section 8… Got mad at the neighbor, mad 
at the boyfriend. Wants to move because she wants a new house. Just – there’s no reason for it... 
They all want to move, all the time.” This causes problems for landlords, because tenant turnover 
incurs significant costs: every time a tenant moves, the landlord incurs expenses including 
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repainting, re-carpeting, and also losing valuable time and money looking for a new tenant. 
Therefore, landlords employ various strategies to attenuate the movement of some voucher 
holders out of their properties, particularly tenants who they deem to be “good tenants,” by 
exploiting the intricacies of the voucher system.51 The HCV program does not allow a tenant to 
be issued a new voucher (which is required to move) if they owe the landlord any money. Alex 
explains how the system has changed in recent years to give landlords more recourse: 
Now Section 8 is a little more refined… because if you have a problem with a tenant, you 
have somebody to go speak to.  There’s a lady - Miss Watkins - at Section 8, sweetheart, 
works with you.  If these people try to even decide to move out, they have to be caught 
up.  In other words they can’t owe a water bill, they can’t owe back rent or they don’t 
give them a new voucher - they can’t go. So they worked it out and if they wreck the 
apartment and you file against them like a lawsuit or something and they can’t get 
another voucher until they settle up with you.   
 
Alex is not along in finding it helpful to have someone to turn to at the HABC voucher office 
who can help him keep tenants’ behavior in line with threat of voucher loss. There are several 
battlegrounds on which these wars are waged: inspection failures, maintenance and repairs, and 
rent collection.  
Inspections and Legal Tactics  
The inspection process represents a unique site to explore how the interests of landlords 
intersect with those of the tenants, and is an important battleground where length of residential 
tenure is often determined. When approved units fail subsequent inspections, tenants must find 
and move to an alternative approved home within the prescribed time period. When the property 
                                                
51 On the other side of the coin, some landlords employ strategies to push certain tenants out of their units 
if they are deemed “bad tenants,” from whom they fear property damage or legal problems. For these 
tenants, even small lapses in rental payment result in immediate eviction filings. The responsiveness to 
repair requests can also be employed to catalyze turnover, creating an unsuitable living environment and 
eventual failure of HQS inspections. Eviction is a powerful too that landlords have at their disposal. In 
this chapter I focus more on retention techniques. For more on eviction, see Desmond, Matthew. 2012. 
“Eviction and the Reproduction of Urban Poverty.” American Journal of Sociology 118(1):88–133. 
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owner is cited for a violation, this may give the tenant the right to break the lease and be issued a 
new voucher to move. Many landlords describe the challenge of holding on to a tenant as a 
constant “battle” against tenants who seem to always want to move. Ryan is particularly 
passionate about this problem: 
Some tenants will abuse the system to get that voucher to move. When they’re ready to 
go, they’re ready to go. They don’t care what they owe, what they signed, they’re ready 
to go, and they’re going to go to every venue they can. Call every office, do this, do that, 
and we don’t back down, bottom line. We’re standing our ground, we’re not giving in. 
Even if you cause us the biggest headaches, we will fight you tooth and nail… 
 
Thus, landlords develop strategies in order to deal with inspectors and demonstrate that their 
properties are in good condition. If the inspection determines that there are no grounds on which 
to break the lease, the tenant cannot be issued a new voucher to move elsewhere, and the 
landlord “wins,” in the sense that he gets to keep his tenant, avoiding turnover costs. Landlords 
will fight an inspection citation not just if they think it’s unfair, but as a means of increasing 
length of tenure. Ryan specializes in waging these disputes in the courtroom. On his wall, he has 
a framed copy of the court decision with which he was involved that determined a landlord is not 
responsible for rodent infestations under certain conditions:  
[The rules] used to be gray… I’m making them right… I’m done playing that game. The 
rat used to be a big go-to [for tenants trying to break a lease]. You don’t hear about it 
anymore, because they know that it’s been put to the test and won. And I have a judge’s 
order, and the other thing I do is I take picture after picture. I don’t do anything without 
photographs. Every person in my crew has a camera … Anything we do, anything that 
gets done, anything that happens, photographs. You can’t deny photographs, so when 
somebody wants to say “rats”, no problem! I guarantee you I’ve got six or eight pictures 
from prior that show the process of how this tenant is. 
 
Some landlords take these disputes to the next level, using the legal system to combat 
tenants’ attempts to move. In order to provide legal evidence that they are doing their job, some 
landlords meticulously record service calls and visits with photographs and written 
documentation. If Ryan can document that a) he exterminated before the tenant moved in, and 
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that b) the tenant has a history of leaving food in the kitchen, failing to remove trash, or not 
mowing the lawn, then he is not responsible for any rat infestation that appears. From his 
perspective, this was a very important achievement because now a tenant can never use rats as 
the basis for a request to move. It is worth noting that though both the tenants and the landlords 
are using the inspection process as a tool in the “struggle,” the landlords come prepared, this is 
their job, and they have far more resources. It is not a fair fight. 
Retention through indebtedness  
Noah discusses the tools or “sticks” that the voucher program offers him in regards to the 
tenant and how the maintain the property: 
The tool is - the stick is - I can call up for a spot inspection…I show up and I see there’s a 
giant hole in the side of the, you know, I’m like, “What happened?”  “My boyfriend put 
his head through the wall last night.”  Oh great, “HABC, please go inspect property 123 
Main Street; there’s a problem inside.  I think the tenants are destroying the place.”  They 
go and inspect it.  Sure enough it’s not a maintenance issue; it’s destructive behavior… 
So the stick is, they can come out and inspect.  Now I’m still responsible for the damage, 
I cannot have a hole in the wall with somebody living there or whatever it is.  But if it’s 
determined that it’s behavioral and not maintenance, the voucher can be pulled.  Once a 
voucher is pulled, if they can’t pay the rent -- because they’re still responsible for the 
rent…if they can’t pay the rent, then I go through the eviction process like any other 
tenant.  
 
When a tenant is responsible for damage to the home, they are also responsible for fixing the 
damage. But many landlords prefer to do the work themselves, and charge the tenant for it. 
Ryan’s policy is not uncommon: “Our policy is that we want our houses fixed our way. We don’t 
want you to bring some guy in that’s going to cut his arm off in our house and try and fix your 
stuff, so our policy is that if you break something we’ll fix it. We’re only going to bill you what 
it cost us.” But there are other reasons why a landlord would want to do the repairs himself: if the 
landlord repairs a problem that the tenant created, then the tenant owes him money. In this 
strategy, landlords like Ryan count on tenants being unable to move (without losing their 
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voucher) until they have paid the money they owe: 
If they owe money for damages, they can’t move until they make good on it. The old 
way, they used to be able … to just pack up move, and be irresponsible … Essentially… 
it’s not really that you’re holding them…[it’s] that they’re accountable… that glitch got 
fixed. So now a tenant has to be 100% current before they move. 
 
Landlords feel this is a vast improvement on the old system, because they so frequently have to 
make repairs and fix damages that the tenant has incurred. The policy can have the effect of 
holding a tenant hostage in a living situation they that may be trying to escape. 
Rent Collection: A Game of Chicken 
  Another means through which landlords address the challenge of rental portion collection 
is through rent court. Some landlords take their tenants to rent court every month even for small 
sums. Even though it costs more in rent court fees than they recoup, landlords like Mark say they 
do this on principle: 
So we’re going to spend $33 in rent court to take you to court for $100? But it’s a 
training issue for us… so we’re just playing chicken. We’re just letting you know how 
we’re going to play ball and we know we have …the really nice house, and it’s in a nice 
area, so we just say, “No, you have to pay your $100 portion.  I’m not going to let it slide. 
I know I’m getting $1200 for Section 8 but I’m getting your $100 just ‘cause that’s how 
we’re going to run this ship, like it’s going to be tight like I don’t want to hear any stories 
‘cause it’s all just drama… You have a $100 portion that Section 8 says you have to pay 
and so we’ll get right up to eviction and it will be over $100 freaking thing, and they just 
think we’re bluffing… That’s fine, we’ll do this every month if you want… you’re not 
going to lose your voucher, and so I’m going to win this game of chicken.   
 
But other landlords have a different strategy. Some allow these small sums to build up over time. 
Ryan does not file a claim in rent court until a tenant owes him at least 500 or 600 dollars. He 
says it costs him 50 dollars just to get the paperwork, and tenants so often pay late that it’s better 
to wait. In addition, there are other advantages that he does not directly refer to, though they are 
clear. As he stated at other times – a tenant cannot leave if they owe him money. This holds true 
for Ryan’s attitude about eviction as well. 
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Just about four months ago [a tenant] just stopped paying her portion. She has like a $400 
a month portion. Hasn’t paid in the last four months, so I went to rent court, got the 
judgment. Like, what’s going on? Going through a tough time, but she’s been with me 
seven years. So it’s not like I’m going to evict her over four bad months. I mean Section 
8 pays a larger portion. Like $800 or $900 or something like that…Look sometimes they 
get in jams, and at tax time, they’ll make right on it… Do I evict somebody over $400, 
$800, $1200, go fix up the house, re-rent the house, get a new tenant… How long do you 
wait? You still are getting something. You’re getting nine out of $1300, and you’ve been 
getting $1300 for the last seven years, and she’s been golden, a great tenant, model 
tenant…I just think it’s a bad business model to evict somebody for $1200 and destroy 
her whole life, because when I evict her she loses her voucher. Then her kids are 
homeless. I’m not going to do that as a human being, and I’m not going to do it as a 
businessperson. Because it’s bad business. 
 
Ryan is delicately interweaving several rationales in his explanation. On the one hand, “as a 
human being,” he claims does not want to be responsible for the tenant and her family being put 
out on the street. In addition, it is clear that Ryan likes this “model” tenant and has had a positive 
experience with her over the seven years she has rented from him. Finally, Ryan articulates that 
from a business perspective, evicting a good tenant is not profitable in the long term. It is in his 
financial interest to keep tenants for as long as possible in order to minimize transition costs, so 
this is one of the tactics devised to keep the tenant in the unit even when they want to leave. 
Mark is very familiar with this type of strategy, though he is disdainful of it: 
They’ll just kind of game the Section 8 system back to the tenant because…they’ll take 
the low rate tenant, but then they’ll keep them there because if they bang up the house 
they’ll threaten them out.  They are just very aggressive … if someone owes them money 
or if someone doesn’t pay their $100 portion…[they] would let them not pay and then 
hold that over their head so when they say, “I want to leave,” “No, you owe me $1500,” 
and…they are never coming up with $1500.  They’ve never seen $1500, I mean they 
barely have any income ... He just lets them [not pay] and then uses it against them so 
that they can’t move ‘cause ... they’re not released. 
 
This practice of allowing debt to accrue as a means of increasing tenure may serve as a broader 
mechanism that prevents voucher tenants from leaving undesirable living situations and possibly 
moving on to better home and neighborhoods. It also has the potential effect of retaining the 
most disadvantaged voucher holders – those behind on their rent – in some of the worst units, in 
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the worst neighborhoods. 
Discussion: Selection, Matching, and Selective Retention 
In this chapter I examine how landlord practices contribute to selection processes that 
sort the urban poor into different neighborhood environments. Recent changes in the Baltimore 
housing market have made the voucher program more attractive to landlords, who have 
responded by structuring their businesses to around the program. I find that that these strategies 
are linked to residential sorting patterns through three steps: selection, matching, and selective 
retention. Across all three stages I argue that race, gender, and geography structure how 
decisions are made that have repercussions for residential sorting.  
Selection: Recruitment Reversal 
Landlords find it in their interest to rent to voucher holders, and findings also suggest that 
landlords may be collecting more money for properties rented to voucher holders than those 
rented to market tenants.52 Targeted recruitment tactics involve recruiting outside of the voucher 
office, and offering incentives that more disadvantaged tenants will be more susceptible to. Even 
within the voucher population, certain tenants are more vulnerable to landlords’ targeted 
recruitment tactics because they a) lack the education or resources to properly use the website to 
make an informed choice, 2) lack the transportation resources to visit multiple homes before 
                                                
52 There are several reasons why this could be the case. The first possibility is that because landlords are 
investing more in certain properties in order to attract voucher tenants, these properties are in fact worth 
more money than other properties in the same area, which are poor quality. In this scenario, even if 
voucher holders are moving into disadvantaged areas, at least they are receiving quality housing. But this 
explanation would suggest that market rate housing in the area is not sustainable because there are not 
enough renters who can afford to pay it. In the second explanation, the suggestion is that somehow the 
landlords are actually getting the government to pay more than the property is worth. The rationale behind 
this explanation is that the person selecting the unit, the tenant, has no cost conscious incentive. The 
criteria for the determination of rent reasonableness are meant to avoid this problem by using other 
similar properties as a price comparison, though it may not be functioning correctly. Importantly, in both 
scenarios, the landlord is still incentivized to find voucher tenants in poorer areas. Future research should 
aim to disentangle these possible explanations. 
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making a decision, 3) are in a dire residential circumstances and have limited time to conduct a 
proper housing search.  
The Matching Process 
Processes selection and sorting often occur simultaneously. Tenants must meet a 
minimum standard, which may vary by landlord, but it also varies by property; some tenants are 
more appropriate for certain types of units located in certain neighborhoods. Landlords are 
making strategic decisions about what type of tenant will be most likely to settle for a unit in a 
rough area, and how best to attract them. Landlord’s preferences emerged during interviews, but 
there was no clear identification of what makes the universal “ideal tenant” across all contexts. It 
was only through fieldwork, as I watched landlords field calls and visits from prospective and 
tenants and carefully pick which properties to show them and in what order, that Oscar’s 
statement “there’s a tenant for every home” took on its full meaning. Landlords have an array of 
properties. They also have a list of prospective tenants. They are (a) trying to satisfy their 
customer by finding them a home they will be interested in, and (b) trying to fill as many of their 
units as possible with tenants who are likely to stay. In a city with a soft rental market like 
Baltimore, it is not surprising that landlords have quite a bit of opportunity to shift residents 
around within their properties. Landlords engage in a matching game, sorting residents into 
optimal units in order to minimize vacancies and maximize profit. 
Further, evidence suggests that the lower end voucher holders are those who have less 
power – based on one or more of several criteria: 1) level of resources (time, money, education) 
that would allow them to make more informed choices; 2) race: landlords reserve units in better 
areas for whites, so they pre-emptively place blacks in more disadvantaged neighborhoods, 3) 
gender: women are more likely to be heads of household which put them in more precarious 
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financial positions. Some landlords market properties specifically toward this “lower-end” of the 
voucher market. Tenants who have bad credit histories, unfavorable residential references, or 
criminal records have less options about where to live, and are more likely to accept the first unit 
a landlord is willing to offer them. Voucher holders who have little money saved up for a 
security deposit are more likely to accept a unit if the landlord offers a waiver; those who have 
only lived in rental units with rodent infestations, dysfunctional kitchens, or persistent water 
leaks are more susceptible to a newly renovated kitchen or the offer of a dishwasher; those with 
little information or resources to learn about new and different neighborhoods are more likely to 
be swayed by the physical features of the unit than the unknown characteristics of the 
neighborhood. Landlords capitalize on these fragilities, playing on them by “building a better 
mousetrap” to attract certain tenants. These tactics corral voucher holders into units where they 
have vacancies, which are often located neighborhoods already on a downward trajectory. 
Previous research clearly shows that black voucher holders live in much poorer and more 
segregated neighborhoods than white voucher holders (Devine 2003; Pendall 2000), but whether 
or not race is a salient characteristic upon which landlords make explicit distinctions above and 
beyond socioeconomic background is an empirical question. Results do not show race to be a 
salient trait on which landlords select a tenant, but it is relevant to the matching of tenant to 
property.53 In other words, I find no evidence that a landlord would turn away a black voucher 
holder, but I find clear evidence that the interplay between the racial background of the voucher 
holder and that of the neighborhood do inform landlords’ actions; landlords place black voucher 
holders in particular types of neighborhoods, i.e. those where whites do not want to live. For 
                                                
53 The results show little explicit mention of race by landlords in their strategies; it is rare to discuss how 
the racial background of a tenant plays a role in selection. Certainly, this type of discrimination is taboo, 
and landlords may not have been willing to discuss such views with me. It may also be that because over 
90 percent of voucher holders in Baltimore are black, race cannot be used a criteria of selection (HUD’s 
Picture of Subsidized Housing, 2009). 
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example, Pastor Lewis admits that he does not place white renters in poor, black, high crime 
neighborhoods. Given that few of these landlords’ units are located in predominantly white 
neighborhoods, if tenant placement agents like Pastor Lewis are prioritizing the placement of 
white voucher holders in those neighborhoods, they are de facto unable to place black tenants in 
such neighborhoods. This may be one explanation for the disparate outcomes we see for black 
and white voucher holders in the quantitative research.54 
Selective Retention: Leveraging the Voucher 
The selective retention of tenants is a key mechanism through which landlords can affect 
residential flows. Previous research has demonstrated that eviction is a means through which 
landlords selectively purge residents (Desmond 2012). Similarly, I find evidence that the process 
of retention can play an important role. Once the tenant is acquired, landlords may undertake 
efforts not only to rid themselves of certain tenants, but also to selectively hold on to desirable 
tenants, notably, those with a voucher. Strategies of retention operate through subtle tactics of 
threat, intimidation, and financial indebtedness. These occur during (1) inspections, and (2) legal 
battles in the courtroom. Further, landlords imagine the rental process to be characterized by a 
struggle between landlord and tenant, where the voucher is in jeopardy, and can be used as a tool 
to manipulate behavior. As with eviction, there is a gendered aspect to this process; women are 
                                                
54 The data presented here are well suited to investigating the mechanisms through which black voucher 
holders are disproportionately channeled into disadvantaged, predominantly African American 
neighborhoods. However, sample constraints make the data less suited to identifying how landlords with 
properties in affluent white neighborhoods may be actively preventing blacks from accessing these 
homes. Qualitative in-depth fieldwork focusing specifically on landlords with properties in these 
“opportunity” areas is warranted in order to better understand whether and how this type of active 
discrimination may be taking place. It is not known, for example, if landlords are actively keeping blacks 
out because of direct discrimination, a desire to cater to the discriminatory preferences of their existing 
tenants, or if there is a more indirect sorting process at work, whereby landlords are merely showing these 
properties to white families first, based on a calculation that they will not want to live in a black 
neighborhood. Future research should focus on systematically disentangling how landlords market 
properties in neighborhoods with different racial and economic compositions, to voucher holders of 
different backgrounds. 
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disproportionately leaseholders and heads of large families in the voucher population, and are 
thus more vulnerable to these tactics. 55 Landlords have the information and resources, and know 
the rules of the game. In contrast, many voucher holders are not aware of their own bargaining 
power, and do not have the resources to employ it effectively. These retention tactics effectively 
trap many voucher holders in units in disadvantaged neighborhoods; and because landlord tactics 
are more effective at holding on to tenants who have few other options, there are important 
repercussions for which voucher holders are more susceptive to retention. 
Policy Implications 
Taken together, the landlords in this sample represent a significant portion – over 14 
percent – of the HCV units in Baltimore City.56 If landlord implementations of the HCV program 
are preventing voucher holders from accessing new and better neighborhoods, researchers and 
policymakers need to know more about this process, how it operates, and how to fix it. 
Research shows that landlord practices can contribute to the concentration of subsidized 
renters in disadvantaged neighborhoods, operating in three keys ways: First, through 
discrimination against source of income (SOI), or other characteristics closely correlated to 
voucher holder status, such as income level;57 second, the definition of Fair Market Rent (FMR), 
which may create disincentives for landlords to rent to voucher holders in affluent areas and 
incentives in disadvantaged neighborhoods; and third, through the sorting and selection practices 
that I reveal in this chapter. Much of the policy debate around the HCV program centers around 
                                                
55 Desmond’s work has shown that male tenants may have more opportunities to “work of the debt,” and 
negotiate leniency on late rent payments (Desmond 2012). 
56 See calculation above. 
57 Although in some states and counties there are Source of Income Protection (SOI) laws that make it 
illegal for landlords to discriminate on the basis of voucher status, in many states landlords often refuse to 
accept families with vouchers. See (Freeman 2011) for a complete list of states and jurisdictions with SOI 
laws.  
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SOI discrimination laws, and whether or not they should be more widespread to prevent 
discrimination against voucher holders (which is often a proxy for race) in more affluent 
communities (Briggs 2005; Freeman 2011; Freeman & Li 2012; Turner & Ross 2005; Turner et 
al. 2002; Yinger 1995).  
But there are important policy issues to be considered among landlords who do rent to 
voucher holders. If landlords’ strategic use of the voucher program involves 1) selecting certain 
types of tenants for their rental portfolios, 2) sorting certain tenants into certain properties and 
types of neighborhoods within their portfolios to optimize returns, and 3) selectively retaining 
tenants through methods of entrapment, policymakers ought to take notice. By actively shaping 
residents choices and sorting them into certain types of neighborhoods, landlord practices 
operate in direct contradiction to idea that the voucher program should be providing the 
opportunity to access new neighborhoods.  
There are several policy options that could be used to address these problems. Better 
information and counseling for families without Internet access, transportation for housing 
searches, security deposit assistance would all minimize the effect of the landlord’s targeted 
recruitment tactics. It is essential that families are well informed of their rights as tenants so that 
to report necessary repairs or request to move without fear of losing their voucher. Another 
potential area of intervention is in the definition of Fair Market Rent. New research investigates 
whether changes in voucher price-ceilings result in better housing for voucher holders, finding 
that more generous vouchers cause landlords to raise prices on tenants, with only small impacts 
on unit quality and none on neighborhood quality; findings also show that when FMR is defined 
at the zip-code level rather than at the metro level, voucher holders move to better neighborhoods 
with no additional costs (Collinson & Ganong 2013). This research has important implications 
  123 
for the impact that landlords may have on the cost effectiveness of voucher administration, 
which should be of great interest to policymakers. 
We need to understand how landlords engage with the voucher program if we want to 
most effectively leverage low-income rental housing policy to provide mobility opportunities for 
low-income families. The sorting processes revealed in this article should be understood as 
unintended consequences of the voucher program. This research does not suggest that the HCV 
program is responsible for the racial and economic sorting in which landlords may engage; these 
are processes that absolutely occur outside of the HCV program. Nor does it suggest that 
eradicating such behaviors on the part of landlords would solve the problems of concentrated 
poverty and segregation. Rather, I argue that it is important to investigate the unique mechanisms 
through the landlords’ implementation may contribute, in order to guard against them. 
Policy solutions should draw on an understanding of incentive structures, landlords' 
interpretations and reactions to these structures, and the relationships between tenants and 
landlords (Elmore 1979). Creators of housing policy may or may not want the HCV program to 
function explicitly as a tool for deconcentration of poverty and desegregation; however, in its 
role an expanding program to house the poor, they should be made aware of the ways in which 
landlord practices intervene to circumvent and shape residential choices in ways that undermine 
agency, recreating sorting patterns that the program was designed to uproot. A clearer 
understanding of these mechanisms can help policymakers better design a program that can truly 
offer low-income renters the opportunity to move to a neighborhood of their choosing 
Conclusion 
Scholars of the city contend that the patterned flow of people in and out of geographic 
regions of the city constitute an important dimension of urban inequality, and yet we have much 
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to learn about the selection processes through individuals come to live in the places they do. The 
shift in American housing policy in the last two decades towards individual subsidies has been 
touted as a way to let the private market solve the problem of concentrated poverty – in which 
federal housing policy has been historically complicit – by providing opportunities for poor 
families to move to neighborhoods of their choosing. However, without studying the 
intermediary role that landlords play in sorting processes, we miss an important mechanism 
thorough which residential choices are shaped. Rather than providing low-income families the 
opportunity to make informed decisions about what neighborhood would be best for them, the 
whole system has been turned on its head. The process of choice has been reversed to 
recruitment by landlords, who have perverse incentives to attract and then sort tenants into the 
units and neighborhoods where they will be most useful, selectively retaining desirable tenants. 
In this scenario, supply actually creates demand: the effect of landlord practices is to shape, 
create, and constrain residential choice. This reversal illuminates a mechanism in processes of 
residential sorting and selection that are fundamental to urban sociology. The set of landlord 
practices described here becomes a powerful sorting instrument that sends the most 
disadvantaged voucher holders into some of the worst neighborhoods, serving as an important 
pathway in the reproduction of spatial inequality and the reconcentration of poverty. 
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Chapter 5: Neighborhood Effects on “Choice” and Churning 
 
It is often remarked how difficult it is to get a family to consent to move out of the slum no matter 
how advantageous the move may seem from the material point of view, and how much more 
difficult it is to keep them from moving back into the slum 
 
— Henry Zorbaugh, The Gold Coast and the Slum (1929) 
Introduction 
 In Chapter 4, I examined how landlord practices contribute to the sorting of voucher 
holders into disadvantaged neighborhoods. Yet even within these constraints, families make 
decisions about where to live. In this chapter, I tackle a related puzzle: What role does choice 
play in the residential decisions play in the cycling of low-income renters in, out, and between 
similarly disadvantaged neighborhoods such Park Heights? I draw on fieldwork and interviews 
from the 64 renter respondents, including 27 voucher holders, 37 unassisted renters. How can we 
explain the heterogeneity in response to exposure to a poor and violent neighborhood? Why do 
some families decide to move out, while others remain? When poor residents are given a voucher 
that can be used anywhere, why don’t they access better neighborhoods? When they do move, 
why do so many choose a similar neighborhood? I address these questions by examining how 
residents’ orientations towards their neighborhood shape residential decisions. 
 Scholars of poverty and residential mobility have long been interested in how the choices 
of low-income families interact with structural barriers to create high-poverty and racially 
segregated neighborhoods. “The sorting of individuals by place…is a process that knits together 
and defines the social-ecological structure of the city” (Sampson 2013, 288). To explain these 
sorting processes, much research has focused on the structuring ecological forces that push and 
pull urban dwellers into different residential locations. Residential decisions are shaped and 
constrained by important structural factors that limit the search process, including key 
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neighborhood characteristics of poverty, instability and high crime. But these structural reasons 
alone cannot explain why and when some voucher holders move to, stay in, or move back into 
relatively poor neighborhoods when their voucher affords them the economic resources to live in 
more affluent ones. Researchers have also considered how the self-selection mechanisms of 
preferences and decision-making act to disperse residents into neighborhoods of their choosing 
(Sampson & Sharkey 2008). But I ask: how do structural forces interact with the choices of low-
income families? How might the life-long experience of living in a certain type of neighborhood 
shape and constrain future residential decisions? I argue that neighborhood characteristics are 
filtered through a cultural mechanism that I call an “orientation,” that is, how a resident thinks 
about and engages with his or her neighborhood. This concept can help explain when and why 
residents are roused to make a move. 
 Like frames, orientations allow an individual to selectively focus on certain aspects of the 
neighborhood, while downplaying others (Goffman 1974; Small 2004; Young 2004). There are 
two interrelated dimensions to these neighborhood orientations: the first is the narrative that 
residents weave about how the neighborhood fits into their personal story and experience of past 
neighborhoods, and the second is the set of behavioral and cognitive strategies that residents 
develop to engage with and navigate their neighborhood environment. I show that these 
orientations reflect residents’ expectations for what their neighborhood should offer them, and 
therefore have an important link to the types of neighborhoods they are likely to consider in the 
future.  
 In order to fully understand why families end up in certain neighborhoods and not others, 
scholars must look beyond the social forces that operate within these contexts, and also beyond 
individual preferences as static attributes, to consider how neighborhood environment shapes 
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individual choices in a more dynamic way. The neighborhood environment is constituted not just 
by objective factors related to the neighborhood (poverty, crime, race), but also by residents’ 
experiences of the neighborhood. By looking at the stories people tell about these experiences, 
we can understand residential decisions that otherwise seem counterintuitive. I observe narratives 
and behaviors over time in order to show how understandings of what a home and neighborhood 
should offer are associated with strategies within the neighborhood and future plans. I find that 
when new events in the neighborhood became dissonant with the orientation, it can rupture, 
inciting the individual to reorient and make a residential decision. 
Neighborhood Effects and Selection 
Research on neighborhood effects is based on the premise that living in a poor 
neighborhood has important consequences for life chances, independent of individual 
characteristics (Wilson 1987). Neighborhoods of concentrated poverty have been shown to have 
important effects on social networks, employment opportunities, educational achievement, youth 
behavior, non-marital childbirth, and family management (Brooks-Gunn et al. 1993; Mayer & 
Jencks 1989; Sampson et al. 1997; Sampson et al. 2002; Wilson 1987; Wilson 1997). In their 
attempt to understand the independent effects of the neighborhood environment on the 
individual, researchers have had to grapple with the fact that individuals may self-select into 
certain types of neighborhoods. This selection effect has been something that researchers have 
tried to eliminate in order assess the “true” effect of the neighborhood. But if neighborhood 
context is an important dimension of inequality, then we must understand how and why 
individuals come to live in the places they do. Given this, there has been a recent turn to study 
selection into neighborhoods in their own right (Sampson 2012; Sampson & Sharkey 2008).  
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 Some research has explored residential preferences as an explanation for the locational 
attainment of low-income renters, and of voucher holders in particular. In the case of vouchers, 
researchers wonder why families are not using the full value of their voucher by moving to the 
best possible neighborhood (Collinson & Ganong 2013; Sampson & Sharkey 2008; Sampson 
2008)? This points to an important empirical puzzle: why do voucher holders end up in 
moderately poor neighborhoods such as Park Heights, rather than in the “better” neighborhoods 
that their voucher should give them access to? Residential preferences show that both blacks and 
whites would be open to – and in some cases would even prefer – more racial integration than 
currently exists (Charles 2003; Clark 1991; Krysan & Farley 2002; Krysan 2011; Schelling 
1971). Why then, even when give the opportunity to access better neighborhoods, not all 
residents do so? 
Structural and Supply-Side Explanations 
 Much research has documented macroeconomic factors and the role of racial 
discrimination in keeping blacks in certain types of neighborhoods (Massey & Denton 1993; 
Wilson 1987). A complex set of structural factors operate to shape the experiences and locational 
outcomes of low-income families (DeLuca et al. 2013). DeLuca et al. find that procedural 
aspects of the program such as the types of homes advertised contribute to families’ moves to 
disadvantaged areas (2013).58 Once a family decides to move, they have sixty days within which 
                                                
58 Further, the HCV program in Baltimore is plagued by the problem of substandard housing units.58 
Newman notes that about 33,000 rental units (32 percent) are deemed substandard, making Baltimore one 
of the top three U.S. cities of its size in its proportion of substandard rental housing (2005). Only homes 
that pass inspection qualify, which of course makes eligible rentals difficult to come by. Additionally, 
when approved units fail subsequent inspections, tenants must find and move to an alternative approved 
home within the prescribed time period. Previous research has pointed out that due to these failed 
inspections, staying in a unit can be as hard as finding a unit (Rosenblatt & Deluca 2012). These practices 
can make or break prospective tenants’ ability to successfully lease up, or lease up in a low poverty, high 
resource neighborhood, and remain there. A report by the Abell Foundation documents the widespread 
  129 
to find a new home, or risk losing the voucher. When they find a unit, it has to pass inspection, 
and units frequently fail. Further, the costs of finding a new apartment are very high for residents 
who often do not have much savings for a deposit, and lack resources such as transportation to 
make the search easier. Despite these constraints, low-income renters have high rates of mobility. 
Rather than preventing them from moving, these constraints (combined with reasons discussed in 
Chapter 4) seem to make it more likely for renters to settle on less-than-ideal residences, in less-
than-idea locations (Ibid). This can at least partially explain the high levels of churning between 
neighborhoods of similar disadvantage. 
 The voucher theoretically allows the tenant access to any affordable unit, and ensures that 
a tenant will pay no more than 30 percent of their income in rent, although there is an upper limit 
to how much HUD will pay, beyond which the voucher holder must cover the difference, 
without exceeding 40 percent of their income.59 This means that in practice, many rental 
properties in Baltimore city and suburbs – especially in the mostly white and affluent areas – are 
unaffordable for voucher holders, attenuating the list of available options (Rosenblatt & Deluca 
2012, p.265). Nevertheless, even given these constraints, many white voucher holders are 
successful in getting access to units in low-poverty neighborhoods, while black voucher holders 
are significantly less likely to do so (see Chapters 1 and 4 for details) (Devine 2003; Edin et al. 
2012). Although not every neighborhood has affordable options, black voucher holders are 
realizing far less locational attainment than their vouchers would, in theory, allow them to afford. 
                                                                                                                                                       
violations of lead-based paint, structural deficiencies, poor sanitary conditions, and a lack of smoke 
detectors in apartments that had supposedly passed inspection (Jacobson 2007). The Abell report 
estimates that during one ten month period (between 2006-7), the Housing Authority issued 1,593 
vouchers for tenants already in the program, who had to move due to inspection failures (Jacobson 2007). 
59 The maximum price of the unit is set at Fair Market Rent (FMR), which is defined as the 40th percentile 
of area median rent, adjusted for bedroom size (Schwartz 2010). There are two exceptions: the QHWRA 
allows housing authorities to set payment standards between 90 and 120 percent of FMR under certain 
circumstances, 2) the FMR was raised to the 50th percentile in the 39 most expensive housing markets in 
the country in 2001 (Schwartz 2010). 
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 In Chapter 4, I offer a supply-side explanation for this conundrum. I show that landlords 
play a key role sorting low-income renters across urban space, acting as mediators between the 
housing market and residential preferences. Research shows that landlord practices can 
contribute to the concentration of subsidized renters in disadvantaged neighborhoods, operating 
in three keys ways: (1) discrimination against source of income, or other characteristics closely 
correlated to voucher holder status, such as income level60 (Briggs 2005; Freeman 2011; 
Freeman & Li 2012; Turner & Ross 2005; Turner et al. 2002; Yinger 1995); (2) the definition of 
Fair Market Rent (FMR), which may create disincentives for landlords to rent to voucher holders 
in affluent areas and incentives in disadvantaged neighborhoods; (3) and through the sorting and 
selection practices that I reveal in Chapter 4, that send disadvantaged voucher holders to the 
worst neighborhoods. Despite these important forces that channel voucher holders, landlord 
practices interact with a complex set of factors that operate from the voucher holder’s 
perspective, which is the object of this chapter.  
Choice, Constraint and Culture 
 Both preferences and structural constraints are important for our understanding of how 
residents sort themselves, and are sorted within the urban environment. This two-dimensional 
“preference-constraint” model is predominant in the quantitative literature that considers why 
voucher holders do not “max out” on the value of their voucher to attain better residential 
outcomes. The underlying principle is the idea is that residents rely upon a rational-choice 
framework of hierarchical preferences that allows them to trade one desired trait for another 
when options are constrained. For example, if a family places a premium on school quality, they 
                                                
60 Although in some states and counties there are Source of Income Protection (SOI) laws that make it 
illegal for landlords to discriminate on the basis of voucher status, in many states landlords often refuse to 
accept families with vouchers. See (Freeman 2011) for a complete list of states and jurisdictions with SOI 
laws.  
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might choose a neighborhood for a reputed school, sacrificing the quality of the home or 
neighborhood because of a limited budget. However, though these underlying preferences are 
highly relevant for researchers who want to know “why not somewhere else?” they are 
sometimes very hard for residents to articulate. Further, the framework of hierarchical 
preferences does not always reflect the way that residents think about their decision to live in 
Park Heights. The preference-constraint paradigm can obfuscate the way that previous 
experiences and narratives shape residential decisions. In trying to understand decisions to move 
to or from a neighborhood such as Park Heights, I examine and uncover the narratives and 
behaviors that shape how families think about and search for housing, contextualizing within a 
structural framework that shapes, constrains, and enables this decision-making process.  
 Incorporating an understanding of how culture may mediate neighborhood effects 
research is not a new trend. A common model of culture in neighborhood effects proposes that 
residents develop adaptations in response to generations of blocked opportunity structures, which 
may or may not persist beyond the structural contexts that created them, shaping future behavior 
(Harding & Hepburn 2014).61 In this “deviant subculture” model, residents are embedded in a 
neighborhood subculture that imbues them with a set of cultural strategies that reflect distinct 
values;62 these differences are exacerbated by racial and economic segregation and isolation 
(Harding & Hepburn 2014, pp.6–7; Massey & Denton 1993; Wilson 1987). There are important 
exceptions to this “subcultural” model, including empirical works in urban sociology as early as 
Liebow’s Tally’s Corner (1967) and Hannerz’ Soulside (1969), as well as more recent work such 
as Duneier’s Sidewalk (2001) and Edin and Kefalas’ Promises I Can Keep (2005). These works 
                                                
61. 
62 “Oppositional culture” as the quintessential example of this model (Fordham & Ogbu 1986). 
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have provided vital data to support the idea that the poor share many values in common with 
middle-class America (Harding & Hepburn 2014). 
 Sociologists have looked at other behavioral strategies and coping mechanisms that 
residents of poor and violent neighborhoods develop to adapt to these conditions identifying 
three main psychological strategies though which residents mitigate the effects of the violence in 
the neighborhood: “Telescoping” is the act of defining one’s neighborhood as within the block 
that one lives on – violence in the larger neighborhood is not accounted for (Rosenblatt & 
DeLuca 2012); residents claim that “staying to yourself,” a form of social withdrawal, keeps 
them away from trouble (Murphy 2014; Rosenblatt & DeLuca 2012; Rosenblatt et al. 
Forthcoming); and an attitude of “it’s not where you live, it’s how you live” makes it acceptable 
to live almost anywhere (Rosenblatt & Deluca 2012). They discuss the trade-offs in 
neighborhood quality that many families have to make in order to find quality units, and argue 
that the coping skills families learn to thrive in less-than-ideal neighborhoods reciprocally make 
them more confident in their ability to live in such a neighborhood, and therefore more likely to 
move to such a neighborhood in the future (Rosenblatt and DeLuca 2012, 254).  
 Previous work takes an important step towards acknowledging the role of culture in 
residential mobility decisions, but some important questions remain: First, where do these 
strategies come from and how are they transmitted? Second, do residential decision trade-offs 
that result from coping strategies indicate a change underlying values, or merely a compromise 
based on available resources. For example, the “subcultural” model might imply that due to 
structural circumstances limiting available housing options,63 the urban poor have adapted to 
value nice homes above safe neighborhoods. Indeed, in dangerous neighborhoods families feel 
                                                
63 For example, as suggested in Chapter 4, landlord steering practices may make it unlikely certain 
residents will view a full set of housing options. 
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safer in single-family homes, and are willing to make trade-offs to acquire them (Wood 
forthcoming). But whether this reflects a change in underlying values regarding the relative 
importance of a neighborhood versus a home, remains unclear. And third, how can we explain 
the heterogeneity in response to exposure to a poor and violent neighborhood? Why and when 
does a family decide to move? How do residents’ orientations towards the neighborhood shape 
future residential decisions? 
 In this chapter, I consider how culture may operate as a neighborhood effect: in other 
words, how living in a particular type of neighborhood environment may in turn affect future 
residential decisions. To do this, I draw on analytical tools from the “cultural turn” in sociology 
(Harding & Hepburn 2014). This approach emphasizes a dynamic explanation of behavior, 
including adherence to “mainstream” values while adapting to a new context of blocked 
opportunities (see Edin & Kefalas 2005); the existence of cultural conflict (Hannerz 1969; 
Swidler 1986); the presence of cultural heterogeneity within the poor neighborhood, which is not 
merely different from a more advantaged neighborhood, but may offer “a wide array of 
competing and conflicting cultural models” (Harding 2007);64 and finally, there is a place for 
individual agency in filtering cultural messages from the social networks in which individuals 
are embedded, for example, people may react to the same social environment in different ways 
(Harding & Hepburn 2014).  
 In order to understand how the neighborhood context may be mediated by cultural 
factors, I consider residents’ orientation to the neighborhood. I use this term to encompass 
                                                
64 This is still up for debate, there is some evidence that disadvantaged neighborhoods may not have a 
wider array of cultural models (Rosenblatt et al. Forthcoming). 
  134 
aspects of three analytic tools 1) narratives of past neighborhood experiences, 2) behavioral 
strategies in the current neighborhood, and 3) expectations and plans for future neighborhoods.65  
 
Figure 14: Neighborhood Context, Residential Decisions, and Orientations 
 What people want is deeply shaped by past events, the sequence and time in which these events 
took place, the manner in which they were experienced and interpreted, how people reacted to 
them, and where individuals locate themselves within these narratives (Emirbayer & Mische 
1998; Small et al. 2010; Somers 1994). Narrative accounts render isolated “events” into episodes 
with enduring meaning that guides action (Somers 1994, 616). Looking beyond static 
preferences can help to understand how previous and new experiences shape shifting identity 
                                                
65In Small’s Villa Victoria he used residents’ frames of their neighborhoods past to understand their 
current engagement in the neighborhood (2004). 
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conceptions and imagined futures that are relevant to mobility decisions (Ewick & Silbey 2003; 
Somers 1994, p.606). Like Frye’s study of young Malawian women and their aspirations, 
residential preferences may reflect identity conceptions of future “possible selves” and moral 
claims more than rational choices or plans about where they will live (Frye 2012; Hall & Lamont 
2009). Therefore, the question of “who adopts what narrative” is not as important as “when and 
why does a person adopt a given narrative?” In other words, the variation that I am exploring 
occurs not so much between residents, as within residents, across different points in time. Within 
each respondent, I examine how the narrative shifts over the course of their residential trajectory. 
When narratives are contradicted by outside events, people are moved to action. I argue that 
these orientations, created by their current and past experiences in poor neighborhoods, shape the 
residential decisions that create patterns of churning. 
Neighborhood Narratives  
 Neighborhood characteristics discussed in Chapter 3 such as transportation, housing 
affordability, and social networks can only begin to explain how and why Baltimoreans move to 
and remain in Park Heights. Residents draw on experiences and memories, making explicit 
comparisons with past homes and neighborhoods to explain how they arrived and why they stay. 
In this chapter, I will tell the stories of four residents and their families to illustrate patterns in the 
neighborhood. First, Raven, an unassisted renter who spent her childhood in the Lafayette Courts 
and then moved to the suburbs before coming to Park Heights. Ms. Sharon, a voucher holder 
who recounts growing up in the neighborhood of Park Heights and how her childhood 
experiences shaped her decision to move back two years ago with her voucher. Tina, an 
unassisted renter, lost her grandmother’s home when she could not afford the upkeep and though 
she now has stable housing in Oakland Terrace, she fears for her daughter’s safety. And finally, a 
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couple, Ray and Sandra, who grapple with the tricky process of finding a suitable home: they 
have been trying to find a unit with their voucher for over a month, and were turned away from 
their previous two choices because of failed inspections. They weigh the risks of moving into a 
newly renovated home in Park Heights, and struggling with the stigmatized reputation of the 
neighborhood. 
 
 I met Raven one afternoon on her front porch as she was sitting with a friend discussing a 
recent mugging on the block. Raven is thirty-nine, and has nine kids between the ages of four 
and eighteen. She and her husband live together with their kids in a three-bedroom row home on 
a side street off the main thoroughfare of Park Heights. The house is in bad shape. Inside, the 
entire first floor has no lights because the electric wiring got wet due to a leak during the last 
storm. The wall that runs the length of the living room is stained with dark streaks of water 
damage; when it rains, water pours down the wall and Raven’s four-year asks: “mommy why 
does the wall rain?” The front room is covered in a dingy wall-to-wall carpet, and is completely 
empty of furniture except for the glass dining room table with plastic lawn chairs where we sit 
when I visit. Three months ago Raven’s landlord went into foreclosure, and since then, she and 
her family have been living in the home illegally.  
 Raven and her family moved to the neighborhood from the county, where Raven says it 
was quiet, but she was more scared of crime there because she did not know her neighbors at all.  
What I can respect about the hood…you hurt a child, or somebody’s mom, you’re wrong. 
I can say that. There’s more good in there than bad. As opposed to how I lived in the 
county…nobody talks to anybody, it’s different... something happens around here 
everybody’s gonna know….For me, I was more scared out there than I ever was walking 
around the projects at two or three o’clock in the morning. Or right now, I can go to the 
gas station three, four o’clock in the morning, true that, any one of us can, and I’m not 
going to say nothing’s ever gonna happen, but I’ll tell you…we all know each other… 
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Initially, Raven was not thrilled to move to Park Heights, but she has stayed there for several 
years because there are some positive aspects relative to life in the county, and relative to her 
childhood home in Lafayette Courts, a public housing development that has since been 
demolished. In all our discussions of what makes a good neighborhood, Raven implicitly and 
explicitly made comparisons to the public housing in which she grew up: 
You go into a high-rise building everything around you is concrete and you go on this 
elevator or you take the steps and there was urine, feces, needles, whoever sleeping there 
was there in the way.  And always drugs … like I was in some type of compound 
almost…because of how, it was the concrete, how everything was concrete, damp and 
fenced.  And I remember that bothered me. 
 
The concrete structure of the high-rise buildings and the violence she witnessed there have 
marked her indelibly and shape the way she thinks about neighborhoods and housing even now 
as an adult. She will implicitly compare every new home she lives in to her baseline experience 
in public housing. Though Park Heights may have a high crime rate, and her home may be only 
partially functional, unlike in public housing, living there feels like a choice to her, and this 
makes all the difference.  
 
 When I first met Tina, she was waiting for me outside her building, “I just wanted to 
make sure you got in OK,” she said. She escorted me upstairs and straight into her apartment, 
which was a vision of calm and order in the midst of the run-down building. She had heavy 
blankets draped over the two windows in the living room that looked out on the parking lot. I 
assumed they were for the cold, but she later informed me it was to keep out the noise from the 
neighbors who liked to congregate below. Her living room was neatly furnished with antiquated, 
but well-cared for furniture that used to belong to her grandmother. 
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 Tina is thirty-four years old, she has a thirteen year old daughter, and is expecting another 
child in a few months. She was raised by her grandmother on her father’s side in the Lafayette 
projects in Baltimore after her mother passed away when she was eleven. In that neighborhood, 
everybody knew each other; all the kids hung out together and knew each other’s families, and 
she still keeps in touch with many of these old friends. When Tina left home she moved to a 
subsidized apartment complex nearby. Though it was affordable, Tina was not comfortable there; 
she was mugged several times, and Tina said her neighbors thought she was “uppity” and they 
always wanted to borrow things from her without giving them back. After a few years she was 
relieved to move to a house left to her by her great-grandmother in East Baltimore, in a quiet 
neighborhood primarily occupied by homeowners. She hoped to raise her daughter in a similar 
environment to the one in which she had grown up. She loved the home, and the fact that her 
grandmother had lived there made her feel safe. Pointing to a photograph on the wall, Tina tells 
me:  
That’s my great-grandmom. She passed away a couple of years ago but I maintained her 
home for three years until I moved here. The roof and everything caved all in. I didn’t 
have enough money to fix it and my family, we didn’t have the money. So I ended up 
leaving …and moved in here until my grandma and my uncle and the rest of them can try 
to fix it up… The house was old. I wish I could show you these pictures. My bedroom 
wall there was rocks, stone, that’s how my wall was in my bedroom… The antique man 
said to me he would come in and give me $3,000 just for my walls…They were so old. 
And my rocking chair is still there, my grandmother’s rocking chair that sitting on the 
porch, he even wanted that…I said “No, you’re not getting that.” I said “No, indeedy!” 
 
Although the house was paid off, and property taxes weren’t too high, there were structural 
problems with the home. Tina lived there for three years before things started going wrong and 
the bills began to pile up. First the roof caved in. Then a pipe burst in the basement and was 
leaking into the neighbor’s house. Tina started seeing rats; she thinks they were coming in 
through hole in the basement wall, and she couldn’t pay the exterminator. There were no 
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electrical sockets in the house. When Tina’s uncles had been living in the house before her, they 
did not pay the bills. When Tina moved in she managed to pay off some of the water bill and the 
taxes, but she found it difficult to keep up. Tina attempted to get grants to help pay for the 
BG&E66 bills, but her aunt was on the deed of the house, and since they were not on good terms, 
her aunt refused to put her name on the grant applications. Tina got a cat for the rats, but it 
wasn’t enough: one day, she came down the stairs to see the cat fighting with a rat of its own 
stature. This was the proverbial ‘straw that broke the camel’s back.’ Tina abandoned the house 
and moved with her daughter into the first place she could find that would accept her. This 
turned out to be Oakland Terrace, a complex in Park Heights inhabited by very low-income 
renters, 60 percent of whom have a housing voucher. She had been at Oakland Terrace for a year 
and five months when we met. 
 Many residents find themselves in crises like Tina’s, which prompt a move. Residential 
mobility scholars have begun to study these types of moves: called “forced” or “reactive” moves 
(DeLuca et al. 2011; Schollenberger & Desmond 2013). They may be due to a life crisis, or often 
an eviction, formal and informal (Desmond 2012). These reactive moves are very common 
among the unassisted poor, and help explain why unassisted renters see their move to Park 
Heights as less of a choice than many voucher holders. However, we need to learn more about 
which events trigger reactive moves. There is a range of moves that are not “forced” in an 
objective sense. People may say they want to move or plan to move for a long time before they 
ever do. Some who say they want to move never do. Under what circumstances is a resident 
incited to take action and make a move? 
 
                                                
66 Baltimore Gas and Electric. 
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 I first met Ray and Sandra, a middle aged voucher-holding couple with a teenage 
daughter, on a 102-degree day in August. Upon entering their newly renovated house I was 
greeted by a blast of cool central air. The home has three bedrooms, though their voucher is only 
for two – the placement agency helped negotiate with the landlord to count one of the bedrooms 
as a “den” in order to make the voucher qualify. The house has almost everything they had hoped 
for – refinished hardwood floors, central air, a newly renovated bathroom and kitchen, and a 
finished basement with a second bathroom that allows their adult son to stay in the house, though 
this is against the rules of the lease. Sandra emphasizes that the amenities of the house mean she 
does not have to go out in the neighborhood as much: “I was so thankful that this house had a 
washer and dryer in it because now we can just do everything here.” Not having to go out into 
the neighborhood to do laundry feels a lot safer for the family. They do not have a dishwasher. 
But Sandra says, “this is an amenity I can do without.” Finding a home is all about trade-offs. 
Ray and Sandra describe how they went about searching for a home: 
Sandra: this time when we was looking for this we were going to section8.com…In the 
packet they tell you where you can go. They give you a listing. They give you a website 
that you can go…You put in what you want. 
 Ray: Amenities that you want.  
Sandra: Say you looking for a house… we went there and then we get a virtual tour of the 
house on the computer and everything and we even mapped different houses out or 
whatever. The website is great … You can see what you want to see and stuff like that. 
You can check for different ones ... That’s what we did. We made a list of houses we was 
interested in and that’s the houses that we called and stuff. But they has, oh man, they 
have a lot of houses.  
 
Sandra and Ray’s search process was an unusually informed one, in that they made a list of 
criteria that were important to them, did a search online to find homes that fit their needs, and 
then they drove around to visit these units before making a choice.67 
                                                
67 Access to information about available properties is the most obvious way in which we would expect 
voucher holders to have the opportunity to make an unbounded choice about where to live. However, the 
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 However, even with these resources to search, settling on their current home was not a 
simple process. The couple considered two other apartments in the area, both of which failed 
inspection during the lease-up process. Though they had started hunting early in the sixty-day 
period allotted to find a home, by the time they had gone through the search and inspection 
processes for two different homes, they were nearing the end of the sixty days. At that point, they 
decided to cut their losses by not waiting around for the second home to pass a new inspection, 
and they enlisted the help of a tenant placement service to help them find a home. The first place 
the agent showed them was what became their current home, on Central Ave, which is just off 
the main thoroughfare. Though the street has recently been paved and outfitted with camera 
surveillance, the couple is not thrilled with the location due to its reputation for lively drug 
activity. The street is notorious for a publicly funded housing complex that has only recently 
been torn down. Over the years there were frequent shoot-outs, warranting its nickname the 
“O.K. Corral,” by residents and police. After years of violence, the city revoked the owner’s 
multi-family dwelling license in 2005, and apportioned Housing Choice Vouchers to all the 
residents. In 2008 the complex was torn down. But Ray and Sandra explain that its legacy is 
durable.  
I’m going to tell you something. I was real apprehensive in moving into this house 
because of that. Cause I know what that was. I know what this whole area was, saturated 
with drugs. Saturated and each place you’ve got saturated with drugs, you’ve got 
problems. I was real apprehensive …They tore it down and that caused everything to 
move. 
                                                                                                                                                       
Housing Authority of Baltimore City (HABC) does not provide listings to prospective tenants. Rather, 
voucher holders are directed towards the privately owned www.gosection8.com, a website where 
landlords willing to accept vouchers advertise their properties. Tenants are ultimately are responsible for 
finding a landlord willing to accept their voucher and a property that will pass inspection. Although this 
could be an excellent way to offer people a powerful search mechanism to find a unit that best fits their 
needs, there are several reasons why this is not necessarily the case. First, unequal access to computers 
and the internet is pervasive in poor neighborhoods, as are deficiencies in literacy with search techniques. 
Many voucher holders will be more comfortable relying on social networks and locally available 
information to learn about available properties. 
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Before deciding they felt comfortable moving in with their teenage daughter and adult son, Ray 
and Sandra did some research. Sandra explains: “We had even drove around here different times 
of the day before we even moved in the house. You know it would be nighttime. We had went 
out and then about two o’clock in the morning we would drive around just to see if we could see 
any activity. Eleven o’clock in the evening time, just to check it out.”68 They found that the street 
was mostly quiet at night, and what they saw during the day did not seem much different from 
other streets on which they had lived in the past, so they felt they could handle it. Although they 
were nearing the end of their time to find a unit, Ray and Sandra’s story is not simply about how 
procedural time constraints forced them to take a house in a neighborhood they might not have 
otherwise considered. Their choice reflects their previous experience in similar neighborhoods 
with similar reputations, and their confidence that they know how to cope in this type of 
environment. 
Strategies for Neighborhood Violence & Instability 
 The stories that residents tell about previous homes and moving decisions are also related 
to the diverging strategies upon which they draw in response to neighborhood violence and 
instability, which form the second component of an orientation to the neighborhood. Some feel 
that the best way to protect themselves and the neighborhood is to develop deep social ties. In 
contrast, others feel that if they keep themselves out of social situations, they run little risk of 
encountering trouble. Both strategies are based on narratives regarding how the neighborhood 
operates and how to keep safe; as narratives, they are select for certain details and leave out 
                                                
68 Ray and Sandra are lucky to have a car – most voucher holders aren’t able to do this type of scouting 
research in order to make sure they feel safe in a neighborhood. In fact, their story is somewhat atypical. 
Many of the voucher holders that live in Park Heights found their homes through a process that can 
hardly be thought of as an informed decision. 
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others. Thus, denial is an element in any strategy. Each of these strategies has an important role 
in shaping mobility decisions.  
Social Investment versus Social Disengagement 
 Recent research has identified a common strategy of social disengagement, or in 
residents’ words: “I stay to myself,” (Murphy 2014), or “We don’t live outside, we live in here” 
(Rosenblatt & DeLuca 2012). These strategies can be likened to the distrust Sandra Smith found 
among the black urban poor that hindered social capital (Smith 2007). In Park Heights, I heard 
this type of rhetoric on a daily basis. In Ms. Sharon's words: “as long as you keep to yourself you 
are protected,” or, as Destiny puts it, “the more you stick to yourself, the more better it be.” 
Sharon discusses the strategy thinks works best with her neighbors: “they fine, you just don’t 
hang out there with them cause they all in your business. They in everybody’s business I just 
don’t sit around and carry gossip.  They don’t come in my house I don’t’ go in theirs.” Tina only 
goes out during the day, she does not walk around the neighborhood after dark: “During the 
daytime I can go by myself but at night neither one of us walks. When it turn nightfall we in the 
house around here. It’s not a good place to walk. You even really got to watch it during the 
daytime but I figure if I don’t bother nobody and go and come right back, it should be no 
problem.” For Tina and others, keeping to oneself is a way of protecting oneself physically not 
just socially.  
 Tina relies on a strict strategy of social and physical withdrawal from the housing 
complex and the neighborhood. When I asked her what aspects of the neighborhood she didn’t 
like, she explained that in he rmind, communicable diseases such as HIV are not just health risks, 
but neighborhood-level dangers. 
For one, this area code has the highest AIDS rate there is in Baltimore City. I didn’t know 
that until I moved here…They were talking at my mental health clinic and they had a zip 
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code where the AIDS populations are and this zip was one of the biggest one, Park 
Heights… I know one thing, you just have to be careful. Be very careful.  
 
Tina advises her daughter to stay away from public areas in their housing complex, and to stay 
away from other kids. In fact, she is afraid of her neighbors in a generalized sense. She has a 
strong inclination to stay indoors and stay out of trouble in order to protect herself and her 
daughter. At the same time she tries to be generous and friendly. 
I don’t think that it’s right for people to prey on your because you’re weak or you don’t 
have [much], or you just don’t live a certain way. I don’t think it’s fair. I’m not going to 
judge this person because they don’t have. If anything, I might say “I got this little bit, 
would you like some?” Like Sean and his mother Miss Sharon, I give them food every 
month, every month. Not because they don’t have because god said, you feed people. 
You give those who don’t have that much. …When I go to do my freezers and stuff, I 
give everything to her, because they don’t get food stamps like I get them. I share with 
her. I even give Miss Jenny. I give Miss Jenny and if I give somebody else before giving 
her, she gets mad. I gave a lady a crab, she got mad. She said “Oh I’m jealous.” I said 
“Would you like a crab?” I gave her four of them. “Here, here, there you go. I apologize. 
There you go.” Don’t get your family, don’t do this over some crabs…One lady asked me 
for a soda when I was waiting for you out there and two other ladies come up, they want 
a soda. I spent three minutes running up and down the steps giving out soda. And my 
boyfriend looking at me like “What’s up with that?” But …if you give — especially me 
— if I give one, they all want it. They say, “That’s the girl, she got it. She got it.” “You 
know I got it, I just can’t give it to you all.” 
 
I stay out of it. I don’t even be in their face that much. The only time they catch me is if 
I’m waiting for somebody or I got out in the morning to get some air, then I come on 
back in. I’m in for the rest of the day. They don’t see me no more than that. They be 
calling up to my window…Either they want to know what I’m doing or what I’m eating 
or if I got something that they might like. They know I like steaks so they’ll say “You 
know she’s got steaks.” Yeah, I got steaks, t-bone steaks and all that, it cost money.  
 
Tina is deeply torn between her impulse to be generous and neighborly with those who have less 
than her, and her own limits, both financially and emotionally. She tries to find a balance 
between protecting herself psychically, while also maintaining social relationships that are not 
overly draining. 
 In contrast, some residents deal with the instability and crime in the neighborhood by 
investing in social relationships in order to protect themselves. When Raven first moved to the 
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neighborhood she was wary of her neighbors and kept to herself in order to stay out of trouble. 
But as she began to get to know some of her neighbors more, they revealed to her that they did 
not like how much she kept to herself. One day a few months after she had moved to the 
neighborhood, Raven fainted on the street, and three local men who sell cigarettes on the corner 
a few blocks from her house picked her up and carried her home. She was shocked that they 
knew who she was and where she lived. She recounts that at this moment she realized the value 
in getting to know people in the neighborhood. 
 A conversation between Ray and his wife Sandra exemplifies the tension between these 
two competing strategies: 
Sandra: I was sitting on the porch yesterday and a Caucasian lady came down here. She 
came because she was looking to buy something [drugs] and stuff. We saw her 
transaction right there but see the thing about it is, you see and you don’t see. You’ve got 
to mind your business. You have to live in the neighborhood, you know what I mean? 
  
Ray: No, no if it’s done in front of me and I don’t get the respect, my family don’t get the 
respect that I think that’s necessary, I’m going to say something. But we don’t have no 
problems here because I know all the young guys. We know all the young guys. They 
speak to us just like with their transaction that transpired the guy said “Get that on, take 
that over there somewhere.” Didn’t he? Because we was sitting on the porch. We get 
respect. We give everybody in our community respect. Therefore, people think that you 
have to demand respect. You don’t. You earn respect and so far, this far we’ve been here, 
what? Seven months? And thus far we get respect around here. Ain’t had no problems, 
have we? 
 
Sandra: We mind our business. You know sometimes when you move into a 
neighborhood, until you know what’s up with your neighborhood you’ve got to mind 
your business. You can’t get too friendly with the neighbors because if you get too 
friendly with the neighbors then that’s when trouble comes because there will be a whole 
bunch of he say, she say, we say stuff because half the people in your neighborhood they 
got idle time you know what I mean? Because of the idle time they ain’t got nothing 
going on. So then they conjure up stuff and that’s when drama comes in the 
neighborhood.  
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Whereas Ray relies on a strategy of reciprocal respect that comes with “knowing” his neighbors, 
Sandra employs a strategy of keeping to herself in order to avoid “drama” that – in her 
experience – comes with socializing. 
Narratives and Navigational Strategies  
 Many residents have narratives about why they are or are not safe, and how to stay that 
way. Debbie is a fifty-one year-old unsubsidized renter who lives in Oakland Terrace. She works 
fulltime as a nurse and has a few strategies to stay safe. She makes sure to do all her errands on 
her way home so she does not have to go out again. She does not leave the house after dark 
unless she is with a friend. She sticks to these rules, but she also does not worry too much. “We 
have cameras in the complex. Once you get out you got the police right there too. When I would 
go out just say the blood of Jesus, lord watch over me and I would just put it in his hands and 
pray that nothing like that happened to me. And I’ve never, never been robbed.” She does hear 
about robberies and muggings, but she sees these events to be attached to certain kinds of people: 
It’s the crowd that you’re with, the activity that you do. That’s the outcome. If you go to 
work every day and pay your bills and living right, you’re not going to have all that kind 
of drama. But when you’re out there getting high, going to the drug spots and hanging 
with that, then you’re setting yourself to get robbed…It’s not random robbery. You put 
yourself there.  
 
She acknowledges that some are random: 
Don’t get me wrong it can be a random robbery. It could be one day I’m walking home 
from work and coming through the crack [alleyway] and someone could be coming 
through and try to stick me up and they see no one there. Because I have a job and they 
might think I have some money on me. You know what I’m saying? But they’re going to 
get their feelings hurt cause I’m not going to have any money on me but then some days I 
might have some money on me.  
 
Debbie takes strategic precautions to protect herself when she is out and about in the 
neighborhood. Fear of crime does not keep Debbie at home, but it does change the way she uses 
and navigates the neighborhood: 
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But I always call my friend so when I’m coming home on the bus I say “Alright, meet me 
at the bus stop.” And he’s right there at the bus stop meeting me…I take a little 
precaution. I don’t try to put myself in harm’s way because you know, I am aware of the 
surroundings and it can happen. Some days he might not be able to get me, meet me and I 
just I’m praying and I’m walking through this gap. Or what I do is I won’t get off at 
Woodland and walk through that gap. I get off at Oakley and I will walk around where 
the police lights is and I walk around it’s more light and walk into my complex. 
 
Debbie’s story is somewhat contradictory, because it just that, a narrative that she has 
constructed about how to stay safe in the neighborhood. At the beginning of the discussion she 
professes that she is not afraid of being mugged because she does not put herself in situations 
where that could happen; and by the end of the conversation she is citing concrete navigational 
strategies that she employs to keep herself safe in the neighborhood. Both of these narratives are 
real for her, and she draws on both to help cope with the violent circumstances in which she 
lives.  
 Violence in Park Heights is so frequent that many residents have physical markers of 
what they have endured. Cheryl has had several formative experiences with violence in the 
neighborhood. She was robbed at gunpoint last year on her way to pick up dinner. 
I came home from work one day.  I was living up here on Oakland, across the street from 
my mom, and I wanted some Chinese food. And I still had my nursing uniform on, so I 
go in the house, I put my bag on and I put my wallet in. I take one $20 bill out of my 
wallet and I walked to the store and the store was so crowded, so I said ‘I'm going to 
walk up the street to the next one,’ right?  Cause there's another one out there – and just 
as I leave out the store, I walk up, and two guys come out from the store behind me and 
one grabs me by the hoodie like this and he was like, "You know what this is? What you 
screaming for?"  Bow! - and hit me right here with a gun. I done had all of this right here 
busted wide open.  Robbed…Split, eyeball hanging out.” 
 
Cheryl points to her left eye and reveals a deep scar. Having lived in the neighborhood for many 
years, this is not the only violent incident in which she was a victim. Ten years ago, Cheryl was 
sexually attacked and physically assaulted on the way to work, just a block from her house. After 
the incident, she went through a period of deep fear about living in the neighborhood. She was 
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afraid to walk to the bus, and would spend ten minutes before leaving the house trying to decide 
which route to take and how she could protect herself. But over the years she has come to think 
differently about how to interact with the neighborhood. She thinks of the rape as “an act of 
violence,” that has the potential to maintain enduring power over her, and other people in the 
neighborhood who have been victims of similar attacks. She explains that her “fear drives it. It 
fuels it daily, so if you don't be afraid of it,” you will not be controlled by it. Cheryl says she now 
walks freely in the neighborhood without being afraid:  
I'm going wherever I want to go.  I'm just not going to be afraid of it. I'm not going to be 
afraid to live.  I'm going to walk when I want to walk.  If I decide I wake up in the middle 
of the night at twelve AM and I want something from the store, I'm going to get it.  I'm 
just going to go get it.  If there's a store open, I'm going to get it…That's just me. That's 
what I do. Whatever happens is gonna happen.  My faith is up there.  He looks high, He 
looks low and He knows all. If it's meant for me, it's meant for me. I don't - like I said, I 
don't live scared. I just don't. 
 
But Cheryl’s family worries about her. As we were talking about the different routes we each 
used in the neighborhood to get to different places, Cheryl’s son walked into the room and 
overhead us discussing how she often takes the shortcut through the woods – referred to by some 
as “the cut” or the split” – between their street and the neighboring housing complex, Oakland 
Terrace. “Ma, why you got to walk that way by yourself?” Cheryl scowled at him without 
answering and turned to me to say, “like I said, I've been around here so long, everybody knows 
me and even if they don't know me personally as a person, they know who I am by reputation.” 
She feels that this offers her some protection. But Cheryl does carry a knife now in case she 
needs it. Cheryl has developed these strategies in response to the neighborhood’s demands; this 
has allowed her to remain in the neighborhood for many years, despite her multiple violent 
encounters.  
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 There is an element of denial present in both social investment, as well as disinvestment, 
in order to cope with the neighborhood violence and instability. This denial can be thought of as 
a sort of compartmentalization, or rationalization of the facts. Many residents explained that the 
neighborhood is not really that dangerous despite its reputation, or that yes, the neighborhood is 
dangerous, but “it’s like anywhere.” Others employ a strategy that could more aptly be called 
“faith,” but it is related to denial in the way that it orients a person toward actively ignoring 
certain facts.  
Moments of Rupture 
 As time went on and I watched residents’ stories unfold, I learned that the distinction 
between successful versus maladaptive orientations was not a fruitful one. All the strategies that 
residents employed “worked” much of the time. However, almost all of them broke down at 
some point as well. Over the course of ethnographic observation, I watched families confronted 
with irrefutable evidence that their narrative about the neighborhood was wrong, and therefore 
the strategy was flawed. This evidence arose during events in the neighborhood – especially 
violent ones – that conflicted with the stories they had told up until that point that allowed them 
to deal with the challenges in the neighborhood. Those who reached out to their neighbors and 
believed that this protected them often faced moments where no one could help them; those who 
withdrew were confronted with acts of violence from which they could not retreat; and those 
who believed that acts of violence were rarer than reputed had to confront events that directly 
contradicted this understanding. As a result, I saw residents modify their narratives of the 
neighborhood before my eyes, and I saw their strategies adjusted accordingly. This ‘moment of 
rupture’ was a tumultuous one, and often motivated people to action when they had previously 
been inert. 
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 Over the time that I knew her, I watched Raven attempt to refine the delicate balancing 
act of self-preservation through social withdrawal while simultaneously reaching out in strategic 
ways. One afternoon as we sit at the kitchen table – the only piece of furniture on the first floor – 
Raven made a cryptic statement about her neighbors. She says that they are “nosy when they 
shouldn’t be, and not enough nosy when they should be.” When I asked her what she meant, she 
recounted what had happened the previous weekend. Unbeknownst to her, someone had left the 
front door unlocked; with nine children in the house, this happened from time to time. Early 
Saturday morning, Raven’s six year old daughter Carla tip-toed into the room she shares with her 
husband and tugged at the sheets: “Mom, somebody’s downstairs in our house.” Carla is always 
telling stories, jokes, lies, anything to get her mother’s attention. So Raven did not take her 
seriously, and turned over sleepily. But then she came to the other side of the bed and “she gave 
me this look, and she didn’t have to say no more. So, we gets up and I got a bat, and I’m coming 
down the steps and there’s really, literally a guy in my house, in my kitchen!” Raven watches 
him for a few minutes, incredulous, trying to decide what he is doing. He “knows where I kept 
glasses because it wasn’t none of the other cabinets was open, he went straight to the cabinet 
…Like he’s been here before!” She cannot believe her eyes. He’s just meandering around the 
kitchen, “getting a glass and sippin’…So I make like this sigh noise, right, because I’m saying to 
myself “what the—? I’m having this personal conversation with myself, like “Raven did you 
just, did you just see this? No, seriously Raven, did you see it?’” He is an older man, and does 
not seem to doing anything illicit, other than trespassing in her home. At this point Raven is just 
angry and confused, and she summons the courage to speak to him: 
I’m like “what in the bleep, bleep, bleep are you doing?” So, he’s like, he’s real 
nonchalant, he’s like, “I’m having a glass of water.” Like I was almost inconvenient, like 
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intruding?! So I go back inside myself and say “Raven…You know what needs to be 
done.”  I look at Carla, “Get your brother, go upstairs.” And I said to the man, “you got 
such and such a time to get to the door.”  He says “Phew,” puts the cup down…So he 
takes the chair, the same chair you’re sitting in, and he takes it, he sits it outside my door.  
 
Raven went on to call the police, and when they arrived they identified the intruder as a man who 
lives a few blocks away and has Alzheimer’s, who commonly wanders off and into other 
people’s homes. But Raven is livid; she cannot believe that her neighbors did not notice or say 
anything: 
Now I’m mad, I am so heated.  So I’m cursing, so all the neighbors come outside, all the 
neighbors, all the neighbors.  …So they like “Raven what’s wrong, calm down,” I said 
“No you calm down! You see him in my chair, who IS this?”  So they like, “Well Raven 
we thought that was probably your father because we seen him come there earlier.” 
 
In particular, it was a friend of Raven’s across the street who had noticed the old man on several 
occasions hanging out on the porch and coming in and out of the house. Raven was surprised to 
find that the problem was not that her neighbors were not looking out for her. Rather, it was that 
they did not know her well enough to accurately understand what was going on. Now that they 
know that Raven’s father is no longer alive, if a strange man enters her home, they will know to 
call the police. Raven realized at this moment that neither keeping to herself, nor reaching out is 
a foolproof method for protecting herself and her family.  
 When I stopped by Raven’s a few weeks later to bring her a battery-powered light since 
there was no electricity, she asked if we could reschedule because she had just received an 
eviction notice and was scrambling to figure out where she and her family would go. I stopped 
by anyway the next day to see how things were going. No one answered. I tried Raven’s cell 
phone several times. When I finally got through to her I learned that she and her youngest 
children were staying with a friend in the county, and her four older children were spread around 
staying with various friends and relatives. I asked her if she had been evicted. She said no. I 
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asked her if she had received a notice. She said had not. “But why did you leave then?” I asked 
her. She told me that the incident with the intruder had got her thinking. Even though she had 
been building relationships with the older women on the block, whom she was very fond of, and 
with the men on the corner, she had realized something important: There were some things her 
neighbors could help her with, and others they could not. The day that the sheriff comes to serve  
eviction papers, or the city comes to claim the house, “there ain’t nothing they can do for me 
then.” And with such a large family, Raven did not want to be rush out in a dramatic seen with 
the sheriff. Raven said but that she thought it would happen soon, and she wanted to be “ahead of 
the game.” 
  
 On an early spring day, I pay a visit to Tina. This time when I arrive, she is not waiting 
for me. There are five or six residents sitting out front, talking and laughing. I am carrying a box 
of cookies, which they see, and ask, only half-joking: “where are our cookies?” I tell them that 
these are for Tina’s daughter and I’ll bring more next time. The front door to the building is ajar, 
as usual, so I let myself in and climb the stairs to the third floor. When I reach the second floor I 
notice a spattering of dark stains all over the walls, and railings. Some of it has been wiped clean, 
but I can still see the streaks. Tina is happy to see me, but nervous. She wants to talk, she wants 
to tell me what’s going on, but she makes me swear that I wont reveal it was her who told me. 
We sit down out the table, she offers me a Coke, and she tells me that a neighbor recently 
informed her that a registered sex offender was living in the complex, and showed her the 
website where you can look up local sex offenders. She browsed through the names and photos, 
and quickly found a picture of her downstairs neighbor. Then things got worse. 
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 Just a day before, she heard a commotion in the hallway. Tina opened her door a crack, 
just enough to see this very neighbor banging on the front door to his apartment, yelling and 
begging his wife to let him in. She then sees three woman come in the unlocked door to the 
building, run up the stairs, and proceed to beat him up, kicking him in the stomach and ribs, 
smashing his head against the iron banister:  
He was busted open. When I say busted open, he was in a puddle of blood. …And he had 
got stabbed, and the lady [his wife] wouldn’t let him in.  She wouldn’t let him in.  The 
man was at the door saying “Help me! Let me in, let me in,” she wouldn’t.  And three 
[women] beat his head, beat him…He lives there [downstairs]. So he was trying to come 
home… and the woman, his wife, she didn’t open that door. She was scared to death. 
They probably would have stomped her head in. He was all drunk and hollering and 
screaming and f-this and f-that. Those girls tore his high horse up in the hallway. 
Between me and you, they punched him …I opened up the door to see what the 
commotion was about, but when she threw the first punch and he hit the step, his head. I 
shut my door…me and my child and went in the back, because the police came and they 
didn’t do nothing. 
 
Tina was shocked and petrified. She does not feel she can rely on the police to keep her daughter 
safe; even if they were able to subdue the violent altercation, this does not address the more 
mundane dangers of the blood in the hallway. Tina says: “every time you turn around there is 
blood in that hallway.” Tina says that the management company sent one of the tenants, who 
often performs odd jobs for pay, to clean up the blood. He has “full-blown AIDS,” she says, 
which is why they send him to do jobs like that, and Tina says he did not do a very thorough 
cleaning job. She went in after him with a bucket of bleach to finish the job. Though I realize she 
did not get it all either, as I think of the streaks I saw on my way up the stairs in her building. 
Tina is very worried that her daughter will contract HIV from the neighbors; she warned her not 
to touch the door or the railings when she walks into the building, she keeps a bottle of hand 
sanitizer by the door.  
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 Tina wants to move, but she doesn’t have a lot of options, and is not convinced it would 
be any different anywhere else. Furthermore, though she is deeply unsettled by what she has 
learned and seen, the events do not completely puncture her working model for the how to cope 
with neighborhood conditions, rather, the almost affirm what she already feared to be true. Thus, 
Tina does not need to completely reorient. Instead, Tina adjusts her strategy. Whereas before she 
tried to keep a balance between reaching out to her neighbors while still keeping to herself, now 
Tina keeps her daughter in the house at all times, and even walks all the way to school every day. 
 
 In late summer, I received a call from Ms. Sharon. She invited me to meet her brother-in-
law, Darryl. I said, “Of course,” and before I could continue, she blurted out: “Roland is dead.” I 
had spent many hours talking to her husband Roland about life in Oakland Terrace. I was 
shocked and saddened. I immediately drove over to the house. When I arrived, she explained that 
she had been out at a friend’s a few blocks away until around 10pm, and called him to see if 
Roland would come over to walk home with her since it was late. On the short walk home: 
A guy followed us. Which- we saw him coming but we didn’t think he was going to do 
what he did… he just pulled out a gun and started waving the gun around, “Give me the 
money, give me the money.”  And Roland… was tussling with him, and I don’t know, the 
guy dragging me, kind of dragged me with the gun in the other hand and had his hand on 
my shoulder and tore my blouse. Roland was trying to stop him from hitting me in the 
head with the gun.  So he shot in the air one time, and the second time he just pointed to 
his head and shot him.  And I was something out there, and I was screaming and running, 
and screaming and screaming for help.  And I ran back to him, and he was laying there 
his brains were coming out, and blood was running down the street.  And I just really lost 
it. And it seemed the police took so long to get there, and they came and then they came 
and then the ambulance and they took him.  And I had to sit in the police car and wait on 
Homicide for about forty-five minutes, and I just said, Oh my god. 
 
Ms. Sharon, who was one of the residents who never seemed to mind Oakland Terrace, had told 
me it was “quiet” and “safe,” now said, understandably, that she was frightened and all of a 
sudden felt she had to leave. “I just want a new place to live, you know. I just wanna feel safe,” 
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she told me. The narrative she revealed to me over the next few weeks about her time in Park 
Heights diverged drastically from the one she had told to me over the earlier months. The recent 
experience with intense violence and loss rendered past experiences more salient. Sharon talked 
about how her seventeen year-old daughter had been mugged last year, and hit over the head 
with the barrel of a gun. She told me about a robbery in a local take-out restaurant where she had 
witnessed someone getting shot. She explained the alternative route home she takes from the bus, 
which is twice as long but allows her to avoid the street with the drug dealers. It was as if she 
lived in a different neighborhood. Though we had had numerous conversations about violent 
incidents in the neighborhood, about personal experiences with crime, about strategies she used 
to protect herself and her daughter, she had not mentioned a single one of these incidents. I do 
not think Ms. Sharon had been lying to me. But perhaps she had a selective memory. Perhaps the 
narrative of a neighborhood that was “not that bad,” was the easiest way to deal with the regular 
violence that she was subjected to around her home. Until she was confronted with it in a way 
that changed her life undeniably, and irrevocably.  
 I spent a good deal of time with Ms. Sharon that summer observing her take steps to get a 
new voucher to move. The first step was to add her daughter to the voucher so that she could get 
a bigger home. In Oakland Terrace she was able to get a two-bedroom unit even though she has a 
one-bedroom voucher, because one of the bedrooms counts as a den. But if she were to move, it 
would be hard to find a similar situation, and one-bedrooms are not always easy to come by. Her 
daughter Melissa had recently moved back in after fighting with Ms. Sharon’s oldest daughter, 
with whom she had been living for the past several years.  
 First, we went to the housing voucher office to discuss the process for getting a new 
voucher. Ms. Sharon made an impassioned plea to be issued a new two-bedroom voucher. She 
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explained to the agent, a white man who looked to be in his early twenties, that her husband had 
recently been killed, she had watched him die, and she was now afraid for herself and for her 
daughter in their own neighborhood, and needed a new voucher to move. He stared back blankly, 
trying to translate this emotional onslaught into concrete bureaucratic steps. He paused and took 
a deep breath as he lifted the keyboard off his desk and slammed it back down to squash a roach 
that had crawled out of it a moment before. Ms. Sharon and I both jumped, and then the three of 
us had a laugh as we realized what he was doing, releasing the tension. The young man 
explained that there were two separate issues to deal with. First, adding Melissa to the voucher 
would depend on whether she had turned seventeen yet. In order to get Melissa added to the 
voucher, Ms. Sharon would need a copy of her birth certificate. Second, once Ms. Sharon 
initiated the process to get a new voucher, she would only have sixty days in which to find a new 
apartment, so he advised her to find the apartment first, then initiate the process once she is sure. 
For the next several weeks I accompanied Ms. Sharon around the city in the summer heat, as she 
took the steps to get a new copy of her daughter’s birth certificate, return to the housing office to 
add Melissa to the voucher, speak to her landlord, and begin the process of thinking about where 
she would like to move. 
 When I went back to see Ms. Sharon the following year, the landlord informed me that 
she had moved. But when he gave me the new address I realized she had not left Park Heights. 
When she had informed him that she had a new voucher to move, he proposed that she relocate 
to one of his other buildings about a mile away. And although she had some doubts about 
whether it would be safer, she also had doubts about moving somewhere completely unknown. 
And she would not know anyone in the new building. Ms. Sharon is armed with a lifetime’s 
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strategies for dealing with a neighborhood like Park Heights. Her daughter is quickly learning 
these strategies as well. Taking a risk on an unknown neighborhood is not worth it to her. 
Discussion: When an orientation is ruptured 
In this chapter I show that a resident’s “choice” is shaped and constrained by the 
orientation they have developed toward the neighborhood environment. Orientation to the 
neighborhood has three components: narratives of the past, strategies of the present, and plans 
for the future. Orientations are composed of narratives that residents recount regarding their past 
and current neighborhood experiences, often rooted in childhood experiences, the way they piece 
together these experiences, the causal story they tell themselves about why things happen the 
way they do, and how their own identity fits into the story. These narratives are not necessarily 
consistent within people, or across time. The second component of the orientation is behavioral 
strategies. Residents of poor and violent contexts develop and employ an array of strategies of 
neighborhood engagement. For example, many residents rely on social networks to protect them 
from risky social and physical environments: “as long as you know the right people you are 
protected.” Some simply disinvest and retreat to their homes to keep safe. Many seek a balance 
between these two poles. A common and powerful component of these strategies is a sort of 
denial; residents explain that the neighborhood is not really that dangerous despite its reputation. 
The interplay of narratives and strategies, and the expectations and plans that accompany them 
create different orientations toward the neighborhood. 
 The question of “who adopts what narrative” is not as important as “when and why does a 
person adopt a given narrative?” In other words, the variation that I am exploring occurs not so 
much between residents, as within residents, across different points in time. Residents bring with 
them narratives and strategies that were developed in previous neighborhood contexts. For 
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example, Sewell’s (1992) concept of the “transposability of schemas,” where schemas (like 
orientations) formed in one context, are transported and applied in a new context, is useful to 
understand how Raven’s formative experiences in public housing shaped her expectations for 
neighboring behavior. Strategies developed in recent contexts are more “retrievable” when 
triggered by similar cues in a new environment (Schudson 1989). This “transposability” is a 
mechanism for change, since alterations are sometimes necessary. We can see these imported 
narratives shift over the course of the residential trajectory within each respondent: for example, 
with Ray and Sandra’s move into the neighborhood. We see it with Tina and Raven’s strategies 
for dealing with the neighborhood – one withdraws and the other invests, but they both struggle 
with this line, doing a little bit of both. And we see this narrative rupturing most pointedly in 
Sharon’s story, when she is faced with undeniable evidence that she, in fact cannot deal with the 
neighborhood. She is no longer in control of the situation, and perhaps never was. 
 When an orientation is challenged in a “moment of rupture” a person is moved to action. 
The narrative permits stasis, until new information destabilizes it. People endure all sorts of 
uncomfortable conditions as long as they have a working understanding of how to deal with and 
manage it. In Raven’s story, she and her family livid in semi-squalid conditions – with no 
electricity and imminent threat of eviction. But I see Raven endure these conditions for months, 
and in our conversations, Raven does not mention concrete plans to leave. But when someone 
breaks into their house, and Raven learns that though her neighbors are watching, they did not 
know her well enough to know that the person did not belong there, she realizes that the safety 
she felt knowing her neighbors were keeping an eye out for her, was an illusion. Remaining in 
the precarious housing situation no longer made sense without the added benefit of community. 
Raven preempted the eviction by moving out; hoping to set down roots somewhere else. 
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 In the second story, about Tina, we see that despite the difficult conditions at Tina’s 
grandmother’s house, she dealt with it. To explain the move as a “forced” move is not entirely 
accurate. Tina did not go into bankruptcy, her home was not in foreclosure, and conditions were 
not “unlivable.” But there was moment where things did become unmanageable. Tina had been 
doing everything she could to keep up with the bills and maintain the home. She got a cat and 
told herself this would keep the problem at bay. But when she saw a cat-sized rat in the house, 
something snapped. What had seemed manageable became completely untenable. She had run 
out of new strategies. Tina sprang into action, and found a new home, in Park Heights. With the 
violent events in Oakland Terrace when I knew her, Tina faced a second challenge: when she 
learned about the sex offender who lived on the floor below her, and witnessed the violent 
beating in her hallway, she was traumatized. But though these events were shocking, they did not 
fundamentally challenge her understanding of the way things worked in the neighborhood. Tina 
was not motivated to move, but she did shift her strategy from where she tried to invest in social 
relationships in the neighborhood, to complete withdrawal.  
Preferences: Unit or Neighborhood 
 Unit quality is indeed a salient characteristic that respondents look for in a new home. 
Residents are indeed optimizing with the resources at their disposal, and sometimes this means 
choosing a “nice” home in a “not-so-good” neighborhood. Several studies have found this to be a 
relevant trade-off (Rosenblatt & DeLuca 2012; Wood forthcoming), and I find it to be true in my 
data as well (though to a lesser degree).69 A little over a quarter of voucher holder respondents (8 
                                                
69 There are some reasonable explanations for why interviews might reveal a preference for unit, despite 
an underlying value placed on neighborhood. For example, categorizing respondents into one category or 
another is fraught. Second, there may be a selection effect at play: many residents do not think that the 
neighborhood is a bad place to live. In this sense, how can we say they are choosing unit over 
neighborhood? It is difficult to understand how residents conceptualize the trade-off between 
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out of 27) report making a trade-off of unit over neighborhood. Six of these reside in the mixed 
areas (discussed in Chapter 3), and live in single-family homes, often recently renovated. The 
other two voucher holders who made this trade-off lived in bounded transitory areas such as 
Oakland Terrace. About a fifth of unassisted renters (7 out of 37), report having sacrificed 
neighborhood quality in order to access a nice, affordable unit. There are important differences 
by micro-neighborhood here too. All seven lived in mixed areas, close to homeowners, meaning 
that the units in this micro-neighborhood were likely more attractive than it would have been in 
an apartment complex, and the neighborhood had more stable residents. Renters in both the 
voucher and unassisted groups who live in mixed zones (the transitional spaces where 
homeowners are moving out and renters are moving in) are much more likely to be there for the 
unit than those in the bounded areas (i.e. the apartment complexes), who very rarely say they 
came there for the unit. These findings highlight the importance of the single-family home, 
which is more common in the mixed zones.  
 For the remaining two-thirds of renters, this hierarchal ranking was not a relevant 
distinction, suggesting that this categorization only reveals part of the story. With additional 
observational data, it was clear that families deeply valued characteristics of the neighborhood in 
addition to unit amenities. Their stories about why they came, how they chose, what they like 
best, and what they need or want, tend to change. Further, observation over time revealed that 
                                                                                                                                                       
neighborhood and unit, when they have quite a bit of information about the first, and very little about the 
second. Furthermore, in Baltimore there is a high degree of variability in unit quality, whereas there is 
less variability in accessible neighborhoods – many residents perceive them to be equally bad. The search 
process, in the best-case scenario, encourages people think about their house as an isolated unit. Video 
tours and lists of amenities focus attention on physical characteristics, without giving information on 
neighborhood characteristics, availability of schools or grocery stores, nearest public transportation, crime 
statistics, etc. Given all this, in an interview setting it is much easier for a respondent to articulate their 
reason for choosing a specific physical dwelling than it is for them to articulate the reasons for “choosing” 
the neighborhood. It is only in observing the search process that the research can learn that there was 
likely not much of a “choice” of neighborhood at all.  
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which neighborhood and unit traits residents focused on as their most desired or reviled, were apt 
to change very quickly in a moment of a rupture, as we saw with Tina and the rat, or Ms. Sharon 
and the murder. Therefore, I propose that additional forms of data are useful for a understanding 
why families move to neighborhoods like Park Heights. 
Methodological Pluralism 
 To complement the stories disclosed in interviews, I use ethnography to reveal how 
orientations morph over time, as people adapt to outside events in the neighborhood. The 
narratives were revealed as such during moments of rupture, where external events prompted 
residents to confront their flawed or incomplete accounts about the neighborhood. Over the 
course of ethnographic fieldwork, I observed many moments of rupture, when new information 
that rendered the working interpretation impossible to maintain. These events – especially 
violent ones – meant that the strategies they had used to deal with challenges in the 
neighborhood were no longer useful, catapulting residents into constructing new understandings 
of the neighborhood order, prompting a mobility decision. 
 The stories that people told me during interviews, as much as the stories they did not tell 
me, and the way in which the narratives were woven together, revealed important details about 
their neighborhood navigation strategies. Only the combination of in-depth interviewing, coupled 
with repeated ethnographic observation over time allows the holes in each form of data to reveal 
themselves.70 Narrative renderings are carefully framed accounts of the unfolding of events, a 
process of “selective appropriation” where certain details are privileged as salient and others are 
omitted (Ewick & Silbey 2003; Somers 1994). Interviews are key for identifying these narratives 
– post hoc constructions of sequences of events and their meanings are exactly what we need 
                                                
70 See (Lamont & Swidler 2014) for a discussion of the merits of methodological pluralism. 
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when we try to understand narratives (Katz 1999). At the same time, I would not have known 
about how people construct these stories without making repeated observations outside of the 
interview context. This points to a methodological shortcoming of much of the research on this 
topic. 
 When interviewing residents about their residential decision-making process, frameworks 
of ordered preferences are privileged; formal interviewing methods can therefore, by default, 
emphasize logical and rational explanatory schemas. When relying solely on an interview, it is 
much harder to understand a) the hidden contextual and structural impediments to making an 
informed “choice” and b) the extraneous details that are not relevant to the respondent’s personal 
narrative of the story, but may in fact be relevant to a larger understanding of what is going on.  
 On the other hand, when used in conjunction with ethnography and long-term 
observation of both behavior and external events, contradictions between the two methods reveal 
themselves. Relying solely upon the interview data would have emphasized one aspect of 
decision-making, a hierarchy of preferences. Ethnographic observation adds another layer to this 
story. Using the methods in tandem allows a comprehensive understanding of how residents 
make sense of past, present, and future neighborhood contexts though narrative and behavioral 
strategy. This illuminates the finding that action – in this case, a residential decision – is 
motivated by a consciously noted contradiction in the narrative’s ability to accurately explain 
one’s social environment. In other words, when a narrative is forced to shift in order to 
accommodate new information, people are motivated to act.  
Conclusion 
Narratives allow residents to discount the neighborhood’s dangers and emphasize their 
own toughness and ability to handle things. When the narrative is ruptured, residents must 
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confront the revelation that the neighborhood does not meet a minimum preference threshold. No 
story they tell or justifications they make can change the fact that the neighborhood actually falls 
below their minimum criteria. This leads to a residential decision. I argue that rupture causes a 
type of move that is not forced, but not random either.  
However, the residential outcomes do not widely diverge. In each case, residents either 
stay put, or move to a similarly poor neighborhood. Ray and Sandra opt for a home in a 
neighborhood that is less than ideal, but its not so different from other environments in which 
they have lived in the past, and they feel confident they can handle it. Raven and Tina both adjust 
their strategies when they learn more about their neighbors. Tina does not move. And Raven 
finds a temporary solution. Sharon’s narrative about staying safe in the neighborhood is shattered 
when her husband is shot and killed. And though she is resolved to move somewhere safer, she 
ends up in a similar neighborhood in a building owned by the same landlord. The orientations 
and skills these residents have acquired to survive and thrive in these neighborhoods make them 
more likely to compromise or choose similar neighborhoods in the future, especially when they 
hit inevitable roadblocks.  
Like most Americans, Park Heights’ residents imagine futures where they live in big 
homes in safe neighborhoods. However, these aspirations of white picket fences are not 
necessarily in line with reality. In this sense, these neighborhood aspirations can be thought of as 
moral identity claims that help them transcend reality, than as rational choices or plans (see Frye 
2012). Not only do they often not have the resources to get to these neighborhoods, when faced 
with a choice, they often feel that they do not have the resources to succeed there. The tools that 
residents have to adjust and reconstruct neighborhood narratives are limited. The skills that they 
have accumulated over a lifetime of living in a dangerous environment render it possible to move 
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on to a similarly violent context. The reasons people move to, or stay in a neighborhood, in 
themselves are a product of living in neighborhoods like Park Heights where violence and 
instability are high. It is this violence that can lead to further instability and the reproduction of 
poverty in residential outcomes: churning in, out, and between disadvantaged neighborhoods. It 
may be that one of the most pernicious effects of the neighborhood is that the orientation that 
allows residents to live in these neighborhoods also makes it more likely that they will end up in 
a similar neighborhood in the future. This is a mechanism for the reproduction of poverty 
through mobility decisions.  
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Chapter 6: Heterogeneity and Social Organization 
 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, policymakers and researchers hoped that moving assisted 
renters to less poor neighborhoods would have positive social effects. In Chapters 4 and 5, I 
examine two mechanisms that help explain why poor residents do not access better 
neighborhoods, and are often re-sorted into disadvantaged neighborhoods. However, on average, 
the neighborhoods to which voucher holders move are still somewhat less poor than those in 
which public housing was located. In Park Heights for example, there is a good deal of 
heterogeneity due to a substantial homeowner population, and though poverty is moderate, it is 
not “high.” If this is the type of neighborhood that many voucher holders are moving to, then we 
need to understand what this means both for the voucher holding families, as well as the 
receiving families. How is social order created, maintained, and contested in new post-public 
housing neighborhoods? What factors do or do not promote integration between neighboring 
residential groups? 
Scholars of the city and neighborhood effects researchers have long argued for the 
importance of the neighborhood as an geographic unit that structures social relations in important 
ways (Wilson 1987; Sampson 2012). This study contributes to a wide body of ethnographic 
research on community response to neighborhood change. For example, the middle-income 
children of Italian and Eastern European immigrants in Canarsie (Rieder 1987); the experiences 
of the black middle class (Pattillo McCoy 1999), working-class ethnic whites (Kefalas 2003) and 
residents of two Latino neighborhoods in Chicago (Wilson & Taub 2006); the aftermath of white 
flight in a community of white stayers, black pioneers, and “second-wave” black settlers 
(Woldoff 2011); the South End’s upper-middle class gentrifiers in Boston (Tissot 2011), among 
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others. Like many of these studies, Park Heights is a formerly middle-class neighborhood, 
resettled in the seventies by working class African Americans, and now experiencing new 
change. This study draws on an ethnographic case study of Park Heights to consider the fate of 
the assisted poor into new neighborhoods, as well as community responses to a neighborhood in 
transition more broadly. 
 Sociological theories would predict that in a best-case scenario, a range of social 
processes would help integrate voucher holders into receiving neighborhoods. Scholars of 
neighborhood effects would argue that the poor benefit from being around more affluent 
neighbors, and that these same poor neighbors do not negatively affect the outcomes of their 
affluent neighbors (Mayer & Jencks 1989). Formal social organizations would bridge the gap 
between newcomers and old-timers, providing spaces and opportunities for groups to get to 
know one another (Marwell 2007). Collective efficacy, or the ability of community members to 
act together to achieve common goals, would be a key mechanism though which to achieve 
positive social change (Sampson et al. 1997). Social capital would be leveraged, allowing 
residents to draw upon local social networks and rely upon one another for help in a range of 
situations ranging from everyday life, to crime control, to natural disasters (Klinenberg 2003). In 
this chapter, I examine each of these factors and how they operate in the neighborhood. To what 
degree might low-income renters be socially isolated from others in the neighborhood, despite 
the fact that physical isolation is not longer a primary factor? To what degree to residents with 
different residential situations face common problems? What types of symbolic boundaries 
operate between residential groups (Lamont 2000)? 
 To address these questions I draw on fifteen months of ethnographic fieldwork with two 
residential groups in Park Heights: The first, long-time African American homeowners who 
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moved to the neighborhood in the 1960’s as upwardly mobile working-class families in search of 
stability. While these original families have remained in the neighborhood through many 
changes, many are now passing on and their families are either renting or selling their homes. 
Meanwhile, the renters have churned in and out, with a recent influx of Housing Choice Voucher 
holders over the past ten years. Within this context of transition, instability, and often neglect by 
formal services, how do residents organize to fill in the gaps through informal channels? I draw 
on fieldwork to examine interactions between longtime homeowners and incoming renters who 
now share the same space. I examine informal responses in the neighborhood, ranging from trash 
collection and beautification of vacant lots, to the controlling of youth behavior and drug sales, 
examples of community justice, and engagement with formal social services. 
In this chapter I examine how neighborhood contextual factors of residential instability, 
high crime, and formal social organization shape neighboring behavior and social ties, social 
boundaries, and mechanisms of social control. But what explains the different experiences, 
strategies, and outcomes we observe within the same neighborhood among those who face a 
common set of contextual challenges and risks (Harding 2010; Shaw & McKay 1942; Suttles 
1968; Tran et al. 2012)? Neighborhood characteristics in Park Heights affect residents in the 
neighborhood in divergent ways. In order to understand these differences, I argue that we should 
think about neighborhood effects on a smaller scale. In Chapter 3, I identified three “micro-
neighborhoods,” that is, ecological zones within the neighborhood that have distinct 
characteristics relating to residential and poverty status of inhabitants: sheltered homeowner 
havens, transitional mixed areas, and bounded transitory zones. I argue that these local 
environments mediate neighborhood factors. 
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First, I examine social ties, interactions, and social boundaries between residential 
groups. There are distinct patterns of social networks and between these residential groups, 
which are best understood within the context of the micro-neighborhood. I examine the ways in 
which in individual’s residential status (i.e., whether a resident is a homeowner, voucher holder, 
or unassisted renter) structures the way a resident interacts with the neighborhood, and also how 
this may vary by the micro-neighborhood environment in which a resident is embedded. Does 
the ability to establish useful social ties vary by the context of the micro-neighborhood, or by the 
individual’s residential status? 
Second, I examine mechanisms of informal social control in the neighborhood, 
considering the ways in which residents in the neighborhood draw on social capital to regulate 
and shape each others’ behavior. There is important heterogeneity the way that social control is 
exercised by different residential groups and within micro-neighborhoods. For example, many 
are deeply invested in the neighborhood and have weekly routines of cleaning up trash in the 
street, maintaining their lawns, and checking in with their neighbors. This is the case both in 
sheltered homeowner havens as well as in transitional mixed zones. In contrast, in the bounded 
transitory areas, most residents are more transient, there are few long-time residents, and they do 
not invest in community activities in the same way. I also explore differences in the way that 
residents regulate youth behavior and drugs sales.  
Third, I consider how residents’ engagement with formal social organizations such as the 
police and social services shapes social relations. I find that though there are many formal social 
services in the neighborhood, they do not promote integration between residential groups 
because homeowners and renters do not frequent the same organizations. For example, many 
older homeowners are members of the recently built senior center, and attend the monthly 
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community meetings held there, where they discuss neighborhood issues such as crime, traffic 
control, and trash collection. There are few opportunities for social mixing between homeowners 
and renters within formal organizational settings in the neighborhood. 
Neighboring Behavior and Social Ties 
It is common for long-time homeowners to have strong social connections amongst each 
other, even if they have few of these connections. Ms. Patty, a seventy-six year old long-time 
homeowner, does not know a lot of people in the neighborhood other than her daughter, but she 
has one very close friend, her neighbor, who she has know for years. She explains: “Some people 
go visit from house to house, that has never been me. I like to know my neighbors but it’s not an 
in and out of their house thing.” She and her next-door neighbor go to church together every 
week. They do their grocery shopping together, and take walks together. Ms. Patty warmly tells 
me that they “call each other each and every day, we talk on the phone the first thing in the 
morning, and before we go to bed, we talk on the phone again.” As they get older and it is more 
and more difficult to move around the neighborhood, Ms. Patty and her neighbor rely on each 
other for company and for safety. 
There are fewer social connections between old-timers and newcomers, and since renters 
tend to have arrived more recently (see Chapter 3), there is less social mixing. There is another 
factor at play here that creates social distance, which is that both in my sample, as well as in the 
neighborhood, renters tend to skew somewhat younger, and owners somewhat older, as 
demonstrated in Figure 15. 
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Figure 15: Age of Householder, By Occupancy Type 
 
Source: ACS 2010, 5-year estimates 
Ms. Patty has so little contact with others in the neighborhood that she estimates there are 
only “a few” renters residing in the area. Raven does not know of any new vouchers holders in 
the area, in her words: “Why would you come Park Heights if you have a voucher you can use 
somewhere else?” Many residents are not aware there are voucher holders in the neighborhood at 
all. Those who do know voucher holders often refer them as “Section Eights” or “Section 
Eighters.” 
The ways in which residents talk about their perceptions of their neighbors reflect the 
moral and symbolic boundaries they draw about other residential groups (Lamont 2000). Shelley, 
a homeowner, reports that she can recognize voucher holders because they have a lot of kids. She 
claims that the “Section 8’s” are responsible for trashing the apartments on her street. Bob, a 
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homeowner, also says he can tell if a family has a voucher: “it’s not like they look shabby or 
anything like that,” but because of the way their children are rowdy: “the [parents] don’t 
discipline their children. They’re never around, they always elsewhere. The kids are raising 
themselves and you can sense it, you can see it, you can see how the children, you can tell by the 
respect that those children have for other people, other people probably, elderly people you 
know. You can tell.” But above and beyond the social distance created by age and length of 
tenure in the neighborhood, there are important ecological differences by micro-neighborhood. 
Mr. Green lives in a homeowner haven, sheltered from the transitions occurring 
throughout most of the rest of the neighborhood. He thinks very highly of his neighbors: 
“Beautiful neighbors. I wouldn’t trade them for nothing in the world. Just nice people.” He says 
they do not spend time together socially, but they do check in on each other. “We just speak and 
holler and make sure we’re okay and if they see my car don’t move for a day or so, they’ll knock 
on my door or they’ll call me.”  
Bob, who has lived in Park Heights since the eighties, is a sixty-five year-old African 
American man who owns a home in a transitional mixed zone. He knows many of his neighbors 
because he does landscaping in the neighborhood for extra money. He loves his neighborhood, 
and is able to point to many homes on the block and identify who lives there and what they do: 
“I’ve had the best neighbors. My neighbor on my left here has been there before I moved here 
and the people on the other side of them, they were here before, before we moved here and they 
have been the greatest. Neighbors on the right house has changed over a couple times but they 
are good neighbors.  I know just about everybody in the block.” Bob lives on block that has 
become more transitional in recent years; many of the original homeowners have passed away or 
moved to other places, and new owners have bought these houses and increasingly rent them out. 
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The renters are less likely to hire him to do landscaping, and so he does not know them as well. 
He feels that things have changed over time as newcomers have arrived. The way Bob sees it: 
The first thing they do is they try to sell them for half price when they’re vacant at 
auction. Then when eventually they can’t get that money for them, nobody can afford to 
buy them then they decide to try to rent them out.  And usually they rent them out to a 
family that has a bunch of children that are not disciplined, a little rowdy, you know.  
 
With the influx of new renters, Bob has seen significant changes in the neighborhood. “It’s not as 
quiet here anymore. Now you have to really be careful about locking your doors and everything 
or locking your gate, which you should never have to do. Because I mean the kids come right in 
your private property and just destroy.” When I first met Bob on his front lawn, he showed me 
his meticulously planted flowers that had been torn up and stomped on, strewn with cigarette 
butts and beer cans the night before. He says that the kids come through his back gate, and run 
between the houses from the back alley to the front street, knocking down whatever is in their 
path, with no regard for his private property. He sees these families as different from the ones 
who used to live in the neighborhood. “It’s mostly the parents’ faults because the parents don’t 
watch them. Some of the parents may work. Okay fine, but they not disciplining their kids, they 
be running up and down the street all hours of the night.” 
Beverly also lives in a transitional mixed area – though one with fewer older 
homeowners than where Bob lives – where there is an assortment of older homeowners, newer 
renters, vacants, and newer homeowners like herself. Beverly participated in a residential drug 
rehabilitation program in Park Heights ten years ago, and then participated in a “rent-to-own” 
program to purchase her home. Having been a renter in the area herself previously, she is 
sensitive to the differences she sees between homeowners and renter, and the differences 
between micro-neighborhoods: 
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The neighborhood can change from block-to-block. You can have a great homeowners 
block, and then the next block can be wild and crazy. When people aren’t homeowners - 
not all people - some people don’t respect the property, the neighborhood or the 
neighbors in a way that homeowners would like them to. They may be loud; they may 
have the most visitors on a daily basis; they may stay out later, you know just more 
activity, more activity going on than homeowners may have.  Homeowners are usually 
folks that work and spend time fixing up the neighborhood.   
 
Beverly hopes the neighborhood is on the upswing, but worries that some of the renters are less 
invested in the area. 
There is one community member who manages to cross all boundaries in the 
neighborhood; I learned about his role early on in my fieldwork. One afternoon as we were 
discussing the neighborhood, I asked Sue why there was a group of haphazard and dilapidated 
buildings protruding from the wooded area behind Oakland Terrace. Sue looked incredulous at 
the question: “Oh, that’s Caribbean Bill’s place. Wait, you haven’t met Caribbean Bill yet?” It 
sounded like a joke. “Caribbean Bill?” I asked, with a quizzical smile. “Yeah, Caribbean Bill!” 
Sue answered, sighing at how little I knew. “You know, the one who feeds the cats? He’s been 
here for years, he knows everyone around this way. C’mon let’s go find him.” We exited 
Oakland Terrace through the back, and walked through the “split,” a pathway through the woods 
leading to Forest Ave. There, we came upon Bill’s old home, which is now vacant and boarded 
up. He does not live there any more of course, but the cats remember, and they still swarm 
around the house and wait for him to feed them each day. To my surprise, when Bill finally came 
around, he recognized me: “Yeah, I seen you around here last week talking to Ms. Jeanette. I was 
wondering when you’d come find me,” he said with a smile. I was continually struck by the 
degree to which people I had not yet met knew of my presence in the neighborhood. 
I sat with Bill on his old porch for the next few hours, while the cats meandered around 
us and meowed for our attention. Bill explained to me that every day he walks a three-mile 
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stretch from South Baltimore to Liberty Heights. Along the way, he pushes a grocery cart 
stocked with several large bags of cat food – most of them donated by a local animal shelter and 
by residents who have come to know him well over the years he has been walking his daily trek 
– and feeds all the stray cats he can find. Bill explained how this started: 
I would walk every day from Smallwood, I would come down, make a right, turn on 
Ashmont and then Perkins, come up right there past Mondawmin, and just take 
Reisterstown road up to Springhill Avenue, make a right on Archer Avenue and Cortland, 
Georgia and Wentworth, all those neighborhoods in between. Then I cut up on Springhill, 
cut down Forest Avenue and then go up Oakland Avenue to Oakland Terrace Apartments 
and my final stop is at Highland and Church. [After a while], I realized there are dozens 
of other cats along the way when I was coming up here, and I kept adding until I have a 
total of about 30 stops with approximately 200 cats. I feed cats all along the way. I'm able 
to find homes for them and with the help of others, I've been taking them to the doctor to 
get them fixed. 
 
Bill knows all the cats individually and has names for many of them. But his work extends far 
beyond feeding and rescuing cats. In his daily treks, he has befriended residents not only 
throughout Park Heights, but also across the entire west side of Baltimore. He does all sorts of 
odd jobs for people including a dog walking service, a pet care and placement program, lawn 
work, home repairs, and more. He also connects people to others that he knows for jobs or 
services that they may offer or desire.71  
When our legs got cramped from sitting on floor of the porch, we got up and Bill showed 
me the series of shacks attached to the back of the house. He had built the structures years ago to 
house stray dogs. He also ran laundry business. “I would go to people's house and pick up their 
dirty clothes and wash it and hang on the line and put some to dry.” Bill would accept whatever 
people offered for this service, and was happy as long as he could afford to buy food for the cats. 
Trying to explain to me who he was, Bill said: “You heard about the old white lady who 
                                                
71 Later in my fieldwork, Bill was invaluable in helping me locate certain types of people in the 
neighborhood. With IRB approval, I paid him $10 for every referral made, 100 percent of which he said 
went straight to the cat food. 
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feeds 100 cats? I'm the old black man who feeds and [rescues] cats and dogs and rescues human 
beings.” Bill takes in people as well. Back when he lived in the home we were sitting outside of, 
he offered his spare room to three homeless men he had gotten to know in the neighborhood. But 
when his houseguests started selling drugs out of his home, the house was raided, Bill was 
evicted, the dogs were taken to the pound, and the laundry business he ran out back was shut 
down.  
The police destroyed the washing machines, the dryers. I had just bought a laptop. They 
busted the laptop all up. Everything of value - I had a refrigerator with icemaker, double 
door. They broke everything of value. My good clothes, they put ketchup, relish, 
mustard, bleach, fabric softener, on the clothes. Everything of value, they destroyed.  
They thought – now, maybe they thought I was selling drugs but using the laundry as a 
disguise.   
 
Bill no longer has a permanent residence in Park Heights, but everyone in the neighborhood still 
thinks of the house as “Caribbean Bill’s house.” He now has a few different places where he 
“stays” in Park Heights, but he does not have a lease of his own, and does not spend much time 
at home anyway, he is too busy with the cats.  
Maintaining Order  
Like the working-class whites that Kefalas studies, the homeowners of Park Heights 
“share a collective understanding of how their place ought to look and, in a philosophic sense, 
how its residents to be” (Kefalas 2003, p.5). Many residents engage in what I call neighborhood 
“order maintenance,” not dissimilar to the “fetishistic” strive for cleanliness of Kefalas’ Beltway 
residents (Kefalas 2003). This order maintenance entails two types of social control: first, the 
enforcement of a set of aesthetic rules about what sociologists would call “signs of disorder,” 
including trash, unkempt lawns, and other visual cues, and second, the regulation of behavior. In 
the first type, the homeowners are concerned with keeping the neighborhood looking clean and 
orderly, often performing tasks with which city public works do an inadequate job or cannot 
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keep up. Barbie takes a proactive approach with the issue of litter. She grew up in the 
neighborhood, and now lives in her childhood home on a street in a transitional mixed area. She 
and her father used to take walks down the street to pick up stray bits of trash and litter. Now that 
her father is gone, she and her husband Roman continue the tradition. 
Me and Roman and we start on the other side of the street and go on down there and bag 
up trash.  Now, I try to recycle. I get to all the recycle paper and put it in a certain 
trashcan and I got Miss June recycling. I got the guy on the corner recycling. The girl 
next door, she had been doing it when she moved there. She asked me about the recycling 
days and I told her. I got Andrea recycling across the street. And quite a few people 
wants to steal their neighbor's recycling bins so I been trying to get them all to recycle. 
We have to get our own bins. You know, they told us we had to have yellow or blue but I 
got a big black trashcan with a top on it. I put it in there. The guys know to get it and 
when they don't come, I call. I call for everything.  I call them to clean the alleys up - I 
call for them to clean the lots, the empty lots. 
 
Recycling in Baltimore city is not required by law, but Barbie encourages her neighbors to 
participate in the recycling program. She provides her neighbors with bins that the city does not 
supply, and teaches them how and when to recycle. Her campaign is not just about trash and 
recycling. In fact, Barbie has no particular agenda related to the environment or clean waste 
disposal. Rather, she sees it as an opportunity to connect with her neighbors, get to know them, 
and promote neighborly behavior.  
But Barbie is an exception. Rather than reaching out to their neighbors to bridge the 
differences in lawn manicuring and waste disposal, many homeowners draw stark moral 
boundaries about the nature of their new neighbors’ character, reflecting larger fears that trash 
and tall grass are signs of disorder that will damage the neighborhood (Kefalas 2003). Just a few 
blocks away in a similarly transitional mixed area, another homeowner Bob, is also very 
concerned with the upkeep and maintenance of the homes on his block. In particular, he worries 
about the house on the end of his block, which has turned over quite a bit since the original 
owners sold a few years ago. 
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The house that’s down here on the corner, people moved in there about a month ago and 
they gone already, from what I understand…They were, I think they were evicted, you 
know. I haven’t seen the inside of the house for years because the original people that 
used to own the house have been gone for a long time. There was a lady that lived down 
there, she had a grandson and his mom was there. They kept it up pretty good as far as 
the property and all is concerned; but not the folks who are in there now. 
 
Bob is engaged in what he feels is a sisyphean battle with trash pick-up on the block, and these 
new neighbors are not helping.  
[The neighbors] throw garbage and trash all over the place in the tall grass, which rats 
love hanging in, you know. Then, the trash cans – even if they have them – they don’t put 
the trash in them, or the kids kick the trashcans over. On trash day, the trash truck can 
come up this alley, so we put our trash out the back. But they can’t quite come down the 
alley on the other side of the street, so the people across the street bring all their trashcans 
and all the bags down here on this corner out front. So that it smells, especially when the 
cats and dog and whatever get into them. And then when trash man comes they don’t 
clean the street or all the stuff that’s laying on the ground and we have the smell and 
everything and we have the rats coming out the alley. And we have to – my neighbor and 
I – we go out and we clean the streets and everything, we do.  
 
Bob points out that the trash is not just unsightly, it attracts animals. Rats are a pervasive 
problem in Baltimore’s aging housing stock, but Bob’s block in particular has a serious rat 
infestation that has gotten worse in recent years: “Right now we have a rat population. We got 
the rat patrol, and we filling in holes and everything, but since they moved down there, I mean 
we see rats quite often now.” Bob associates the problem with the newcomers and their bad trash 
etiquette. This points to the important fact that the first type of social control is not purely 
aesthetic, as the visual cues have important implications about residents behavior, as well as 
significant consequences (e.g. unsightly trash may indicated that a neighbor does not care about 
the neighborhood, or is lazy, and it also has consequences that affect everyone, such as rats and 
other feral animals including cats, raccoons, and more).  
We took at stroll around the block and he pointed out each “problem” house to me. When 
we approached the house at the end of his block, about five houses down from his own, a pit-bull 
  178 
resting on the front steps arose and began barking ferociously and came running towards us; a 
few feet from where we were standing at the edge of the lawn, the chain caught and the dog was 
stopped in his tracks, but continued to warn us against trespassing with his growl. “Even though 
it’s a young dog, you know, still, you know he should be in the back – you want to have a dog 
out you supposed to have a dog house and all things for it. They don’t have none of that.” Bob is 
particularly concerned with this house and its upkeep. “I don’t know if you notice it now, it looks 
a little better now that they just recently cut their grass, it was so high…But if you look out at 
their back, they didn’t cut their back [lawn], I mean they got wild trees and everything going on 
there.”  
Bob’s apprehensions about the appearance of the homes on his block do not stem from 
cosmetic concerns alone, and also go beyond sanitary issues related to vermin infestations; many 
residents express fears that unkempt lawns, dogs chained out the front, and trash strewn about 
signal to outsiders that the residents of the block are not paying attention and do not care what 
happens on the block. He is worried that such visual cues will increase drug trafficking on the 
corner, as Broken Windows theory would indeed predict (Kelling & Wilson 1982). 
You know that’s done changed. People used to care about it, but now I mean we have 
cars that drive up the street and just throw trash bags and all right out the street out the 
windows of the cars and keep on going. Some cars or guys that come up here that 
sometimes the school yard in the back, in the next block and they sell drugs and all back 
there sometimes.  
 
You see we have a police light up here… They used to sell, yeah they used to sell on the 
corners and now they put the light up here so they’re in the back.  Cars will park out up 
here on the side here, by the playground. But the people sitting in the car will clean their 
car out…Fast food bags and half eaten food out, right out in the gutter. 
 
Homeowners also have methods for regulating controlling behavior like drug dealing in 
front of their homes. One afternoon in August I sat with Bob on his covered front porch to catch 
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some breeze and escape the late-summer sun. We had exhausted topics of conversation for the 
day, and were sitting quietly when two young neighborhood men walking down the street paused 
in front of the gate. They did not appear to see us sitting there as we were camouflaged in the 
shade of the house. A third man – this one appeared to be young, in his late teens – approached, 
and the three began talking closely and quietly. As I was trying to determine what they were 
doing, Bob’s voice rang out next to me, in a tone I had never heard from him before: sharp and 
authoritative, but avuncular, not hostile:  “Hey. Not in front of my house young man.” The three 
looked up suddenly, a bit startled to notice us there, one nodded his head in Bob’s direction in a 
gesture of understanding, and they made their way down the block. Bob turned to me and said, 
“Most of them [listen] because most of them I have known basically ever since they was 
children.” Like Anderson’s “old heads” (1992), long-time homeowners are much more likely to 
engage in informal social control with neighborhood youth. These young people are embedded in 
the same social networks as the older residents, and mechanisms behavior regulation have 
developed over a long period of time. 
In contrast, areas with high renter populations have very different manners of maintaining 
order. In a place like Oakland Terrace, upkeep is more centralized, and tenants are not 
responsible for trash maintenance and keeping common spaces orderly. The landlord and 
property manager are technically responsible for maintaining order. Nevertheless, some residents 
pitch in. For example, Ms. Sharon lives in Oakland Terrance, and cleans the halls periodically: 
“They just don’t keep it as clean as I would like for ‘em to keep it clean… from time to time I go 
out there and scrub my own hall because the rental office might do that once a month … when it 
gets too nasty out there in the hall I go out there an scrub it.” This is a no-brainer to Sharon, who 
wants to feel comfortable in her building. When it comes to regulating the sale of drugs, common 
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spaces are policed much more vigilantly (as compared to mixed areas for example) through 
formal surveillance methods including security guards and cameras. This means that residents 
engage in less informal social regulatory behavior, and have less of a sense of ownership over 
the space. They report that these formal techniques work well: every respondent I spoke with in 
Oakland Terrace said they rarely, if ever, saw dugs deals occur in the shared outdoor space of the 
complex. However, what happens behind closed doors, and in the unmonitored hallways of the 
buildings, is another story. 
Informal Versus Formal Mechanisms of Social Control 
Like Bob, many older residents live in single family homes, almost all of which have 
covered front porches, where they often sit on their porches to escape the heat of their older and 
often un-air-conditioned homes. This provides much needed “eyes on the street,” monitoring 
activity and serving as both an informal mechanism of social control, as well as a conduit for 
alerting the formal law enforcement of unusual behavior such as cars left sitting on the street or 
strangers lurking near the playground. Mr. Green takes it upon himself to call the police if he 
sees anyone suspicious or unknown in the neighborhood. 
That’s my job, cause I’m here and if I see somebody, especially in the summertime cause 
my rocking chair - I sit on the porch…And if I see somebody here that shouldn’t be or I 
don’t think should be here, I call 911; they come check it out… And if I see a car sitting 
here for two days, I call 911 and they check it out.  Every time I’ve called so far, it has 
been stolen; somebody put it there cause see, we’re back in here.  We’re back and they 
bring it and leave it. 
 
Homeowners are much more likely to develop long-term strategies and relationships with the 
police. Ms. Barbie is the middle-aged woman who has spent her entire life in Park Heights and 
inherited her home from her parents who bought it years ago. She says she does her best to make 
the neighborhood a better place to live. In November, Ms. Barbie happened to glance out her 
window when she saw two men loading toilets, sinks, and copper piping into a truck in front of 
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the old house where Ms. Cohen used to live. She called the police as usual, but it took them two 
hours to arrive, which was not before the house had been stripped of all its copper piping, and 
other items like toilets, sinks, and even some electrical wiring. She worries that when homes are 
stripped in this way, they remain vacant for longer, attracting rats and drug dealers, and 
ultimately depressing the value of the homes. She later called the city to ask them to board up 
two of the empty homes on her street to prevent any more striping. She commonly calls the city 
for other matters as well. 
I call the city. 3-1-1.  They connect you to the city office and you just make your report 
there.  They give you a claim number and tell you you got 15 days or 30 days for them to 
come out. But when they don't come, I keep calling them. I got my name down there a 
hundred times because I call for everything. I call when that playground over there get 
dirty.  They come out and clean it up often now. 'Cause we have a lot of children come 
over there.  
 
The police are not always responsive, but Barbie has a special method to get their attention: 
I used to tell everybody to call, call, call… I would call and use several names, different 
addresses of empty houses. I didn't want to be the same person calling... I would call and 
I would leave my name and I just tell them, "In the 3600 block of Rockland Avenue." I 
wasn’t afraid, but thought it would be more effective to be someone else. 
 
Barbie says she hears far fewer gunshots than she used to. She is not afraid to call the police, and 
in the past she found that calling really has make a difference: 
It's been I guess about five years now. They don't even shoot on New Year's no more.  
When they used to shoot on New Year's, I say, “get on the floor.” I say, "Everybody get 
down." …You know, shoot up in the air.  But they don't even do that anymore.  I'm glad 
they don't 'cause that used to scare me. But other than that, everything sort of calm in our 
neighborhood. The drug dealers, I think I done chased them away… I called the police on 
them. They used to hang in front of my door…You know, at the gate, you know, and I 
started calling and they would come.   
 
Many homeowners report that they call the police commonly for this type of behavior regulation 
and order maintenance. Ray, the newly arrived voucher holder from Chapter 5, is an anomaly in 
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his strategy of confronting the dealers on his block directly; his wife Sandra would prefer to let 
things resolve on their own. 
Unlike Ray, most renters describe a reticence to engage with the police, especially when 
it comes to issues that do not directly affect them. Raven would call the cops when her family is 
in danger, such as when she had an intruder in her house (see Chapter 5), but not for things like 
drug dealing that are not directly hurting her, and in fact could create problems for her by 
reporting. She would rather rely on her older neighbors who have lived there for a long time. “I 
like my older lady neighbors, like all of them. I’m in a good block, even though they did let me 
down with the old man in my house.”  
This hesitance to engage the dealers directly may be related to the fact that mechanisms 
of informal social control do not work as well for renters and newcomers to the neighborhood. 
For example, when Caribbean Bill first rented a house in the neighborhood, when no one knew 
him and he was just “Bill,” he asked the teenagers who liked to sell drugs in front of his house to 
move on down the street. He did not have much luck: 
You can ask them to leave.  I've asked them to leave but, me asking them is like I'm telling 
them to stay, because they're not going to pay me no mind. They feel that they were 
selling drugs before I came here. One day, I had this man put up a fence for me, fence 
around the property. They told me, “Why are you putting a fence up? That's not going to 
stop me.  I'm going to do what I want to do anyway.” 
 
When Bill first moved to the neighborhood, his admonitions fell flat on the ears of the young 
boys selling drugs in front of his home. But as Bill lived in the neighborhood longer and got to 
know residents better, thing changed. Now, he knows all the dealers, and they update him on 
important goings-on in the neighborhood. This points to the fact that while there is a hierarchy of 
respect between long-time residents and the dealers, which helps to regular behavior, newcomers 
have a very hard time asserting informal social control. Furthermore, it’s not just homeowners 
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like Bob who can regulate behavior, but also anyone who has been in the neighborhood long 
enough and has social ties with other residents. These mechanisms work much better on the 
children of homeowners than on recently arrived children of renters who do not know who is 
who in the neighborhood and what the rules are. 
 A few months after I moved to the neighborhood, a rape occurred that was covered 
extensively in the local news. The event was a significant one in the area, people talked about it 
for months. The victim was a young mother of four who had grown up in the neighborhood with 
her homeowner parents. She had recently moved back, renting an apartment near her childhood 
home. Thus, she was well connected to her neighbors and known in the community. 
Neighborhood residents saw the crime as a transgression of a set of unwritten rules because this 
woman minded her own business and stayed away from trouble. Raven explains:  
She a single mother, she have a daughter, she got three sons, she stayed to herself … 
Even in the hood certain things is recognized and certain people are off limits. Even if 
you a bad guy – like, I know bad guys – and bad guys be like, ‘No, I don’t do this, but I 
will do this.’…In the hood, you hurt a child, or somebody’s mom, you’re wrong. I can 
say that. 
 
Though seemingly random violence does occur, Raven is pointing to the fact even in high-crime 
neighborhoods like Park Heights there are rules about who is, and is not, off limits. The act 
violated a tacit, but well-understood code. And there are consequences for violating this code: 
Although there was a consensus among neighborhood residents that the perpetrators were two 
local men involved in the drug trade, the police did not arrest them. Raven explained that there 
are consequences for breaking the code and involving “decent folk” in a violent incident. In her 
words, a “public justice” was meted out; the perpetrators “had the shit kicked out of them” by a 
group of neighborhood men who were long-time residents. This was the only incident of 
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vigilante justice that I heard about specifically, but it suggests that when formal justice fails to 
operate, at least some of the time Park Heights’s informal mechanisms spring into gear. 
Formal Control: Surveillance 
The city of Baltimore has installed surveillance cameras in select areas throughout the 
city in recent years.  
Figure 16: "Blue Light" Surveillance Cameras in Baltimore 
Source: Baltimore Police Department 2014 
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Residents refer to the cameras as the “blue lights” because there is a blue flashing light attached 
to each camera to indicate to residents that they are being filmed, with the presumption that this 
will deter crime.72 Residents who live near cameras tend to take notice of what happens, and 
some report that the installation of the camera really did seem to deter criminal activity such as 
drug sales in the near vicinity. However, other residents do not notice any change in after 
installation: five respondents report witnessing drug sales and even violent crime directly 
underneath a blue light, with no immediate response from law enforcement. Some residents 
question how the system is supposed to work, and whether there are even cameras attached to the 
blue lights.73 For example, Bob wonders if they are anything more that just flashing lights: “They 
are supposed to be cameras, in fact they’re supposed to have people monitoring those cameras… 
I’m not even sure they have film in there…I seen drug dealing and all, I seen fights, I seen 
people get stabbed out there you know, you just wonder.  You call, that’s the only way the police 
know.” Bob is wonders if the camera just relocates the drugs activity around the corner without 
really changing much: 
There’s still, you see a lot of activity, I mean because we can’t see down this alley you 
know and the guys go down and do the deal … you go back up in there and do the little 
deal in whether, you can’t see around the corners somewhat. But like I said I have seen 
things go on out here right underneath the camera and no police comes or anything you 
know. 
  
At the same time, he acknowledges that the camera does have a certain power: 
You know, it does somewhat [affect behavior].  It’s almost like - some of the houses, we 
                                                
72 A report by the Urban Institute analyzed the impact of the cameras in Baltimore finds positive 
improvements in crime in four out of the five neighborhoods it evaluated. Impacts were larger in the 
downtown area where cameras are mores saturated and more heavily monitored. However, cameras have 
limited use for convictions in the courtroom due to visibility issues related to light and obstructions (La 
Vigne et al. 2011). 
73 In reality, this may not be far from the truth. In recent years the intervention has been expanded to 
encourage private residents to install their own cameras, and use a blue flashing light in their window to 
indicate its presence. Yet these cameras are not monitored by law enforcement at all, and so there is no 
guarantee of police response in their presence either. 
  186 
have, have the alarm system and everything, but a lot of times it doesn’t matter whether 
it’s on or off if you got the sign out there a lot of times see the sign say well I’m not 
going even…Yeah the sign does maybe a better job of doing it than the alarm system 
does.    
 
Though cameras have an effect, they do not necessarily eliminate crime and drug sales. A 
camera was put in few years ago when residents on his block requested one, but he says: 
I’ve seen stuff go on right underneath of that camera. Nothing [changed]. Every now and 
then we get a good police presence…Every now and then and sometimes you know it 
seems like you see the police maybe one policeman drive through you know in days. But 
after they put the camera up there like I say, the activity moved somewhere else, went to 
the playground back there.  
 
Many have come to believe that whole campaign is a sham, and perhaps there are no cameras at 
all. Some find that perversely, not only do the cameras fail to deter crime, they serve as an 
indicator of crime, stigmatizing an area as dangerous. For example, when I asked Michelle what 
her block was like, she used the presence of the “blue lights” to give me a metric for how 
dangerous it was.  
Right here in this area, it has got really bad…They had the [blue] lights at the top [end] of 
our block…They had them everywhere around here because about four summers ago, 
two years in a row, people was getting choked around here left and right. Left and right, 
left and right, left and right…You know, it's scary every time you turn around, you hear a 
police helicopter. You see the lights flashing. You wondering what in the world 
happened.  
 
The camera has since been removed, which Michelle takes as a signal that crime has gone down 
on the block.74 
Video surveillance plays a different role for those who reside in bounded transient areas. 
In Oakland Terrace, I learned that that the cameras transmit and record a live feed into the rental 
office where the building manager Jill sits six days a week. I spent many hours sitting with Jill in 
the office, and the video feeds are displayed on a giant TVs on one of the walls of the office. 
Residents would filter in and out of the office all day; they enjoyed peering over the desk to 
                                                
7474 I was not able to verify whether or not this was in fact the reason 
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watch the activity on the screen and would comment on who was doing what, and where. It was 
commonly known that these cameras existed and were monitored not only by Jill, but my other 
residents who might be in the office taking a peek at the screens. Residents who have lived in 
Oakland Terrace for a long time reported that the cameras have completely changed the housing 
complex, curbing the violence, crime, and drug activity.  
Social Services and Formal Community Organization 
Poor segregated neighborhoods are often thought to be lacking in local social 
organizations (Small & McDermott 2006; Wilson 1995), and certainly, Park Heights did lose 
many of these businesses and organizations in the years following the white flight of the 
seventies. But today, Park Heights has over twenty-seven community and social service 
organizations meant to serve its residents and promote wellbeing in the neighborhood. Many of 
them have popped up in recent years, while others have been around for a long time. The three 
health clinics, a family support center, a Head Start program, and twelve churches providing 
religious services, address a multitude of community needs. Other organizations, such as three 
drug rehabilitation centers, and four halfway homes for people exiting prison, serve many local 
residents, but are also reviled by those who fear they attract unwanted newcomers to the 
neighborhood. A new senior center built in 2009 serves as a gathering place for the 
neighborhood’s older residents, and also houses monthly community meetings.  
Ms. Patty explains that though she remembers the neighborhood going through some 
rough patches, she has seen things improving in recent years. She and her neighbor watched 
from her back porch as the senior center, the Delphi Center, was built. 
You just have to learn how to adjust to different things. Like before the Delphi building 
was built we would – Mrs. Scott and myself – we would always say “Lord, I hope they 
put something on that corner down there.” Because the young people used to be around 
it. They just hung around that corner. There wasn’t anything there but they just… they 
  188 
were just hanging out. We just prayed about it. We said “Lord, just send something that 
they can put something on that block now. That will keep the kids from down that way 
and it will be something that we could be involved in. I sat in my back porch right back 
there. I looked down that street and I saw them building [Delphi] from the ground to the 
roof …Everyday I’d sit on my back porch and I would watch it.  
 
Patty goes to the Delphi Center twice a week, on Mondays and Wednesdays. She rides the 
stationary bike to stay fit, and she also takes a Zumba class. For 6 out of the 16 senior residents, 
5 of whom were homeowners, the senior center represents a central location around which social 
life is organized. Another long-time resident, Arnold comes every single day to the center to play 
pool with his friends. They have joined the Baltimore Senior League, a citywide billiards league 
for seniors, and now compete in tournaments all over the city.  
 The Delphi Center holds a community meeting, which I attended each month between 
September 2011 and August 2012. Before each meeting the agenda is set by board members. A 
representative from each committee – including the Health Committee, The Public Safety 
Committee, the Sanitation Committee, the Home Energy Committee, the Seniors Committee, 
and the Youth Committee – presents on current issues. Each month, between fifty and one-
hundred people attended.  Roughly three quarters appeared to be older residents, perhaps because 
it was hosted at the Delphi Center. I spoke to attendees each week before and after the meeting, 
getting to know many of them and recruiting them to participate in my research. It took me some 
time to realize that these residents were not just older, they were also largely homeowners.  
In the 10 community meetings that I attended over the course over a year-long period, the 
most often discussed topic was sanitation, on the agenda 8 out of the 10 meetings. The senior 
committee was on the agenda in 7 meetings. Health was discussed in 5 meetings. The topics least 
often on the agenda were crime and safety, and youth, which were each on the agenda in only 4 
meetings. Energy, traffic, and local business where also discussed in each of 4 meetings.  
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 As I got to know other neighborhood residents, I sometimes mentioned the community 
meeting and on several occasions invited them to join me. In April, a resident of Oakland 
Terrace told me that she wanted to go with me. Sue is a forty-five year old African-American 
woman. She thinks of herself as different than many of her neighbors in Oakland Terrace 
because she is from a middle-class background, grew up in a stable two-parent family, and 
attended two years of college. Sue had not been aware that such a meeting existed in Park 
Heights. When I mentioned it to her, she was very excited to hear about it because she had been 
looking for a way to get more involved in the community, and the meeting seemed like a perfect 
way. When we walked in to the Delphi Center, Sue looked around, taking in the scene. We took 
two seats near the back, and she leaned in and whispered in my ear, “These here are middle-class 
folk. They stick to themselves.” Sue looked nervous and fidgeted, adjusting her shirt and 
checking her make-up in a small mirror from her bag. Just before the meeting started, she opened 
her phone and made a quick call to her sixteen year-old daughter: “Hi baby, do me a favor? Can 
you call me right back? I won’t answer, I just wanna make sure the sound is off.” It was. As the 
meeting got going, she settled into her seat. 
 One issue in particular stirred up strong feelings amongst the attendees that day. A 
delegate from the local district stood up to announce the news that a bill to limit the sale of 
alcohol in the neighborhood had failed to pass in the state senate, despite widespread support. 
The delegate explained why she believed the bill had failed: When she was canvassing houses to 
get support for the bill, “Not once did a Korean family answer the door. The children don’t 
socialize in the neighborhood. Tell me if I’m wrong?” The delegate said that 14 out of 37 
businesses in the area were not in support of the bill, and that these were all owned by Korean 
families, though they were not all liquor stores. Despite the fact that all 18 senators and delegates 
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from both local districts supported the bill, the “Korean merchants came back and played the 
‘race card,’ arguing that limiting the sale of alcohol was discriminatory and would hurt their 
businesses and livelihood.”75 The letter filed in response to the decision is as follows:  
 
Liquor Legislation HB ___, Delegate ________ 
Maryland House of Delegates 
  
April 3, 2012 
  
Dear Chairman, 
 
HB ___ was given an unfavorable vote in House Economic Matters although you gave 
your word that it would pass.  
 
It boggles my mind that a Baltimore City bill that is supported by the Baltimore City 
Delegation, City Councilwoman Sharon Green Middleton, both Senators and six police in 
that district, the residents in that district, and the majority of the merchants in that district, 
and is opposed by only 14 of 37 merchants would be given an unfavorable vote by 
committee members who do not live in that district. When will the community and its 
residents come first? 
 
After the meeting I turned to Sue and asked her what she thought. She explained to me: “Since I 
come from a middle-class background I had some of the same concerns as them because I want 
things for my kids and stuff like that. But also, on the other, [they were all homeowners]….I felt 
a little alienated about that.” I had not realized until that moment just what segment of the 
neighborhood population attended the meetings. Not only were they older. Not only where they 
largely homeowners. They were homeowners who lived in sheltered homeowner havens and 
transitional mixed zones. Oakland Terrace is only two blocks from the Delphi House, if you take 
the split past Caribbean Bill’s old house. But, few residents even know that it exists.  
Though Sue is an unassisted renter in Oakland Terrace, she grew up in a family with a 
similar class background as many of the meeting attendees. Yet even she felt alienated at the 
                                                
75 Though research shows that heated clashes between in merchant-customer relations are not the norm, 
extreme poverty coupled with the visible presence of newcomers, can provide fertile ground for deeper-
seated conflict (Lee 2006). 
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meeting because she was one of the few renters, and her concerns and needs were different from 
other residents at the meeting. For example, the idea that it would be desirable to close liquor 
stores in the neighborhood seemed patently absurd to Sue. Sue drinks often, and told me that she 
has struggled with an addition for most of her life. On many occasions I saw her making her 
daily trip through the split to liquor store on the other side, usually returning with a large paper 
bag filled with orders of beer and hard liquor that her neighbors request her to bring back for 
them. Though there is certainly alcoholism in both the homeowner and the renter populations, 
the association between individual poverty (in addition to neighborhood poverty) and housing 
instability with alcoholism is well established (Cerda et al. 2010). This does not mean that 
renters value safety less, but they may have different ideas about how to achieve it, and they 
certain face a different set of challenges in the neighborhood.  
These incidents highlighted the ways in which the “community” meeting was only for a 
certain segment of the community. This experience illustrates that despite a density of 
community organizations in Park Heights, they may not operate to bring residents together, as 
they are better suited to serve very specific populations with varying needs. 
Discussion: Heterogeneity within the Neighborhood 
In 1968, Suttles’ The Social Order of the Slum became a template for understanding how 
social and cultural differences operated within the neighborhood. Suttles’ concept of “ordered 
segmentation” described the ways in which space, age, sex, and ethnic background separated 
residents and structured normative social interactions. However, scholars of neighborhood 
effects have only recently begun to acknowledge and examine the heterogeneity that exists 
between different types of residents in the neighborhood. In this chapter, I argue that ecologically 
segmented zones, which I call micro-neighborhoods, and conditions within these settings do 
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structure social interaction, but not in the determinative way that Suttles proposed. Though sex, 
age, and ethnic background structure interactions, I present a much more fluid, heterogeneous 
picture of the neighborhood, one in which residents are not in “moral isolation from wider 
society” as are Suttles' (Suttles 1968, p.5). I find these group dynamics to operate both in 
informal interactions, as well as within formal organizations. 
In this chapter I show that the geographic distribution of neighborhood residential 
instability interacts with individual housing background to shape social organization in the 
neighborhood. There are three distinct ecological zones: sheltered homeowners havens, areas 
dominated by homeowners; transitional mixed areas where homeowners are dwindling, renters 
are moving in, but many homes are left vacant; and, bounded transitory zones like Oakland 
Terrace and several other small apartment complexes. The salience of micro-neighborhoods does 
not minimize the importance of the neighborhood as a unit of analysis.76 But it does suggest that 
we need to be careful about how we define the neighborhood and how we think about its power 
over important sociological outcomes. Residential status structures the way a resident interacts 
with the neighborhood to a large degree, but I find that the micro-neighborhood environment in 
which a resident is embedded matters as well, due to the ways in which formal and informal 
mechanisms of control operate in different ecological zones. 
In sheltered homeowner havens longer-term residents have more mechanisms of informal 
social control. In contrast, in transitional mixed areas informal organization in the neighborhood 
tends to reinforce class and housing based segregation. The ways in which residents maintain 
order regulate behavior, but they also often serve to reinforce divisions between groups. Finally, 
                                                
76 When asked where they lived residents said “Park Heights,” with surprising unanimity in their 
definition of geographic boundaries. 
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in bounded transitory zones the enclosed environments are highly regulated through formal 
means.  
Social Relationships and informal Social Control 
Sociologists define social capital as the resources that are embedded in social networks 
(Bourdieu 1986) and the informal and reciprocal obligations that come from social relationships 
(Coleman 1988). Social capital can be transmitted in the form of economic capital, cultural 
capital, or symbolic capital (social support, resources, such as information or access to 
employment). Through these relationships and reciprocal obligations, informal social control is 
wielded; neighborhood residents thus have the ability to socialize youth and regulate their 
behavior (Kornhauser 1978; Shaw & McKay 1942). Across the different ecological zones of 
Park Heights, I find that informal social control operates variably. 
Sociologists such as Elijah Anderson have argued that with the departure of the black 
middle class, the ghetto has lost the once-influential “old heads” of the community who were so 
influential as role models and agents of social control for the behavior of young men in the 
neighborhood. An “old head” was a man of “stable means who believed in hard work, family life 
and the church. His acknowledged role was to teach, support, encourage and, in effect, socialize 
young men to meet their responsibilities regarding work, family life, the law and common 
decency” (Anderson 1992). More broadly, Anderson has argued that “the level of interpersonal 
trust and moral cohesion that once prevailed in the community is increasingly undermined. And 
an atmosphere of distrust, alienation and crime pervades, effectively altering the social 
organization of the ghetto” (1992). I do not find this to be true in a generalized sense in Park 
Heights. Rather, the three zones in Park Heights reveal a good deal of heterogeneity across 
neighborhood context. For example, in the mixed transitional zones, there are longtime residents 
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who bear a good deal of resemblance to Anderson’s “old heads.” But their influence carries more 
weight with the children of homeowners and longtime renters than it does with newcomers, 
particularly voucher holders.  
Long-time residents, whether homeowners or renters, seem to be better able to draw on 
their social capital to enforce behavioral norms. This is not new on a theoretical sense: social 
control theory would predict that those more embedded in the social network would be more 
capable of effectively extracting reciprocal obligations, they would have more “capital” to trade, 
so to speak. But the finding is significant for the implications of what it means to live in a 
neighborhood with instability. If newer residents are less able to draw on these informal 
mechanisms, then a neighborhood with populations that have high turnover may increasingly 
need to rely on formal mechanisms of control. 
In bounded transitory zones, there are very few longtime residents, and even fewer 
homeowners, and this type of influence seems to have given way to formal mechanisms of social 
control related to the apartment buildings’ security guards and surveillance cameras. Individual 
residents are less empowered to influence their neighbors’ behavior. Agents of formal social 
control, such as the police and the security forces that reign in large apartment complexes, have a 
greater presence in the bounded areas. Simultaneously, residents exercise a lesser degree of 
informal social control. The more individuals do not invest informally, the more they must rely 
upon formal mechanisms. When individuals in bounded zones invest in their environment, their 
efforts often do no go any father than their own door. For example, Ms. Patty cleans when the 
management does not do a thorough job, but she only cleans the landing area in the stairwell just 
outside her door. Crime control is centrally orchestrated by the management. Residents report 
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that cameras have made the complex safer overall, but they have not promoted a sense of trust 
among residents, in fact, they may have hindered it. 
Formal Social Organizations and Collective Efficacy 
The Chicago School tradition argues that poor neighborhoods lack organizational density 
and inter-organizational ties (Small & McDermott 2006). Wilson and others have proposed that 
“poverty in ghetto neighborhoods has sapped the vitality of local business and there institutions, 
and it has led to fewer ...move theaters, bowling alleys, restaurants, public parks, and 
playgrounds, and other recreational facilities" (Wilson 1995 9-10). This echoes longtime Park 
Heights residents’ narrative of the departure of a whole cohort of lively local businesses in the 
seventies. Small and McDermott examine this hypothesis across 331 metropolitan areas, and find 
that it fits conditionally: the theory better explains the effects of black segregation and 
depopulation than poverty concentration in general (2006). Small points out the flaw in an 
argument that moving someone to a “better” neighborhood may get their kids access to higher 
performing school but they will paradoxically lose contact with resources like those offered 
through the child are centers he studies (Small 2009). But Park Heights boasts a plethora of 
organizations. So why don’t residents benefit from the types of organizational resources that 
Small discusses?  
Urban sociologists have argued that formal social organization is the glue that can hold 
neighborhoods together (Marwell 2007), and that a primary role of local orgs is to contribute to 
neighborhood integration and stability (Sánchez-Jankowski 2008). However, collective action 
arises not just from individual membership to organizations, but from the organizational 
infrastructure of the neighborhood (Sampson et al. 2005). In this chapter, I find that despite a 
density of community organizations in Park Heights, they may not operate to bring residents 
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together, as they are better suited to serve very specific populations with varying needs.  
Park Heights’s residents have a wide array of needs, and neighborhood institutions are 
often atomized and only serve one group at a time. There are very few opportunities for social 
mixing through formal community organization. Formal social organization is usually targeted 
towards one group or another, and so it does not effectively bring residents from different class 
and housing backgrounds together. For example, the Delphi community meeting attracts and 
caters mainly to the needs of long-time homeowners. As I show, much of the meeting time is 
focused on concerns that long-time residents in the neighborhood would be more interested in: 
for example, home energy consumption (residents who own their homes), traffic jams (residents 
with cars). And in the case of the liquor law, two groups were marginalized by the 
overwhelmingly dominant view of meeting participants. Sue, a low-income renter, felt 
“alienated” in her disagreement about the benefits of limiting liquor sales. And an ethnic 
minority group, the Korean storeowners, was pitted against the rest of the community. The rehab 
centers tend to serve the lower income residents, and though many stay in the area after 
completing treatment, they are not welcomed by local residents. Of the three health clinics, one 
is specifically for seniors, and one is targeted toward a low-income population, accepting 
patients with no health insurance.  
I find that the organizational infrastructure foes not facilitate the types of interactions 
between homeowners and renters, between old-timers and newcomers, between the poor and 
lower-middle class, that we might have hoped it would. Collective efficacy, or the ability of a 
community to act together to realize its collective goals, is operationalized quantitatively as an 
index of social control and social cohesion (Sampson et al. 1997). It requires first that collective 
goals be defined as a community. The most obvious place where we might expect this process of 
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definition and cohesion to occur, in the community meeting, is not happening. The tension 
between old-timers and newcomers could be a natural phase out of which the neighborhood will 
transition. But if formal social organizations reify these differences rather than help to overcome 
them, transitional neighborhoods will go in the wrong direction. 
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Conclusion: From the Vertical to the Horizontal Ghetto 
 
The New Face of Poverty 
In this dissertation I argue that housing is a key mechanism through which poverty affects 
individuals. Over the past twenty years, changes in American housing policy have transformed 
the landscape of high-rise ghetto poverty. In the 1990s, the U.S. faced a crisis. Across the 
country, public housing had become notorious for the derelict Pruitt Igoes, Cabrini Greens, and 
Lexington Terraces that loomed large in city skylines. Simultaneous sociological research made 
clear the dangers of isolating the poor from the rest of the city (Wilson 1987). And so we 
witnessed the dismantling of an entire system of housing the poor. To be sure, public housing 
was not completely eradicated, but it was drastically downsized, and the burden of housing the 
poor transferred to the private market. 
 In the wake of public housing, housing vouchers emerged as an alternative, where needy 
residents were given vouchers to move to homes of their choosing. The expectation was that as 
the poor shifted into the private housing market and exercised more autonomy over where they 
lived they would experience positive outcomes and there would be a deconcentration of poverty. 
Though vouchers should in theory provide access to desirable neighborhoods, voucher holders 
are now reconcentrating in neighborhoods with moderate to high poverty rates, (Devine 2003; 
Orr et al. 2003; Schwartz 2010). Further, black voucher holders are realizing far less locational 
attainment than their vouchers allow them to afford (Devine 2003; Edin et al. 2012). The 
voucher program was meant to provide families with a means to move to better neighborhoods, 
but instead poverty concentration and racial segregation are being reproduced, and recent 
research suggests that voucher holders are concentrating in a new type of neighborhood. 
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 The vertically organized ghettos of public housing have been dismantled, but the poor 
families they housed have not disappeared. Poverty has turned on its side, spreading across the 
city to create a new type of poor neighborhood, what I call the “horizontal ghetto.”  This new 
neighborhood has lower rates of poverty than the vertical ghetto. Voucher holders are clustering 
in these neighborhoods where poverty is moderate and residential instability is high. 
 This begs several important questions that are the focus of this study: Why do voucher 
holders end up in these neighborhoods? Why don’t low-income families move to better 
neighborhoods when given the opportunity to do so? What does poverty look like in a post-
public housing era? What are the mechanisms through which the horizontal ghetto shapes social 
life for its inhabitants? How should sociologists understand this transformation from high- 
poverty, residentially stable neighborhoods, to moderate poverty, residentially unstable 
neighborhoods? What the implications for social life in these neighborhoods? 
 I argue that policymakers were fundamentally wrong in their assumption that providing 
“choice” would lead low-income families to better neighborhoods. The reasons for this are 
multiple. In fact, choice is highly constrained and manipulated. In Chapter 4, I argue that supply-
side mechanisms related to landlord practices can help explain why families don’t achieve better 
locational outcomes. As I show in Chapter 5, even when families do have a choice, they often 
remain in neighborhoods that are the very places we thought they would flee. This insight is 
important. If we want families to achieve better locational outcomes, it would suggest that pure 
choice is not the right mechanism. Chapter 5 presents significant evidence that the skills families 
develop to survive in disadvantaged neighborhoods may in part be responsible for the way 
poverty is reproduced through residential churning. 
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 Furthermore, I find evidence that the integration that was hoped for on a micro level is not 
occurring. Chapter 6 reveals that there is some mixing and communication between the groups, 
particularly in the mixed transitional areas. But voucher holders are often located in large 
apartment complexes in bounded zones. Though there are some improvements, I demonstrate 
some clear ways in which the social isolation of assisted renters has not been eradicated, and is 
instead being reproduced in a new environment.  
Key Findings 
Landlords 
What forces operate to reconcentrate poverty in the modern metropolis? Research has 
focused on the structural-ecological forces that push and pull urban dwellers into different 
residential locations. I propose two alternative mechanisms through which housing voucher 
holders come to concentrate in neighborhoods of the horizontal ghetto. Accounts of structural-
ecological forces and individual choice explanations ignore a critical intermediary force, the 
landlord. In their role as gatekeepers, landlords affect sorting processes on a simple and 
fundamental level: every renter who wants a home must go through a landlord. In this chapter I 
demonstrate that landlord practices interact with and shape structural forces and residents’ 
preferences alike, constituting an understudied mechanism through which people are sorted 
across urban space. 
I find that landlord strategies are linked to residential sorting patterns through a three-step 
process: selection, matching, and selective retention. First, landlords use targeted recruitment 
tactics to select voucher tenants. Second, they select their ideal tenants – often the lower-end 
voucher tenants – and match them to the units where they are most needed. Third, landlords 
selectively retain tenants who do not have the means to leave. Across all three stages I find that 
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race and geography are salient categories for understanding how selection and sorting processes 
operate through landlord practices. Taken together, such tactics serve as powerful mechanisms 
that sort and trap voucher holders where they can be most profitable to landlords – which happen 
to be the very neighborhoods policymakers would like to provide them with the opportunity to 
leave. The voucher case reveals the ways in which landlord practices can intervene to pervert the 
process of residential choice, revealing the limits of a market-based solution to a complicated 
and entrenched social process. 
However, rather than providing low-income families the opportunity to make informed 
decisions about what neighborhood would be best for them, the whole system has been turned on 
its head. The process of choice has been reversed to recruitment by landlords, who have perverse 
incentives to attract and then sort tenants into the units and neighborhoods where they will be 
most useful, selectively retaining desirable tenants. In this scenario, supply actually creates 
demand: the effect of landlord practices is to shape, create, and constrain residential choice. This 
reversal illuminates a mechanism in processes of residential sorting and selection that are 
fundamental to urban sociology. The set of landlord practices described here becomes a powerful 
sorting instrument that sends the most disadvantaged voucher holders into some of the worst 
neighborhoods, serving as an important pathway in the reproduction of spatial inequality and the 
reconcentration of poverty. 
Choice 
 The tools that residents have to adjust and reconstruct neighborhood narratives are 
limited; and the skills that they have accumulated over a lifetime of living in a dangerous 
environment render it possible to move on to a similarly violent context. The reasons people 
move to, or stay in a neighborhood, in themselves are a product of living in neighborhoods like 
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Park Heights where violence and instability are high; it is this violence that can lead to further 
instability and the reproduction of poverty in residential outcomes: churning in, out, and between 
disadvantaged neighborhoods. It may be that one of the most pernicious effects of the 
neighborhood is that the orientation that allows residents to live in these neighborhoods also 
makes it more likely that they will pick a similar neighborhood in the future. 
 Instead of thinking of selection as a problem to be eliminated, what if we consider that 
families have not necessarily “chosen” or “selected” their neighborhood, but end up there 
through a complex set of forces involving residential decisions that are shaped not just by 
structural constraints in a broad sense, but also by the very experience of growing up in a 
particular type of neighborhood. Recent evidence suggests that the neighborhoods people end up 
in are explained less by individual and family characteristics than by the characteristics of the 
neighborhoods individuals grew up in (Sharkey 2008, p.933). If so, then we must understand 
how the neighborhood’s demands shape the way that people interact with the context in which 
they reside and develop strategies to live, succeed, and thrive. These strategies, both behavioral 
and cognitive, may give rise to certain types of residential decisions (DeLuca et al. 2013). I show 
that the reasons people move to, or stay in a neighborhood, are in themselves a product of living 
in a place like Park Heights for a long period of time. 
Social Organization 
Residential status does structures the way a resident interacts with the neighborhood to a 
large degree, but the micro neighborhoods that residents live in structure the way that social 
control operates in important ways as well. In sheltered homeowner havens longer-term residents 
have more mechanisms of informal social control. In contrast, in transitional mixed areas 
informal organization in the neighborhood tends to reinforce class and housing based 
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segregation. The ways in which residents maintain order often serve to reinforce divisions 
between groups. Long-time residents, whether homeowners or renters, seem to be better able to 
draw on their social capital to enforce behavioral norms. If newer residents are less able to draw 
on these informal mechanisms, then a neighborhood with populations that have high turnover 
may increasingly need to rely on formal mechanisms of control. 
Finally, in bounded transitory zones such as Oakland Terrance, the enclosed environment 
has very different types of social organization than the sheltered homeowner havens or the 
transitional mixed zones. When individuals in Oakland Terrace invest in their environment, their 
efforts often do not go any father than their own door. Maintenance and crime control are 
orchestrated centrally by the management. Cameras seem to have made the complex safer 
overall, but they have not promoted a sense of trust among residents, in fact, they may have 
hindered it. Agents of formal social control, such as the police and the security that reigns in 
large apartment complexes, have a greater presence in the bounded areas. Simultaneously, 
residents exercise a lesser degree of informal social control.  
Ethnographies of urban poor have traditionally highlighted dichotomies between “street” 
and “decent,” homeowners, those who throw the trash, and those who pick it up. But in this 
chapter I present evidence that breaks down the barriers. The distinction between owners and 
renters is not as important as the distinction between old-timers and newcomers.  
Policy and Implications 
Working within the voucher system, there are several policy options that could be 
adopted to help families use their vouchers in better neighborhoods. Better information and 
counseling for families without Internet access, transportation for housing searches, security 
deposit assistance would all minimize the effect of the landlord’s targeted recruitment tactics. It 
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is essential that families are well informed of their rights as tenants to report necessary repairs or 
request to move without fear of losing their voucher.  
Another potential area of intervention is in the definition of Fair Market Rent. New 
research investigates whether changes in voucher price-ceilings result in better housing for 
voucher holders, finding that more generous vouchers cause landlords to raise prices on tenants, 
with only small impacts on unit quality and none on neighborhood quality; findings also show 
that when FMR is defined at the zip-code level rather than at the metro level, voucher holders 
move to better neighborhoods with no additional costs (Collinson & Ganong 2013). This 
research has important implications for the cost effectiveness of voucher administration. If 
housing authorities spent less on rent, they could help a larger number of families, which is key 
since only one in four qualified families receives housing aid. 
However, there are limits to the voucher system. Transitioning to a primarily voucher 
based system also means that housing subsidies are less concentrated in the hands of the most 
needy families since the income ceiling for selection is higher than for public housing. Ironically, 
the very feature of public housing that helped to concentrate the poorest families together, was 
also what ensured that it was the neediest families who received assistance.77 Furthermore, 
public housing provides shelter for the “hard-to-house,” including larger families requiring four 
and five bedroom units, as well as those with disabilities, whose needs go largely unmet in the 
open market (Popkin et al. 2004). 
Market solutions and the “mobility paradigm” and place-based change 
 Some may counter that voucher system’s failure to achieve as much change as was hoped 
is not due to the fact that it is a market based solution, but rather, because it is not enough of a 
                                                
77 See introduction for discussion of the Brooks Amendment. 
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market based solution. In other words, they might argue that in an unfettered market – one where 
landlords do not manipulate the system to their advantage and residents are well-informed and 
free to exercise choice – we would see better outcomes. This may or may not be true. But, given 
the history of racism, segregation and the implication of federal policy in their processes 
throughout this country’s history, it appears unlikely that we will ever encounter a day when 
these forces are not in operation. In this regard, race and class might be considered “fundamental 
causes” that structure inequality across time and place (Link & Phelan 1996). Even when the 
structural conditions that give rise to inequality are altered or removed, there are durable effects, 
as implicated by Chapter 5. Given this, the idea that we could ever rely on solely on forces of the 
free market to address inequality is intrinsically flawed. As long as this country relies upon the 
government to provide housing for our poorest members, it is reasonable to assume that without 
explicit intervention on the part of the government, the same forces that marginalized them in the 
first place will be reproduced in the way they are sorted unequally across the city. 
 This points to a related question: Is there then any role for mobility solutions that do not 
rely solely on market forces? In other words, can the so-called “mobility paradigm,” or the idea 
of moving people out of bad neighborhoods and into better ones, solve place-based inequalities? 
In my view, given the evidence amassing regarding the dramatic negative costs of living in poor 
and violent neighborhoods (Sharkey 2008; Sharkey et al. 2012), there is a role for vouchers as a 
stopgap measure to get poor families out of these unhealthy contexts. We have seen with the 
MTO experiment and a number other studies how meaningful and life-altering it can be to move 
to a better neighborhood (Clampet-Lundquist et al. 2011; Darrah & DeLuca 2014; Kling et al. 
2004; Pashup et al. 2005); one where children are not dodging bullets and avoiding gang activity 
on their way to school, where women are not afraid to walk to the bus on their way to work, and 
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where fathers are not arrested while walking down the street to the grocery store. And the 
research presented in this dissertation highlights the deep value families place on having a choice 
at all, feeling like they have some agency in their own futures.  
Qualitative research entails listening to what families want and care about and what 
housing options mean to them. Those who do manage to move, say loud and clear that these 
moves are meaningful, positive, and important (Darrah & DeLuca 2014). How best can 
policymakers make peoples lives better: by providing them with an opportunity to go somewhere 
they would not otherwise have access to, or by making their current neighborhoods better by 
providing more opportunities on site (Pattillo McCoy 1999)? There are benefits to both mobility 
programs as well as place-based programs, and it may be that different families will benefit from 
different solutions (Deluca 2012). 
 However, a stopgap measure is not a replacement for the place-based investment that 
would be required to achieve sustainable systemic change. By definition, we can never move 
everyone out of a place. As long as we have left some behind, this is not a solution. And what 
about the neighborhoods that the poor move to? Although moving provides an individual 
solution to a pressing problem, on a systemic level, the premise of the voucher system – moving 
the most poor and vulnerable families into “affordable” neighborhoods – is not a sustainable 
solution. On a neighborhood level, we are asking neighborhoods in some of the most precarious 
positions to shoulder the burden.  
The Burden of Neighborhood Change: Poverty, post-welfare, post-public housing 
 This research points to an important question regarding housing policy and the role of the 
state in coming to the aid of low-income populations. Many have come to see the policy 
transformations of the past twenty years, involving the demolition and redevelopment of public 
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housing, and an increased reliance on the private market, as a dominant strategy in U.S. 
antipoverty policy: “HUD was not simply correcting old mistakes [the role they played in 
segregating and concentrating residents]; it was addressing what it regarded as the most 
significant problem facing American cities at the end of the century [i.e., the concentration of 
poverty]” (Goetz 2003, p.54). In fact, in a post-welfare, largely post-public-housing world, 
housing vouchers are one of the few subsidies that low-income families may receive.  
 What do vouchers mean for other populations on the precipice of stability? How can we 
create sustainable neighborhood change? Though there is considerable heterogeneity in Park 
Heights, if we zoom out, it is clear that everyone in the neighborhood is in a precarious position. 
This was also the case with MTO, where we saw that the neighborhoods to which voucher 
holders managed to move were already on a downward trajectory. Park Heights has been 
teetering on the edge, if not declining, since the seventies. What does it mean then for us to ask 
those in the most precarious positions to shoulder the burden of hosting the most disadvantaged? 
Not because the incoming poor will bring everyone else down,78 but because the communities 
most likely to host voucher holders are those that already have elevated crime rates and may be 
on a downward trajectory (Sanbonmatsu et al. 2011), and these neighborhoods are least equipped 
to carry the burden. 
 Another option, though perhaps not a realistic one in the current political environment, is to 
reinvest in the development of institutional resources within low-income communities. We have 
seen this on a small scale with programs like the Harlem Children’s Zone (Dobbie & Fryer Jr 
2011), and Promise Zones. Supporting communities like Park Heights organizationally and 
                                                
78 As might be implied in a hysteria perpetuated by the popular media. See Hanna Rosin’s piece in the 
Atlantic Monthly, “American Murder Mystery,” which implied that waves of voucher holders moving 
into new neighborhood dramatically increase homicide rates in these areas (Rosin 2008). In fact there is 
little to no evidence to support this. 
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financially could help create a more integrated and sustainable community of voucher holders, 
renters, and homeowners.  
Conclusion 
In this dissertation I consider important sociological questions of ecology, inequality, and 
response within the historical backdrop of America’s changing housing landscape. My work 
attempts to move beyond the common empirical focus on one type of poverty – concentrated – to 
consider how a new social context of a more dispersed poverty – the horizontal ghetto – shapes 
outcomes for those within it. The study of landlords allows a window into the minute individual 
decisions and practices that form the building blocks of this structured urban space, with 
enormous consequences in the lives of low-income renters. At the same time, fieldwork with 
families reveals the important ways in which they react to and are shaped by this context. In this 
way, I emphasize the importance of an analytical approach that considers both the structural 
ways in which neighborhood ecology shapes outcomes for individuals in the urban environment, 
and also the multifaceted, patterned ways in which groups of people interpret and respond to 
their own circumstances. 
This topic is important both for the advancement of a sociological understanding of 
concentrated poverty, as well as for public policy and the implementation of housing policy. 
American housing policy has undergone a major shift in the past few decades: out of the five 
million households across the country that federal housing programs now assist, over half of 
them are now housed in privately owned properties (Schwartz 2010). With the dismantling of the 
public housing high-rises and the important increase in the number of housing vouchers, many 
have moved to new areas, concentrating disproportionately in moderately poor neighborhoods 
with high residential instability. This dramatic change provides an impetus for researchers and 
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policymakers to learn more about the kinds of social organization these neighborhoods facilitate. 
We need to learn more about these patterns if we want to promote, rather than compromise the 
wellbeing and future prospects of the recipients of housing assistance. This dissertation suggests 
that although housing vouchers may be a valuable and effective tool for addressing housing 
affordability problems, a market-based solution is inherently limited for solving America’s 
ghetto poverty problem.  
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Appendix 1: Resident Interview Guide 
 
 
1. Tell me a little bit about yourself?  Maybe you could start off telling me a little bit about your 
family.  
• Age/grade? 
• Parents working? 
• Who lives here with you? Siblings? Ages? 
• Other places you stay? 
• Children?  
• What are you really good at? What’s your favorite thing to do? Where is your favorite place to 
spend time? 
 
 
2. Tell me about your childhood, what was coming up like for you?  
• Where were you born? 
• What did your parents do? 
• Siblings? 
• Financial situation? 
• What were you like as a child? 
• Childhood dreams? 
 
 
 
EDUCATION 
I’d like to hear about some of your old schools.   
 
3. Tell me about all the high schools you went to.  Let’s start out with the first high school you 
were at. 
 
4. Tell me about troubles you might have had in high school. [Looking for stories about suspension, 
expulsion – what kind of activities might have got them in trouble?] 
 
 
5. Tell me about other people in your life – friends, family members, neighbors, teachers – who 
have given you advice about education. 
• Who, if anyone, helped you with getting paperwork, filling it out, and applying (for admission 
and financial aid)?  Tell me the whole story around that. 
 
 
6. Have you taken any college classes?  [If yes, probe as follows.]  
• What degree you’re taking these classes for? 
• How has going to college been different from what you expected?  
• How long have you been taking classes at this school?  
• How hard has it been to get money together for tuition?   
 
 
[For those who have dropped out]: 
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7. If you had to choose the main reason as to why you stopped going to high school, what would it 
be?   
• Was there something in particular that happened? (pregnancy, employment, family hardship, 
expulsion, issues with teachers or principal, fights with other students)  
• Or did you just gradually stop going?   
 
 
[For those who have graduated]: 
8. Sometimes it’s really tough to be able to stay in high school and graduate.  Tell me about how 
you were able to do it. 
• What do you think was the most important reason why you stayed in school? 
 
 
9. Did you ever think about not going to high school anymore?  Tell me about what happened and 
how you decided to stay in school. 
 
 
[For those in a GED program or who have a GED]: 
10. Tell me about how you decided to get your GED. 
• Others in your family or friends get their GED? 
• Did you think it would help you in getting a job? 
• GED vs. high school diploma, in your view? 
 
 
 
NEIGHBORHOODS, ROUTINES & FRIENDS 
Now I want to ask you about all the places you have lived.  
 
11. Where is the earliest place you can remember living in?   
• Who were you living with?   
• Was it an apartment or house? Did you own or rent? 
• How long had you lived in that house? How long had you lived in that neighborhood? 
 
 
12. What was the neighborhood like? 
• What was it like to live there (best/worst things)? 
• How did you come to live there? Why did you choose that place/neighborhood? 
• What were the people like? Were you close to your neighbors?  Could you count on them? 
• Were you near family? Who? 
• Did you feel safe? Was crime a problem? Was alcohol or drug abuse a problem? 
 
 
13. What about the next place? 
• How did you decide to go there? 
• How long did you stay there? 
• Did you have family members or friends there? 
• How was that neighborhood? How safe was it? 
• Why did you leave? 
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14. Do you remember moving out of the projects you were living in when you were younger?   
 
 
15. How was the neighborhood you moved to different? What was that like for you? 
 
 
16. Was it hard to get to know the other kids in your neighborhood?  TMMAT. 
 
 
17. Did you switch schools?  Was it hard to get to know kids at your school? TMMAT. 
 
 
18. Do you remember living in other neighborhoods?  What was that like for you?  What did you 
like best/least about those neighborhoods?  
 
 
19. Tell me about your current neighborhood? What do people call this area? 
• How long have you lived here? 
• What is it like to live here (best/worst things)?  
• Do you own or rent? How affordable is it? 
• How is it for raising kids? 
• Do you feel safe? Is crime? Are alcohol or drugs a problem? Change over time? Why? 
• Are you close to your neighbors? Can you count on them?  
• What do you like best/least about living here?  TMMAT.  
• Do you think you will stay?  Why? Where do you imagine yourself to be in one year?  
 
 
20. Tell me about the neighbors in this neighborhood. What kind of people live here? 
• Do you know any of them? What are they like? 
• Race/ethnicity (white/black/Hispanic), age, friendly/not friendly 
• Do you spend time with your neighbors? How? 
• Knows neighbors, has friends, etc.  
• Do most kids around here graduate from high school? Go to college? 
• How are you similar or different from the people here? 
• How is this different or similar to other neighborhoods you have lived in? 
21. What do you do when you need to go somewhere in your neighborhood after dark?  Walk me 
through that. 
 
 
22. Let's say there was a girl/guy your age who is just about to move in to your neighborhood from 
another city. What kind of street smarts would she/he have to learn/know to get by around 
here? How about when walking around after dark?   
 
 
23. Tell me about the young people around here.  What are the males your age in this      
neighborhood like?  What are the females your age in this neighborhood like?   
• Where? Activities? 
• How are you similar/different from them? 
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24. Tell me about who you choose to spend time with in your neighborhood. 
 
 
25. Where do you hang out in the neighborhood?   
• Presence and reaction of adult neighbors/ police 
• Activities? Frequency? 
• Location– corner? Basketball court? Stoop? 
 
 
26. Tell me about other neighborhoods you regularly visit or hang out in. 
• Presence and reaction of adult neighbors/ police 
• Activities? Frequency? 
• Location– corner? Basketball court? Stoop? 
 
 
27. What’s a typical weekday like for you?  
• What are the things you need to get done everyday? How much down time do you have? [Get a 
sense of daily routine –  what areas of the city they move through]. 
 
 
28. People sometimes change the way that they hang out as they get older.  What are some things 
that you used to do in your neighborhood that you don’t do now?  How about in other 
neighborhoods? 
 
 
29. Okay, now let’s flip it.  What are some things that you do now in your neighborhood that you 
didn’t use to do?  How about in other neighborhoods? 
 
 
30. Some people think their neighborhood is pretty safe, while others don’t feel safe.  How about 
for you?  How do you stay safe?  
• Has anything happened in the last 6 months that made you feel unsafe?  
 
 
31. Tell me about safety in your neighborhood?  How do you stay safe?  
• Strategies – what areas to avoid?  
• How did you learn this? 
• Violence—type and frequency? 
• Gangs? 
• Do you carry anything for protection? 
 
32. What about the blue lights? What do they mean? Do they make you feel safer? Less safe? Are 
there any around here? 
 
 
33. Different neighborhoods have different ideas about how people should hang out or what they 
should be up to.  For example, in some neighborhoods, it’s normal to see young men standing 
on the corner or people sitting on the stoop, and in other neighborhoods. Tell me about what 
people expect others to act like in this neighborhood. 
• How did you figure this out? 
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• How does this neighborhood compare to other neighborhoods that you’ve lived in? 
 
 
34. How do you feel about calling the cops?  Tell me about a time you have done this. 
 
 
35. Tell me about interactions you have with the police. 
 
 
36. How about your experience with the knockers?   
(Note:  Ask about this distinction if not mentioned before.) 
 
 
37. If you witness someone shooting or someone getting hurt or robbed, and you know the people 
involved what would you do about the person who did it?  Tell me about the last time this 
happened. 
• What’s the difference between a witness and a snitch? 
 
 
38. How do you feel about talking to the police when stuff like that goes down? 
• What do you think of the police? (specifically issues of trust) 
• When would you talk to police? 
 
 
39. Who all can talk to the police and when can they talk?  Are there types of crime where it’s OK 
to talk? 
• How about older people, like grandmothers – can they talk to the police?  
• How about if a child gets hurt?  Is it okay to talk to the police about who did that? 
 
 
40. Overall, do you think living in this neighborhood has helped provide opportunities to get a good 
job? Has it hindered you from getting opportunities in any way? 
• Quality of schools, access to jobs, adult role models, neighborhood safety, etc. 
• What are other people your age doing?   
• Anything else about this neighborhood that influences your job prospects? 
 
 
 
EMPLOYMENT 
 
41. Tell me about the kind of work you do.    
• Job type 
• Length of employment 
• Ever told you about openings or referred you? 
• How did they get this job? 
• Do they seem to enjoy their job? 
• Is their job part of a career? 
 
How about your siblings? 
• Job type 
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• Length of employment 
• Ever told you about openings or referred you? 
• How did they get this job? 
• Do they seem to enjoy their job? 
• Is their job part of a career? 
 
How about your friends, including cousins? 
• Job type 
• Length of employment 
• Ever told you about openings or referred you? 
• How did they get this job? 
• Do they seem to enjoy their job? 
• Is their job part of a career? 
 
42. Do most of your neighbors have jobs?  
• Is this the same as when you lived in [_____________]?  Why/Why not? 
• Do you know where most of your neighbors work?  In this community?  Somewhere else? 
• Have neighbors given you any leads about available jobs? 
 
 
43. Think back to when you were a kid. Tell me about what you thought you wanted to be when 
you grew up. 
• Why did you want to be that? 
• What did your parents do? Did you want to be like them? 
• Other role models or important adults in your life when you were a kid? What did they do? 
 
 
44. And how about now, if you could be anything, what would you be?  
•  What jobs are the best jobs to have?  
•  Do you know anyone who does this? 
 
 
45. Ok now lets think about reality…What kind of job can someone like you get?  
• Tell me about the jobs your friends have. How did they find them? 
 
 
46. Do you have a job right now? Tell me about that. [if not, ask about most recent job]. 
• Location, distance – how do you get there? 
• Pay, hours? How long you’ve been working there? 
• Does your job relate to long-term career goals? 
• What do you do when you’re there? What are you responsible for at this job? 
• What are coworkers like? 
• Childcare arrangements? (if applicable) 
• Job skills needed – what does someone have to have in order to get hired here? 
 
 
47. How did you find this job?  Tell me about what you did when you were looking and who you 
talked to about it. 
• Talk to friends your age? Who? 
  229 
• Talk to people in neighborhood? Who? Talk to people in your family? Teachers? Who? 
• Anybody talk to someone at job to tell them about you? 
• Other search strategies (on-line, job placement centers in the community or at school?) 
• How long were you looking? 
 
 
48. Are you looking for a (new) job right now?    
• Where are you looking?   
• Are there some neighborhoods/areas where you don’t look?  [Probe:  ask about suburbs as well – 
malls out in the county or nursing homes out in the county.  If not, why?] 
• What are you qualified to do? What do you know how to do? Best job skills? 
• What are the jobs that you really want to avoid?   
• What jobs do you want to do?  What jobs don’t you want to do?  TMMAT. 
• Do you think of some jobs as more for females than males?  (and vice versa)  TMMAT. 
(Note:  Try to get at whether or not there is a stigma surrounding certain types of jobs like fast 
food.) 
 
 
49. Sometimes people apply to a lot of different jobs and either they never get called back, or they 
get interviewed and don’t hear back about it.  Tell me about how that’s been for you 
• What are the reasons why you think you weren’t called back? How do you know? 
• Discrimination on what neighborhood you live in? Racial discrimination? 
 
 
50. Sometimes a job is just a job—a way to pay the bills.  But sometimes a job feels more like a part 
of a career.  Describe how each of your past jobs were just a job or part of a career?   
 
 
51. Tell me more about what kind of a career you would like? What steps do you have to take to get 
that kind of a career?  
 
 
For those NOT working now: 
52. What is the main thing keeping you from getting a job right now?  Is this year different?  
(Probe for whether or not a felony conviction might be in the way.  The summer comparison is to try 
to get at whether or not the current recession has an impact on getting a job.) 
 
 
For everyone:  
53. Everybody’s got bills to pay – how do you make ends meet?   
• Cash from family/boyfriends/girlfriends etc? 
 
 
54. What about hustles, or side jobs? Do you ever… 
• Work for your neighbors? Odd jobs around the house, gardening, dog walking, fixing things? 
• Other people 
• Do hair? 
• Make food to sell? 
• Sell cold sodas/snacks? 
• Other kinds of services? 
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• Sell clothes? 
• Go on dates? 
[if yes to any of these, probe for details] 
 
 
55. How about drugs, is there a lot of money to be made doing this? Is it a good job for someone 
like you? 
 
 
56. Do you (or have you ever)… 
• Carry packages? 
• Sell pot/weed? 
• Sell crack/cocaine? 
• Sell heroin? 
• Other? 
 
 
57. Tell me the whole story of the first time you did this.  
• Where were you living at the time? 
• How did you decide to do it?  
• Who was involved with you? 
• How did it go?  
• Were you nervous? 
• Did you want to do it again? 
 
 
 
BEHAVIOR 
Lets talk more about you a bit.  
 
58. What do you like to do in your free time? 
 
 
59. What music do you like to listen to? 
 
 
60. What are your favorite TV shows? 
 
 
61. What do you do when you get together with friends? Where do you go? 
 
 
62. Tell me about any trips you may have taken outside of Baltimore? What about around the 
country? Where would you most like to go? 
 
 
Now let’s talk a bit about your friends… 
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63. Tell me about your two closest friends. What are they like? How come you get along so well? 
How are they alike/different from you? 
 
 
64. How about friends or associates selling drugs or carrying packages from time to time?  Tell me 
about that. 
• How did they get started? 
• Are these friends from the neighborhood, or somewhere you used to live? 
 
 
65. How about with you?  Tell me about the last time something like that happened with you. 
• How did you get started? 
• About how often do you do it? 
• How much money have you made in an average week selling? 
 
 
66. How about friends or associates carrying or buying or selling guns?  Tell me about that. 
 
How about with you?  Tell me about the last time something like that happened with you. 
• How often does this happen? 
• Do you carry a gun?  
 
 
67. How about friends or associates stealing stuff, like cars, or other things?  Tell me about that. 
• How did they get started? 
• Are these friends from the neighborhood, or somewhere you used to live? 
 
How about with you?  Tell me about the last time something like that happened with you. 
• How did you get started 
• Frequency 
 
 
68. Sometimes people have told us that when they needed money or a place to stay, they called up 
men or women they knew or walked around to meet people.  Have any of your friends ever 
needed to do this?   
 
 
How about with you? 
(Note:  If the respondent has no idea what you are talking about they probably have not, but if the 
respondent shows signs of knowing what you are talking about you might have to ask straight out, 
"Have you ever exchanged sex for money?") 
• When was the first time? 
• Frequency 
 
 
69. Tell me about gangs around here. Are you or your friends involved in a gang?  
• Tell me the whole story of how you got involved 
• What kinds of things do you guys do? 
• Do you feel you need to be involved for safety reasons what is good about being a part of this 
group?  
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70. Tell me about the last time you or your friends smoked weed.   
• Frequency  
• When did you start? 
• How do you get the stuff? 
• Ever buy weed that’s mixed with other stuff?  
• Which friends do you do this with? (current neighborhood / old neighborhood / school). 
• If used to smoke: tell me about what made you stop? 
• If never smoked: would you say that you’re pretty different from other people your age for not 
doing this stuff? 
 
 
71. Any other stuff like Ecstasy or dope?  
 
 
72. Have you ever been arrested?  Tell me about the last time. 
• How many times? [Distinguish juvenile arrests]. 
• What were they for? 
 
 
73. What do you know about prison? Do you know anyone who has spent time in prison? TMMAT. 
• Have any of your friends been locked up?   
• What is prison like? 
• Is it dangerous? 
• What is it like when people come home after being in prison?  
• Do you know anyone who has recently returned? Who? TMMAT. 
 
 
74. Have you ever been locked up?   
 
 
For those who’ve been locked up (this includes juvenile detention): 
75. Tell me about what it was like when you were locked up. 
• Length of time 
• How they got out 
 
 
76. What is it like being on probation/parole?   
• How long are you/have you been on it for? 
• What is your probation/parole officer like? Recent example of an interaction with them? 
• Have you ever worried that someone was going to turn you in for a violation? 
• How does being on probation/ parole affect your ability to get and keep a job? 
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FAMILY & RELATIONSHIPS 
Now let’s talk about romantic relationships 
 
77. Are you currently seeing anyone or talking to anyone?  Tell me about this person. Tell me the 
whole story about your relationship with this person from start to finish. 
 
 
78. How would you characterize your relationship with this person?  Casual?  Serious?   
 
 
79. In general, what’s an ideal time to start living together? How about for you, when did/will you 
feel ready to start living with a romantic partner? 
 
 
80. In general, what do you think about marriage?  What’s an ideal time to get married?     
 
 
81. In general, what’s an ideal time to have a baby? How about for you?  When did/will you feel 
ready to have a child? 
 
 
82. Do you have any kids?  Tell me all about them. 
 
 
[For those with kids]: 
83. Tell me about how having a kid made it easier or harder for you to finish school (and job). 
 
 
84. Tell me about your mother/father.  What is she/he like?   
• Employment, schooling 
• Activities you do together 
• What you admire about her/him 
• Does she have a boyfriend or husband or girlfriend or wife)?  How long been together, 
relationship with you? 
 
 
85. Tell me about what she was like when you were growing up. 
• Strict/overprotective 
• Examples of supporting you (financial and/or emotional) 
 
 
86. Tell me about any other adults in your life who care a lot about how you turn out, and want to 
help you out?  Tell me about that person (those people).   
•  How do you know this person? (frequency of being with them) 
•  Where do they live? 
•  Relation? 
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MENTAL HEALTH 
We’re going to move to talk about some things related to how you feel.  
 
87. What kind of things make you feel stressed, worried, or sad?  
• Tell me about the most recent time when you really felt stressed 
• How long did it last? 
• When you’re stressed, do you notice that you’re drinking or smoking more or less? TMMAT. 
• How do you feel when you’re under stress? (e.g. out of control, angry, physically ill?) 
 
 
88. How does stress or these other feelings affect your daily routine?  TMMAT.   
• Work 
• School 
• Children  
• Leisure time 
 
 
89. Tell me about your strategies for getting through these stressful or sad times.  
• Tell me about a recent time you dealt with this and what you did 
• What strategies work better at home? At school? Out with friends? 
 
 
90. Tell me about how you decide which strategy to use to get you through stressful or sad times. 
 
 
91. What kinds of things make you angry?   
 
 
92. Have you ever gotten so angry that you tried to break something or tried to hurt someone?  Tell 
me about the last time that happened. 
• Think back to a time you got so angry you tried to break something or hurt someone. 
• Frequency? How often in the last year? 
• Do you feel this way more when you’re drinking or using drugs? 
• Ever go to the hospital or doctor for anger? 
 
 
93. Sometimes people get really angry when they’re feeling sad or depressed.  How about with you? 
 
 
94. Friends and relatives can help us out with getting through these tough times.  How about for 
you?  
• Type of support 
• Reliability of support 
• Specific examples 
• Professional services – get all the details (frequency, medicine, etc) 
 
 
95. Thinking back over the past year, how have you been feeling emotionally? Tell me about what 
has changed for you.  
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96. Our neighborhoods can either make us happy or peaceful, or sometimes our surroundings can 
make us feel down. What about you?   
• Worry about children 
• Safety in neighborhood 
• Do you feel like people get along or have each others’ backs in the neighborhood? 
• How does seeing trash in the neighborhood make you feel? Do you notice it? 
• What about abandoned buildings? 
 
 
97. What about when you were living in different neighborhoods? How did those neighborhoods 
affect you?  
• Safety in neighborhood 
• Do you feel like people get along or have each others’ backs in the neighborhood? 
• How does seeing trash in the neighborhood make you feel? Do you notice it? 
• What about abandoned buildings? 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
Okay, we’re pretty much at the end here and I just wanted to end up our conversation by looking back 
and looking forward. 
 
98. You’ve made a lot of big changes in your life in the past few years. [Adapt for the individual 
youth. If the youth has made significant changes in his or her life, give some examples – i.e., 
graduated from high school, had a child, gotten a full-time job, moved out of mother’s house, 
etc.] Tell me how you feel about all these changes, and about getting older. 
• Nervous 
• Excited 
• Restless or fidgety 
• Worried 
 
 
99. How does someone know if he or she is ‘successful’? 
 
 
100. Where do you see your family members 5 years from now? 
 
 
101. Tell me about where you see yourself 5 years from now. What do you need to get there?  
 
 
102. Where would you like to raise your kids?  
 
 
103. Is there anything else you’d like to tell me before we end?   
Anything that you think I’ve missed or that I should know?   
 
 
Thanks so much for talking with me today about things that are going on in your life.   
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Appendix 2: Landlord Interview Guide 
 
INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND INFO 
I want to start by learning a little bit about who you are… 
 
1. Tell me a little about yourself and the work you do 
• Are you a landlord/property manager, etc? 
• Do you work for a company? What is your position? 
• Do you do other work in addition to being a landlord? 
• Where do you own property?  
(get general area of each property, save for later if you need more rapport) 
 
 
BEING A LANDLORD: 
Now let’s talk about being a landlord. 
 
2. How did you first become a landlord? 
• Tell me the story of the first house you bought 
• Did you know anyone who owned property? 
• Financial reasons? Other? 
 
 
3. Being a landlord must be a lot of work: what are your responsibilities?  
• How often do you come to the apartment? 
• Screening people? 
• Repairs?  
• [If owner]: Do you have a property manager?  
• [If property manager]: Are you involved in the acquisition of properties? 
 
 
4. Can you tell me about each of the properties you own? Let’s start with the first. 
(repeat for each property) 
• Tell me about how you made the decision to buy it. 
• When? 
• Where is it located? 
• How did you decide this was a neighborhood you wanted to own in? 
• How did you find out it was for sale?  
• Was it a financial stretch for you to come up with the money for the down-payment? 
 
 
5. How do you find tenants? 
• Newspaper? Websites (Gosection8.com, craigslist etc? Word of mouth? 
• [If they mention Section 8]: Do you leave listings at the Section 8 office downtown? 
• What sort of qualification process do they go through? 
 
 
6. How often do you have trouble filling your units? 
• Why do you think this is?  
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• Does it happen in certain neighborhoods more than others? 
• When people come to you, what are they looking for? 
 
 
7. Tell me about the last time you interviewed (or spoke to on the phone) with someone who 
wanted to rent one of your units? 
• What were they like? (Age, race, family status, work status, etc) 
• Did you want them as a tenant? 
 
 
8. Can you think of a time you interviewed (or spoke to on the phone) with someone who wanted 
to rent one of your units, and you did not accept them? 
• What were they like? (Age, race, family status, work status, etc) 
• Why didn’t you want them as a tenant? 
 
 
9. Are some types of people “better” to rent to than others? 
• Families, single men, single women? 
• Younger people, older people? 
• Working, not working? Type of job? Students? 
• Some landlords I talk to say race matters… 
 
 
10. How do you feel about renting to families with section 8 vouchers? 
• What is your (or the owners you work for) preference?  
• Do you advertise specifically to this group? 
• What percentage of your tenants end up being voucher holders? 
• Has this changed over time? 
• Does it vary between your different properties? 
 
 
11. How many of your properties are occupied by tenants with vouchers? 
 
 
12. How do the section 8 rules work for you? 
• Walk me the through the process and how it is different from market tenants 
• How and when are you paid? 
• What if a tenant doesn’t pay their portion? 
 
 
13. It sounds like renting to a family with a voucher provides assurance that you will get the rent on 
time – but some landlords tell me there a tradeoff here – what do you think? 
 
 
14. Do you (or the owners you rent for) renovate with section 8 tenants in mind? How is this 
different? 
 
 
15. Are Section 8 tenants different from other tenants? 
• Differences in how many people live in the apartment? 
  238 
• Differences in how they care for the apartment? 
• Differences in how long they stay? 
 
 
16. Tell me about the Section 8 inspections. 
• How often do they come? 
• What do they check? 
• What sorts of things have your properties been cited with? 
• Have any of your properties ever failed inspection? 
• Does it help if you get to know the inspectors? 
• Is it ever possible to strike a deal with them / get them off your back? 
• How are these inspections for you? 
• Can you tell me about the last time you had an apartment inspected…what happened? 
 
 
17. What about repairs – how do these get done? 
• Do you do these yourself or hire someone? 
• What are the most common types of repairs? 
• Do tenants ever ask for repairs? What are their most common complaints? 
 
 
18. What about Pest Control? Tell me more about this. 
• Do you have problems with mice/rats? 
• Cockroaches? 
• Bedbugs? 
• Other? 
• Have any of the apartments you own had these problems? 
• What causes pest problems? 
 
 
19. How much does it cost to maintain a building like this? So how do you make ends meet? 
• Are you still paying off your mortgage? 
• How much is left over after you pay your mortgage? 
• What sorts of unexpected expenses pop up? 
 
 
20. Tell me about what you consider to be the tenant’s responsibilities? 
• What guidelines do you set out with the tenant (informally or in the lease)? 
• Cleanliness? (floors? Walls? Appliances?) 
• Pest control? 
 
 
21. Can you think of a time when you had trouble with a tenant? What did you do? 
• Didn’t pay rent? 
• Caused property damage? 
• Made too much noise? 
• Had non-leasing holding adults living in the house? 
• Drugs? Committed a violent crime? 
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22. Do tenants generally pay their rent on time? 
• How do you deal with those who don’t? 
• Are there ways to fight back? 
 
 
23. Have you ever had to evict someone?  
• Let’s talk about each time this happened, tell me the whole story. 
• Is it different for tenants with vouchers than for market tenants? 
 
 
24. How about drugs in the apartment? 
• Has this ever been a problem for you? 
• Tell me the whole story. 
 
 
25. What are the neighborhoods like where you own property? 
• What kinds of people live there? 
• Have you seen the neighborhood change over time? 
 
 
26. Would you (or have you) ever lived in any of the properties that you own? 
• Why/ why not? 
 
 
PARK HEIGHTS NEIGHBORHOOD: 
Now let’s talk a bit about the [Park Heights] Neighborhood (or the neighborhood they own in). 
[this may be more or less applicable depending on how well they know the neighborhood]. 
 
27. What about Park Heights more specifically… 
• Do you spend much time in the neighborhood? 
• Restaurants, stores, etc? 
• Do you walk around, drive, or take public transportation? 
• Are there places that you avoid? 
• What are the best areas to own property? 
• Is there an area in the neighborhood where you would not buy property? 
• What did you know/ hear/ think about the neighborhood before you came here? 
 
 
28. Tell me about the people in this neighborhood. What kind of people live here? 
• Do you know any of them? What are they like? 
• Race/ethnicity (white/black/Hispanic), age, friendly/not friendly 
• Do you spend time with them? How? 
• Do most kids around here graduate from high school? Go to college? 
• How are you similar or different from the people here? 
• How is this different or similar to other neighborhoods you have lived in? 
 
  
29. From your perspective, what are the top three challenges that residents face here? 
  240 
• Housing? 
• Drugs? 
• Crime/incarceration? 
 
 
30. What do you think it’s like for children to grow up in this neighborhood? 
• Do you see many kids around? 
• Who are they? 
• Are there circumstances under which you would intervene? 
 
 
31. What do you hear about crime in the neighborhood? 
 
 
32. What do you hear about drugs in the neighborhood? 
 
 
33. Have you ever witnessed a crime here yourself? Have you ever been the victim of a crime? 
 
 
34. How about gang activity? 
 
 
35. Do you see the police around much? What do you think of them? 
• Are they around when people need them? 
• Is corruption a problem? 
 
 
36. Under what circumstances would you call the police? 
 
 
37. Have you ever called the police? 
 
 
38. What about those blue flashing lights? 
 
 
39. How would you compare Park Heights to other neighborhoods you own property in? 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
40. Tell me more about where you live now. What is your current neighborhood like? 
• How long have you lived there? 
• What is it like to live there (best/worst things)?  
• Do you own or rent? How affordable is it? 
• How is it for raising kids? 
• Do you feel safe? Is crime? Are alcohol or drugs a problem? Change over time? Why? 
• Are you close to your neighbors? Can you count on them?  
• Do you think you will stay?  Why? Where do you imagine yourself to be in one year? 
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41. Tell me about bit about who’s in your family. 
• Who lives with you? 
• Married?  
• Kids? Ages? 
• Anyone in the family help you out with landlord duties? 
 
 
42. How about other jobs you’ve had in the past? 
• Other jobs you’ve had? 
•  What was your best job? Worst job? 
•  How does this compare? 
 
 
43. Tell me about your education. 
• High school degree? Job training? College classes? Other degrees? 
• Did any of your education prepare you to be a landlord? 
 
 
44. Do you plan to buy more properties? 
 
 
45. Do you plan to sell any of your properties? 
 
 
46. What is the most difficult thing about being a landlord? 
 
 
47. Overall, how would you rate it as a job? 
 
 
